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This dissertation examines a group of American men who adopted and adapted notions of
American power for humanitarian ends in German-occupied Belgium with the Commission for
Relief in Belgium (CRB) during World War I. The CRB, led by Herbert Hoover, controlled the
importation of relief goods and provided supervision of the Belgian-led relief distribution. The
young, college-educated American men who volunteered for this relief work between 1914 and
1917 constructed an effective and efficient humanitarian space for themselves by drawing not
only on the power of their neutral American citizenship, but on their collectively understood
American-ness as able, active, yet responsible young men serving abroad, thereby developing an
alternative tool—the use of humanitarian aid—for the use and projection of American power in
the early twentieth century.
Drawing on their letters, diaries, recollections as well as their official reports on their
work and the situation in Belgium, this dissertation argues that the early twentieth century
formation of what we today understand to be non-state, international humanitarianism was
partially established by Americans exercising explicit and implicit national power during the
years of American neutrality in World War I. Many of these Americans, Hoover and Maurice
Pate, for example, would go on to serve in future humanitarian missions and, in the case of Pate,
would even lead an international, non-state, non-governmental organization, UNICEF. The CRB
was an early proving ground for a new kind of American influence in the world.
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Introduction
“With a few rough-and-ready clothes such as one takes for a few weeks’ outing in the
country,” wrote Francis Wickes, some 150 American men went to Belgium and northern France
to work for the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) during the early years of World War I.1
They were college-educated, professional men who came from all over the United States to serve
as delegates of the CRB. They worked all across Belgium during the German occupation and
British blockade. The CRB was unique: it held a monopoly on the importation and supervision of
relief goods in Belgium through special arrangements with both the British government (to let
food through the British blockade) and the German occupation authorities (to allow neutral
Americans entrance into the Occupation and Army Zones).2 It was not formally associated with
the American government, though it did have a special relationship with numerous high-level
American diplomats in Belgium, France, Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands. It also had
relationships with Spanish and Dutch officials stationed in Brussels. While it was an early nongovernmental organization and nominally international, it was very much an American project.
The CRB’s staff drew on the implicit and sometimes explicit power of the United States to
1

Francis Cogswell Wickes, “The American Delegate in Belgium,” in The Public Relations of
The Commission for Relief in Belgium: Documents, Volume I, ed. George I. Gay and H. H.
Fisher (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1929), 478. (PR CRB I) This “150” number
represents the approximate number of American volunteers who served in Belgium as delegates.
There was a paid clerical and accounting staff, but they are not addressed in this study, nor are
those who worked in CRB offices in Rotterdam, London, or New York except where explicitly
noted. Over the course of the CRB’s existence the term “delegate” was replaced with
“representative.” For the sake of consistency, I have chosen to refer to the men who worked in
Belgium by their original title of “delegate.” See the appendix to Herbert Hoover, An American
Epic, Volume 1 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959), 455-461 for a list of all the
volunteers and their dates of service.
2

For the CRB’s relationship with other relief organizations seeking to work in Belgium, see
Branden Little, “Band of Crusaders: American Humanitarians, the Great War, and the Remaking
of the World” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2009).
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maintain their status in Belgium, make their work effective, and create an identity for themselves
as delegates and agents of American power while they lived and worked far from home in a wartorn country, sometimes for six months or longer. They were “Americans abroad” (in Europe) at
a time when the United States was both emerging as a world power and trying to remain above
the fray of Old World political and military disputes. Their work was an early example of not
only deeper American involvement with the wider world in the twentieth century, but also an
example of a potential alternative for how the United States could engage the world, through
non-state, independent, yet American-led relief work.
Herbert C. Hoover led the CRB as its chairman. A successful mining engineer before
taking the helm of the CRB, Hoover’s staff called him “the Chief,” and he oversaw the operation
from his office in London, while delegating much of the on-the-ground work to young men like
Wickes, a recent graduate of Williams College. Though Wickes wrote of a “rough and ready”
atmosphere, the Americans were often the privileged guests of the Belgians, often living with
them in their homes, dining with them frequently, and often acting as witnesses and spectators to
the first great European war of the twentieth century. They detailed their experiences in their
diaries, letters, and postwar accounts of their service.3 Like later groups of American men
involved in U.S. foreign relations—such as the men in the diplomatic corps and those who
served in the national security circle surrounding Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Harry S.
Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy—the CRB’s staff developed a powerful
identity and ethos through their common backgrounds, assumptions about American power and
3

On how these Americans were witnesses and spectators see Thomas D. Westerman, “Touring
Occupied Belgium: American Humanitarians at ‘Work’ and ‘Leisure’ (1914-1917),” First World
War Studies 5, no. 1 (March 2014): 43-53. For more on varied personal experiences during
World War I, see, for example, J. M. Winter, The Experience of World War I (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989); Janet S. K. Watson, Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and
the First World War in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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position in the world, and activities.4 In doing so, they created a fairly homogenous staff and set
of alumni who would go on to conduct future relief and recovery efforts around the world after
World War I.
The work the Americans did between 1914 and 1917 was difficult, and the conditions
were not optimal, requiring improvisation and flexibility. The CRB recruited men who were well
educated with professional careers ahead of them. After the war, for example, Wickes studied
law and became a lawyer.5 The very first group of delegates was made up of American students
from Oxford University, some of whom were Rhodes Scholars. Later the CRB volunteers came
from some of the best universities in the United States: Harvard, Princeton, and Stanford, for
example. The CRB’s leadership viewed the educational and social background of the delegates
as powerful markers of their suitability to the relief work in Belgium. They were “intelligent
thinkers with a practical turn of mind” who had “an ingrained quality of adaptability, accustomed
to independence and initiative.”6 They marked themselves out not only as well qualified for the
task at hand, but as exemplars of American leadership and influence. While Europe collapsed
into chaos and crisis, they would come across the Atlantic Ocean to carve out a space where
some safety and security could be maintained for the Belgian people.
For the CRB delegates, this American-ness was central to their identity, experience, and
work in Belgium. By American-ness I mean something more than just their status as American
4

See Robert Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001); John Garry Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers:
The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1972); Martin Weil, A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978).
5

Wickes, interview by John Niven and Enid Douglass, 1 March 1967, transcript, Oral History
Program, Claremont Graduate School Library, Claremont, CA.
6

Wickes, “The American Delegate,” PR CRB I, 480.
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citizens, though that was important. Without their legal neutrality as citizens of a neutral country
with the implicit power of the United States behind them, they would not have been allowed
through the British blockade and allowed to remain in German-occupied Belgium. By Americanness I mean their cultural and social background as a certain “type” of American man—indeed
Anglo-Saxon man—as popularized by men like Theodore Roosevelt, and organizations like the
Boy Scouts and the Rhodes Scholarship.7 As the United States came into its own on the world
stage after the War of 1898, it was competing with established powers like Great Britain, France,
and Germany, for a prominent place in the international system. Assumptions about American
Exceptionalism, however, meant the United States could seek different ways to present itself as a
new kind of world power, even as it took colonial possessions in the Pacific Ocean and
Caribbean. An American-organized and American-run humanitarian mission to Europe—while
Europe tore itself apart—could strengthen the idea that American power was different from that
of the older European powers, but just as necessary and legitimate. A humanitarian effort—that
is, an effort that seeks to help another person or group without linking that help to anything other
than a common humanity and respect for the other—could be a new and powerful tool for
7

See Stuart Anderson, Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American
Relations, 1895-1904 (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981); Kirsten L.
Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the SpanishAmerican and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Gail
Bederman, Manliness & Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United
States, 1880-1917 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Nicoletta Gullace, “The
Blood of Our Sons”: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship During the
Great War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Sarah Watts, Rough Rider in the White
House: Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of Desire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2003); Michael Rosenthal, The Character Factory: Baden-Powell and the Origins of the Boy
Scout Movement (London: Pantheon, 1986); David I. Macleod, Building Character in the
American Boy: The Boy Scouts, the YMCA, and their Forerunners, 1870-1920 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1983); David Alexander, “The American Scholarships,” in The
History of the Rhodes Trust, 1902-1999 ed. Anthony Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), 100-202; Thomas J. Schaeper and Kathleen Schaeper, Cowboys into Gentlemen: Rhodes
Scholars, Oxford, and the Creation of an American Elite (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998).

4

Americans to represent and project their country’s power abroad, especially in Europe. This
challenged the notion, held since the articulation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, that the United
States would not involve itself in the affairs of European nations.8 The CRB represents an
example of this approach in practice.
This muscular American-ness was tempered, however, by another strain of cultural
norms represented by the restraint and deliberateness evidenced in President Woodrow Wilson’s
call for neutrality by Americans at the outbreak of the war and his eventual, if unsuccessful,
proposals for peace and a new legalistic world order.9 While Roosevelt was a vocal advocate for
preparedness (and, indeed, entrance into the war on the side of the Britain and France), Wilson
sought an alternative.10 He hoped to be an honest broker, and thus the United States had to stay
out of the fighting. The American delegates in Belgium melded these two seemingly conflicting
approaches in their humanitarian activities and created their own alternative approach: they were
mobilized, engaged, and ready for action; but by putting their political neutrality to work for
humanitarian ends, they stood apart from the grand questions of war and peace, and focused on

8

For a very brief discussion of the Monroe Doctrine, see
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe
9

For more on Wilsonianism and neutrality issues, see Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism:
Woodrow Wilson in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Thomas J.
Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992); Robert W. Tucker, Woodrow Wilson and the Great War:
Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914-1917 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
2007); Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins
of Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). On new ideas of law and
U.S. foreign relations at this time, see Benjamin A. Coates, “Transatlantic Advocates: American
International Law and U.S. Foreign Relations, 1898-1919,” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University,
2010).
10

On the Preparedness Movement in the United States, see Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers and
Michael Pearlman, To Make Democracy Safe for America: Patricians and Preparedness in the
Progressive Era (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984).
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the narrow problem of the food crisis in Belgium. Though they stood in Belgium as neutrals,
they were American neutrals, bringing with them and acting upon deeply held values as a certain
type of early twentieth century American man, acting as agents of expanding American power
and influence in the world.11
The Belgians were in need, and the Americans wanted to help. The desire and ability to
help Belgium and the Belgians was rooted in the Americans’ deeply held, privileged values of
American mission and power.12 As agents of humanitarian relief, they were also new agents of
American power in the twentieth century. They constructed a humanitarian world for themselves
out of the familiar context of their understanding of their place in an American-influenced world
and what was possible for the United States to accomplish. They heralded the influential
American publisher Henry Luce’s call in 1941 for the United States to act as “the Good
Samaritan of the entire world.” “It is,” Luce wrote in “The American Century” in his own Life
Magazine, “the manifest duty of this country to undertake to feed all the people of the world.”13
Since the CRB was wholly independent of any previous humanitarian agency, religious
organization, or national-based aid program, it allowed for its members to shape their identity at
this particularly important and dynamic moment of 1914-1917. Unlike the American ambulance
drivers or members of the American Red Cross, the CRB delegates were not attached to specific

11

For a summary of the development of how American power expanded both actually and
intellectually and notions of American Exceptionalism, see Anders Stephanson, Manifest
Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).
12

See Ibid.

13

Henry Luce, “The American Century,” Diplomatic History 22, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 170.
Originally published in Life Magazine on 17 February 1941.
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fighting units or chartered by the United States government.14 Their charge was to help a nonAmerican civilian population living under a foreign occupation. The CRB delegates were able to
create their organization and conduct their affairs independent of any potentially limiting
national political agenda, but still utilize the power of United States neutrality and the emerging
consensus among American political elites that the United States was destined for greatness on
the world stage.15 The CRB was, then, a vehicle for expression of that kind of power.
Since it was in the first two decades of the twentieth century that the United States took
its first steps onto the world stage and, especially, into Europe, the CRB is a particularly
powerful and important vehicle with which to explore how American power was expressed by
those who adopted and adapted it for humanitarian outcomes. While Belgium was of no strategic
value to the United States at the time, it was of international moral and ideological importance in
the World War I era.16 The work the American men undertook in Belgium was an early example
of later American-led relief, recovery, and development programs after World War II and during
the Cold War.17 The idea that the United States could feed the world—actually or through
controlling the logistics—aided in the nation's movement toward greater influence, not just as an
14

Arlen J. Hansen, Gentlemen Volunteers: The Story of the American Ambulance Drivers in the
Great War, August 1914-September 1918 (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1996); Julia F. Irwin,
Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
15

Stephanson, Manifest Destiny, chapter III.

16

See Sophie de Schaepdrijver, “Champion or Stillbirth? The Symbolic Uses of Belgium in the
Great War,” in How Can One Not Be Interested in Belgian History: War, Language, and
Consensus in Belgium since 1830 (Dublin and Gent: Trinity College and Academia Press, 2005).
17

On the role the United States played in later twentieth century international development,
modernization, and famine relief that can trace its origins to earlier developments in American
led humanitarianism, see David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the
Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Nick
Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2010).

7

international policeman, but as a large-scale welfare administrator or, as the historian Branden
Little has noted, the world’s “fireman.”18
This dissertation, which is divided into four chapters, argues that these Americans used
their national identity and notions of American power for a humanitarian purpose, fostering a
new outlet for American involvement in the world just as the United States was embarking on a
“humanitarian awakening” as noted by the historian Julia Irwin.19 The CRB was part of that
process, and many members of the CRB went on to do further humanitarian work. Maurice Pate,
for example, who served with the CRB in 1916, later became the first director of UNICEF.
Chapter One argues that Belgium was a useful site for Americans to begin their
international humanitarian work. It was useful because although it was a war-ravaged country, it
had been (and would again be) a modern, industrial state. This put it in a unique category,
making it capable of participating in its own amelioration, but still in need of American help. It
was, therefore, a particularly safe site for new American ventures into international
humanitarianism. Chapter Two argues that the CRB delegates came from relatively privileged
backgrounds, and many of them were supported by a network of associates who supported a
more active place in the world both for Americans as individuals and the United States as a
nation. These were the kinds of people who set the stage for a path of greater international and
humanitarian intervention that the United States would follow in the twentieth century. Chapter
Three, using a representative sample of delegates’ experiences, argues that while the Americans
attempted to be neutral and dispassionate agents of relief, and saw this superior status as an

18

Branden Little, “An Explosion of New Endeavors: Global Humanitarian Responses to
Industrialized Warfare in the First World War Era,” First World War Studies 5, no. 1 (March
2014): 3.
19

Irwin, Making the World Safe.
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inherent part of their standing as Americans, they were not immune to the visceral experiences of
being in a war zone. This dilemma, of course, has continued to complicate the position of NGOs
ever since.20 Lastly, Chapter Four argues that though the CRB had a great deal of power and
clout in Belgium, it was still not without limitations, and the respect it was accorded could vary
considerably. Part of this chapter is organized geographically to show how individual Americans
could often work independently and had to exercise their own judgment in order to balance the
needs of individual Belgians possibly destined for labor camps in Germany against the larger
work of the relief effort. Humanitarian goals, the new American actors were finding out, could
be mutually exclusive, and require difficult decisions even for those who only wanted to do what
was best for those whom they had come to help. Once United States neutrality in the war ended,
however, so did their place as humanitarians in Belgium. No matter how important or developed
their status as non-state actors was, their connection by way of their citizenship to the American
state was a powerful factor that in the early years benefited the work, but later forced them to
leave. Few, however, abandoned their self-identification as agents of American humanitarian
power, and many continued to work with international relief projects after the war and into the
later half of the twentieth century.21
Recently, historians have begun to not only look at the lives and experiences of new
groups who served with or assisted with war making, but also to examine those people who have
tried to prevent or minimize the suffering associated with war and violence, often through
20

A portion of this chapter, especially the part dealing with the spectating activities of the
delegates, was previously published as “Touring Occupied Belgium: American Humanitarians at
‘Work’ and ‘Leisure’ (1914-1917) in the March 2014 issue of First World War Studies, and is
adapted here with permission from the publisher, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. See
Westerman, “Touring Occupied Belgium,” 43-53.
21

Hal Wert, “Hoovermen: Working with ‘The Chief’ for Polish and Finnish Relief, 1939-1941,”
(unpublished manuscript), in author’s possession.
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organized humanitarianism.22 This dissertation and the story of the CRB contribute to this new
scholarship by taking an in-depth look at one such organization and its staff to see how national
background and lived experience can influence humanitarian work, especially when the group or
groups being helped have no national or experiential connection to the helpers. I argue that the
cultural values and national background of a humanitarian group—no matter how independent of
a nation-state or avowedly international—has a profound influence on the ways in which it
organizes itself and operates.
This dissertation also intersects with scholarship that investigates new ways the United
States and Americans engaged with the world beyond traditional military, political, and
diplomatic efforts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and especially how
“Americans abroad” acted as agents of American power through their travel and interaction with
citizens of other nations.23 With the outbreak of the war came opportunities for new forms of
22

Gary Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: Knoph,
2008); Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire,
1815-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Tammy M. Proctor, Civilians in a
World at War, 1914-1918 (New York: New York University Press, 2010); Keith David
Watenpaugh, “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors and the Making
of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920-1927,” American Historical Review 115, no. 5 (December
2010): 1315-1339; Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2011); “Special Issue: Humanitarianism in the Era of the First World
War,” ed. Branden Little First World War Studies 5 no. 1 (March 2014); Little, “Band of
Crusaders”; Michael McGuire, “An Ephemeral Relationship: American Non-Governmental
Organizations, the Reconstruction of France, and Franco-American Relations, 1914-1924, (Ph.D.
diss., Boston University, 2012); Jennifer Polk, “Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross
and YMCA in Revolutionary and Civil War Russia, 1917-1924,” (Ph.D. diss., University of
Toronto, 2012); Melanie Tanielian, “The War of Famine: Everyday Life in Wartime Beirut and
Mount Lebanon, 1914-1918,” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2012).
23

For the most recent broad synthesis of U.S. foreign relations history, see George Herring,
From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008). For more targeted discussions of new forms of U.S. power in the early twentieth
century, see Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural
Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1988); Emily Rosenberg,
Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New
10

civic engagement and service on the part of Americans. 24 Civic and, indeed, international
engagement for charity, philanthropy, and peace were not new for the United States and
Americans before 1914, but the size and scope of twentieth century philanthropy was. 25
Although most participants had no prior experience in humanitarian work, their background as
good, volunteer-minded men from the middle and upper classes enabled them to bring a
Progressive Era and professional scientific rationalization to their work with the CRB.26 At times
they may have approached their work a little too innocently. This avowed rational approach,
however, could often be challenged by emotional attachments and reactions to specific situations
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in which the Americans found themselves as well as when confronting the particular problems of
local politics and the German occupation government.27
And today, with the centenary of World War I upon us, new works reevaluating the
causes and meaning of World War I are being published.28 While the armies of the great
European powers were doing their best to destroy one and other, this group of Americans went to
Europe to create a sense of safety and security for the Belgian people until such a time as the
governments of the war’s participants could see fit to end the war, with or without the aid of
President Wilson in an “honest broker” role. The first great war of the twentieth century did not
just break up the old world order; it also set the stage for a new international humanitarian
regime, in which the CRB was one early player and the United States would have a large role in
shaping after World War I and later in the century.29
The humanitarian tradition is a long one, as Michael Barnett outlines in his history of
humanitarianism. He demonstrates convincingly that humanitarianism and human rights are
related (“cousins”) but “over the decades they have had distinct meanings.” 30 For this
dissertation, I adopt his definition of humanitarianism and accept his differentiation of it from
human rights: “Human rights typically focuses on the long-term goal of eliminating the causes of
27

For more on the role of emotion in foreign relations history, see Andrew Rotter, “Empire of
the Senses: How Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching Shaped Imperial
Encounters,” Diplomatic History 35 (January 2011): 3-19.
28

See, for instance, Margaret Macmillan, The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914 (New
York: Random House, 2013); Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in
1914 (New York: HarperCollins, 2013).
29

For what World War I bore in terms of new humanitarianism, see Watenpaugh, “The League
of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors.” On the role Americans, including
Hoover, played in post-World War I relief see, for example, MacMillan, Paris 1919 (New York:
Random House, 2001).
30

Barnett, Empire of Humanity, 16.

12

suffering, humanitarianism on the urgent goal of keeping people alive.”31 This distinction is
important for this dissertation, especially in Chapter Four where I discuss a dilemma the
American humanitarians confronted; they had to choose whether to work to stop illegal
deportations (a human rights violation) and risk their larger mission, or to allow the deportations
to continue, while serving as witnesses and saving those they could, but keeping the larger work
alive for the sake of the majority of Belgians who still needed food relief. These questions plague
present day humanitarianism as well.
Unlike previous foreign relief or philanthropic missions in which Americans participated,
the CRB effort was not motivated by religion (missionaries, YMCA) or ethnicity (Irish
immigrants and the Great Hunger in Ireland) or politics (the debate over intervention in Greek
Revolution in the 1820s) or military adventure (Cuba during the War of 1898).32 The sense of
American mission and purpose, however, was strong, even acting as a form of civil religion.33
By virtue of the situation the CRB entered into—a great world war—and through effective use of
publicity, often through the writings and lectures by American delegates themselves, the CRB
was a prime early example of a modern-day humanitarian organization—more so even than
better known organizations like the American Red Cross. Though the American Red Cross
existed, it was closely associated with the U.S. state, having received its charter from Congress.34
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The CRB more closely fit what historian Akira Iriye has categorized as a “voluntary nonstate, non-profit, non-religious, and non-military association.”35 He argues that international nongovernmental organizations are part of a de facto “third space” between the private (individual)
and the state (national group or government) and are not “restricted to certain categories of
people, whether nationality, gender, religion, class, region, or any other division.”36 The CRB
was nominally international—with Dutch and Spanish diplomatic officials serving as honorary
chairmen and even managing the CRB in Belgium after April 1917 until it was returned to
American control after the armistice—but it was thoroughly American in its conception,
management, and institutional identity. While Hoover at first wanted it to be only American, he
decided to add an international component. Hoover explained after the war:
Our original idea was to make the Commission wholly American. However, within a few
days we realized the organization would be stronger if we had patronage of the Spanish
Ambassadors in London, Paris, and Berlin, the Spanish Minister in Brussels….We
eliminated the word ‘American’ from our title….We also received the assurance of every
assistance from the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, through whose country our
supplies would have to pass….The Spanish and Dutch officials were to prove
invaluable.37
The supplies shipped to Belgium had to go through the Netherlands, so having Dutch
representation on the CRB’s masthead made perfect sense. The primary Spanish official, Le
Marquis de Villalobar, was the one Hoover would turn to when the CRB had to “make more
headway with the Germans…[and] he was devoted to the Relief and after the United States
joined the war became our major support in Belgium.”38 The other international patrons were
35
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Alfonso Merry del Val y Zulueta, Spanish Ambassador to Britain; Luis Polo de Bernabé, Spanish
Ambassador to Germany; Le Marquis de Villalobar, Spanish Minister to Belgium; Jonkheer De
Weede, Dutch Minister to Belgium; and Johan Loudon, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs.
This international cooperation was necessary for the American organization to work properly,
but at its core it was an American project. Being non-state does not necessarily make an
organization non-national.
Though the CRB was non-governmental, it operated with the support of American
diplomatic officials in Europe. Brand Whitlock, Walter Hines Page, James W. Gerard, and Henry
van Dyke were the U.S. officials affiliated with the CRB. Whitlock was the U.S. minister to
Belgium; Page, the U.S. ambassador in Britain; Gerard, the U.S. ambassador to Germany; and
van Dyke was the U.S. minister to the Netherlands. All four were honorary chairmen of the CRB,
and Hoover often called on their good services to help him and the CRB out of problems,
especially with suspicious elements within the British and German governments in order to keep
the CRB operating with as much ease and security in its position as possible.
The Belgians readily accepted the CRB’s American identity. During and after the war,
the Belgian people knew exactly whom they wanted to thank for the help: the Americans. The
Belgians did so in many ways, including embroidering flour sacks with gratitude to the United
States, represented by inclusion of American flags stitched into the fabric.39 After the war,
Belgians named streets and squares after Hoover in honor and gratitude for his service with the
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CRB. There is a bust of Hoover at the library in Louvain and a plaque honoring him at the Free
University of Brussels.40
Previous studies of the CRB have either focused on its instructional and organizational
importance or on its singular leader: Herbert Hoover.41 In contrast, this dissertation is a cultural
study of how the CRB delegates created a humanitarian identity for themselves based on their
national cultural background as Americans and their experiences in Belgium, and helped develop
a new way for the United States and Americans to engage with the wider world. Though the
group is a small one and the intense work of the American staff only lasted from 1914-1917, the
scale and scope of the work was immense.
Hoover, with the blessings of British, German, and Belgian officials, organized the CRB
in London on 22 October 1914. During its operation—which extended beyond exclusive
American control after April 1917—the CRB imported 5,174,431 tons of supplies, of which
3,894,941 tons went to Belgium. The rest went to Northern France. The majority of that was for
wheat, barley, and rye. But bacon, maize (corn), rice, beans, cocoa, coffee, soap, and sugar
among other goods were also imported. Importing these supplies was dangerous: 52 cargobearing vessels were torpedoed, mined, or otherwise damaged in the course of their sailing.
Thirty-eight ships were lost, and fourteen were damaged. All told, 114,000 tons of cargo was lost
at sea. The CRB ran 134 warehouses in 2,598 Belgian communes (the smallest municipalities in
40
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Belgium) providing help to some 7,000,000 Belgians in a country about the size of the U.S. state
of Pennsylvania.42 About 500 Americans all told were involved with the CRB’s work, including
paid clerical and accounting staff members, who worked primarily in London, New York, and
Rotterdam, the importation port for CRB relief goods. At any one time about 55 Americans were
serving with the CRB in Belgium. About 40,000 Belgians worked for either the CRB or for their
Belgian partners, the Comité National de Secours et d’Alimentation (CNSA).43 (The CNSA is
discussed in more depth in Chapter One.)
Many governments provided generous subsidies: The United States provided
$386,632,260.44; the British $109,045,328.73; the French $204,862,854.21 for a total of
$700,540,443.38. Add to that many charitable donations from all over the world
($52,290,795.51) and other income from Commission-run exchanges, interest, and other sources
the total income of the CRB was $930,518,276.93. At the end of the CRB’s work, a surplus of
some $38,000,000 remained. Some $33,000,000 of that went to Belgium, primarily as gifts to
various Belgian universities. One organization was created directly as a result of the CRB’s
largess: the CRB Educational Foundation, which, in 1938, was renamed the Belgian American
Educational Foundation (BAEF). The BAEF has facilitated study in the U.S. for hundreds of
notable Belgians and has allowed many Americans to study in Belgium. (I was a grateful
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recipient of a BAEF Fellowship to conduct research in the Belgian State Archives.) The CRB’s
overhead was less than one percent of the CRB’s operations.44
Hoover’s leadership of the CRB cannot be overestimated. He was the central figure
around which the organization revolved, and in later years those who worked for him remained
steadfast in their admiration. His word was law, and his work with the CRB launched his second
career as a public figure in the United States. While Nash’s monumental multivolume biography
of Hoover is the best reference, other historians have looked at Hoover’s interesting character,
such as Hal Wert in Hoover: The Fishing President and Joan Hoff Wilson in Herbert Hoover:
Forgotten Progressive.45 Both of whom look at Hoover from perspectives that challenge the
common knowledge of the Hoover of Great Depression “Hooverville” fame.
Herbert Clark Hoover was born on 10 August 1874 in West Branch, Iowa to Quaker
parents. Hoover was not a particularly religious man, but he was imbued with Quaker values
growing up. His parents died when he was nine years old, and an uncle in Newberg, Oregon took
him in. Hoover studied at the Friends Pacific Academy (now George Fox University) and
eventually joined the inaugural class of the new Leland Stanford Junior University in 1891.46 He
graduated from Stanford in 1895 with a degree in geology and began an engineering career.
While at Stanford, Hoover met his future wife, Lou Henry. Henry entered Stanford in 1894 as
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the school’s only female geology major and she became an important part of Hoover’s future
careers in both mining and humanitarianism; they co-translated a classic Latin text on mining,
De re metalica, and Lou Henry Hoover became a strident advocate for the CRB’s work. They
married in 1899.
In the years between his graduation and marriage, Hoover worked in Australia; once he
and Lou Henry married, they went to China (where they were present for the Boxer Rebellion),
and finally to London. During these twenty years, Hoover established himself as a successful
mining engineer, well respected by those in his professional community.47 By the outbreak of
World War I his gross personal worth from his mining career and investments could have been
as high as $30,000,000.48 Not only did his professional career put him in a position to lead
Belgian relief, through it he also met the man who would be his Belgian counterpart—Emile
Francqui—when the two were in China at the same time. As a man of independent wealth,
Hoover was well positioned to take on the unpaid responsibility of running the relief effort.
Once the United States entered World War I, President Wilson asked Hoover to lead the
newly formed Food Administration and help the United States develop a food conservation
program. After the war he led the relief effort to Europe and headed up the American Relief
Administration (ARA) during his time with the Commerce Department where he was secretary
under both Presidents Harding (1921-1923) and Coolidge (1923-1929). According to the Hoover
Presidential Library, Hoover’s contemporaries said he was “secretary of commerce and under
secretary of everything else” because of his propensity to meddle in the affairs of other
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departments.49 His background in extreme emergencies led Hoover to continue to play important
roles in relief projects in the United States, such as in the Mississippi Flood of 1927.
His election as president in 1928 was the culmination of hard work and patience, but the
stock market crash, the resulting Great Depression, and the wide perception of his
administration’s ineffective response to the financial and human disaster doomed his presidency
and his memory by the American people. 50 Hoover was a talented, if aloof, technocratic
professional, rather than a warm-hearted politician. Even his management of the CRB was from
a distance. It was others—the delegates—who were charged with the hands-on effort to help in
need Belgians. Hoover made sure the Americans in Belgium had everything they needed to be
effective, but he himself did not live and work among them.
Hoover alternately spent the next thirty years of his life in resentment of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, but also as an active proponent of humanitarian efforts by the United States around
the world and he traded on his Belgian experience, even as he was often blamed for the
Depression.51 After Germany invaded Poland in 1939, he organized a relief commission on a
49
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much smaller scale than the CRB that included some of his former CRB colleagues, such as
Maurice Pate. Hoover toured post-World War II Germany at the request of President Truman to
assess that defeated country’s food needs. Hoover died in 1964. In the aftermath of World War I,
the Belgian government gifted Hoover a statue of Isis, the Egyptian goddess of life, representing
their thanks for the work he did giving Belgium life during the war. It stands to this day outside
his Presidential Library in West Branch, Iowa.52
This powerful connection between Hoover, the CRB, its delegates, and Belgium is why
this dissertation focuses almost exclusively on the delegates’ activities within Belgium and not
with the work it did in Northern France. By early 1915 it was clear that Northern France, in a
closely monitored German Army Zone, needed similar help to what was being offered in the
Occupation Zone of Belgium and work was extended there. Many delegates moved across the
Belgian and French border to work in the different regions, but the vast majority worked in
Belgium, and their experiences were informed by that particular national connection. Northern
France was under a much stronger and stricter military government during the war. The
Americans who worked there had much less freedom of movement than they did in Belgium, and
the relief effort is much more closely associated with American-Belgian relations. For these
reasons, the effort in Northern France is left out of this study.53
For the sake of consistency, the French names for locations are used throughout. Today
the language politics of Belgium are complicated and fraught. At the time of the First World War,
French was the official language of the State. I have also Americanized the spelling of words in
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quotations so translations from French and the delegates’ own words are consistent within the
narrative.
The Americans’ work in Belgium is the focal point of this project. To get at their story,
this dissertation privileges their letters, diaries, oral histories, and, for some, published and
unpublished personal narrative accounts of their time in Belgium. As the literature scholar James
Dawes notes, “storytelling is the very nature of the work” of humanitarians and human rights
workers.54 Through these personal accounts, this dissertation can help us better understand the
origins of American involvement with organized, sustained, humanitarian work in the twentieth
century. As the United States began to emerge as a world power, it often sought different ways to
wield its influence than what European powers had traditionally done, even as the United States
expanded its colonial footprint overseas. The humanitarian work of the CRB in Europe was
another projection of American power. It used food, not arms, to make an impression. The
Americans abroad in Belgian acted not as soldiers, but saw themselves as saviors. In later
decades, especially after World War II, the United States and Americans would play an even
greater role in the development of international NGOs and humanitarian organizations. The CRB
is one place to start to see how Americans became enamored with this kind of soft power and
could use it as a tool to keep the United States and Americans engaged with the world.
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Chapter 1
“A Primitive and Almost Medieval State”:
Belgium before, during, and after Invasion
David Nelson, an early CRB delegate who was studying in England when World War I
broke out, wrote home in the fall of 1914 to tell his parents about his plan to help provide
humanitarian assistance in Belgium. He wrote that Belgium was “in a terrible state of desolation,”
highlighting his (and others’) powerful emotional response to what had happened on the
Continent. Another delegate, Edward Hunt, who served from December 1914 to October 1916,
wrote soon after he left the CRB’s service that “[t]he superstructure of civilized society [in
Belgium] was stripped away” because of the German invasion and occupation. And, according to
Francis Wickes whose words would be included in the public and published records of the CRB
after the war: “[i]n those first days of the war the highly developed and largely industrialized
country of Belgium had been, without warning, reduced as it were to a primitive and almost
medieval state by the hostile military occupation.”1 In his memoirs, Herbert Hoover admitted
that he—like most of the world—thought the war would be over fairly quickly. “[N]one of us
thought that the war would last longer than until the next summer,” Hoover wrote: “Therefore, if
we could tide the Belgians over for eight months until the next harvest that would end the job.”2
Of course, the war was not over by Christmas or by the next summer. The CRB’s mandate was
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to keep Belgium adequately supplied until normalcy, structure, and peace returned; that turned
out to be a far longer charge than was anticipated, but the organization, if in changing forms,
continued its work until (and well beyond) the armistice that finally came in November 1918.
At the start of World War I, however, Belgium was a modern, industrial, state with
sufficient international standing to have its own colonial holdings. It was not at all a place of
desolation, but one that a New York Times writer, reviewing the travel book titled Belgium and
the Belgians by Cyril Scudamore, described as a lively and industrious place, with “excellent”
education and possibilities for the development of its “African State” (the Congo). The reviewer
also noted that “such [was] the industry of the Belgians that there [was] no suffering.”3 Belgium,
coming into existence only in 1830, was a young country, younger than the United States. The
New York Times reviewer quoted the author’s perspective on Belgium, as if to note the work the
Belgians still had to do to truly be a modern country: “Belgium is a young country, and one
which is now passing through a probationary period of storm and stress. From this she is likely to
emerge happily, if only she remembers in the future, as in the past, to act up to and to justify her
well-chosen motto, ‘L’union fait la force.’”4 Germany’s wartime invasion and occupation tested
that unity and strength, not only because of the difficult conditions related to being cut off from
trade and proper industrial production, but because of German policies which attempted to divide
the Flemish north from the Walloon south: a policy known as Flamenpolitik.
Belgium was (and still is) a complex country. Two distinct linguistic groups inhabit it:
the Flemish-speakers are in the north (Flanders) and the Francophone Walloons are in the south
(Wallonia). It was not a place many Americans thought much about before the outbreak of the
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war, but with war came great world-wide interest in Belgium through reports of the invasion and
the propaganda surrounding German actions during their army’s attempted quick march to Paris.

The Origin of the CRB
The CRB’s eventual chairman, Herbert Hoover, was in London when war broke out in
the summer of 1914. Unlike the thousands of Americans who left Europe to escape the war,
Hoover stayed in Europe and he helped organize a repatriation effort for stranded Americans
before working on the organization of the CRB.5 As reports of the dire situation in Belgium
made their way to London, Hoover became concerned: “This is not a question of charity or relief
to the chronically poor, it is the question of feeding an entire population. This situation affects
the rich and the well-to-do as well as the poor. It touches every home in Belgium.”6 It would be
up to America and Americans to provide the necessary aid. Americans were in a new and
particularly powerful position as neutrals, but also as citizens of a growing international power.
From the first days of the CRB’s existence, Hoover and his colleagues would draw on prevailing
conceptions of American-ness to create and sustain their successful humanitarian mission.
Hoover also worked hard to have the CRB recognized by the U.S., Britain, and Germany as the
only institution allowed to import foodstuffs into Belgium. He wanted—and for all intents and
purposes got—a monopoly in Belgium.7
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A group of Belgian elites, including Emile Francqui, was in London that fall calling on
the British government—and anyone who would listen—for help in their time of need. One
person who listened was Millard Shaler, another American mining engineer. Through a series of
connections, Hoover met Shaler who had been working with the Belgians. Hoover then met with
the American Ambassador in London, Walter Page, and got the okay to help the Belgians. Soon
after that meeting Hoover and the Belgians announced that the CRB would work with the
emerging centralized Belgian relief committee to import food and provide support. In a statement
to the American press, Hoover said that, “a stream of supplies must be started from America if
the Belgians are to be saved from famine.”8 That stream meant food, but it could also have meant
the staff necessary to supervise the imports and live and work inside Belgium.
The Americans who later volunteered their efforts in Belgium had their own ideas about
the country; these visions were foundational in the ways they devised meaning and reason for
their actions. Going to Belgium was both a drastic and powerful act: they left either their studies
in England or their homes in the United States to go to a fairly unknown country to do difficult
and unfamiliar work. Their relationship to Belgium became more complex over time. It was a
place for the amelioration and a basic reconstruction of civil society, a process that they believed
had to be overseen by Americans, but the actual distribution of relief goods could be effectively
run by the Belgians themselves through their own relief organization: the Comité National de
Secours et d’Alimentation (CNSA), which began as a small, emergency committee and then
broadened its mandate to cover the entire country. The CRB provided the imports and moral and
legal protection of the foodstuffs right up until the actual distribution to the Belgians. The
German invasion and occupation as well as the British blockade drastically altered Belgian life
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and necessitated new internal systems of food distribution and importation of goods from
overseas. While Hoover was emotionally moved by the situation in Belgium, he had not yet been
there to see first hand the scope of the problem in Belgium that necessitated the creation of new
and powerful relief organizations led by him and populated by young, eager American men.

The Invasion
On the morning of 2 August 1914, the German government sent an ultimatum to the
Belgians. That night, King Albert and his Council of State met to discuss their response and
decided to not accept.9 The next day the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, stood before
Parliament and argued that Britain needed to defend Belgian neutrality against German
aggression, even if it meant war. The transcript recorded “loud cheers” following Grey’s
statement that “[w]e have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least
part—of Belgium.”10 Grey’s “vital interests” included, among many other ancient and modern
reasons, defense of international law in the form of Belgian neutrality, something agreed to
decades before by all the major powers of Europe. This treaty was the “scrap of paper” that
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German chancellor Bethmann Holweg and Germany tore up, thus ushering in the first great
European war of the twentieth century.
The 1839 Treaty of London had formalized Belgian statehood and guaranteed the small
kingdom’s neutrality if Europe found itself at war again. At the time, this status was good for
broader European power politics and security concerns: Belgium became a buffer between
France and the German states (two traditional groups that often found themselves in conflict) and,
for Britain, it was a neutral state across the North Sea on the Continent. The treaty also required
the Belgians themselves to defend their neutrality if it were ever threatened. Though by 1914
Germany was set on ignoring the 75-year old treaty, the Belgian government was not. Even with
anti-militarist sentiment in Belgium becoming more powerful in recent decades, the king and his
government refused to ignore their own internationally recognized responsibility to defend not
only their territory, but also their neutrality. Because of longstanding German war strategy,
known as the Schlieffen Plan, Belgium stood on the path to Paris and, the Germans hoped, to
victory in a general European war. The Netherlands, Belgium’s neighbor and former ruler was
left out of the German plan of attack for strategic reasons: as one historian has argued, “If the
war turned out to be longer than expected, the Netherlands would be a very useful ‘windpipe’
that would allow Germany to get supplies by ship from other neutral countries.” 11 The
unanticipated British wartime blockade of the continent, however, greatly disrupted that plan and
very quickly both Germany and Belgium were to be cut off from imports.
When the Germany Army invaded Belgium on 4 August it encountered resistance at the
fortified city of Liège in eastern Belgium. Although the Belgian Army was able to slow the
Germans, it could not stop the superior fighting force from driving towards the capital, Brussels,
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and then Antwerp, the country’s major port, resulting in the capitulation to and the subsequent
occupation of most of Belgium by the Germans. The Belgian Army and its government retreated
westward, eventually holding onto a small piece of land on the North Sea and the northwest
border with France. As the Germans marched through Belgium, they conducted a violent and
destructive campaign that resulted in the powerful “Rape of Belgium” trope for the Allied
cause.12 This was a term used for propaganda purposes by the countries fighting Germany to
drum up support for the war. The Germans who quickly went from being invaders to occupiers
in the course of a month had to establish civil security in the newly occupied territory, even as
they were far more concerned with finding a way to Paris. Conquering Belgium was never a goal
in and of itself; it was a product of tactical planning rather than broader strategy by the German
high command. For Berlin, Belgium soon became a complication.
Back in the United States the press followed the unfolding war closely. The editors of the
New York Times marveled at the fact that the Belgians put up a fight against the Germans: “The
unexpectedly formidable opposition of the Belgians to the passage of a German army corps
across their territory has won for them the admiration of the world,” they wrote on 7 August.13
By 12 August, reports of German “outrages” had made their way across the Atlantic. Again, the
New York Times reported, “The Paris press has devoted most of its attention to alleged acts of
barbarism on the part of Germans…. Not content with firing the houses, it is alleged, the
Germans shot a farmer and others who tried to extinguish the flames.”14 The New York Times
also included reports that supported the German army’s contention that Belgian civilians
12
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engaged in illegitimate attacks on German soldiers. An American doctor from Boston who was
in Belgium reported to the Times: “I was told by German soldiers that at Verviers most of the
shots fired were from houses at the troops, two soldiers being killed outright and one wounded….
Then the Germans shot up every house in town, planted cannon at advantageous points, and
threatened that if any more house firing was done the city would be blown to pieces.”15 The
debate over German abuses in response to potential Belgian francs-tireurs (un-uniformed
sharpshooters) became part of a grand propaganda scheme on the part of the British, especially
after the publication of the Bryce Commission’s Report in 1915. This was a British government
commissioned report on the atrocities conducted by the Germans. It was the first attempt to write
the history of the invasion and occupation. Historians have confirmed that German abuses did
indeed take place and that the German army’s fears of francs-tireurs were misplaced and drew
more heavily on the historical idea and fears from the Franco-Prussian War, rather than on any
real threat from Belgian civilians.16 These stories of German violence against Belgian civilians
and the countryside, however, provided motivation for some members of the CRB, especially in
how they imagined Belgium as a “desolate” place lacking civilization.
One of Britain’s first responses was to declare a blockade of Germany and then, in
November 1914, to declare the North Sea a war zone, thus cutting off not only Germany, but also
Belgium, from international trade. The industrial development of the Belgian economy and its
large laboring population meant that the Belgians imported most of their food. The invasion,
occupation, and blockade stemmed the flow of food into Belgium, immediately requiring local
efforts to ration and distribute what foodstuffs were already available in the country. As the war
15
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moved from the summer to the fall and then to the winter of 1914, it became apparent to the
Belgian elites who remained behind the German lines that a more systematic and perhaps even
international effort was needed. To help provide aid to those in need in Brussels and its suburbs,
Belgian businessmen and industrialists formed the Comité Central de Secours et d’Alimentation
(CCSA) in September and took a first step toward controlling domestic production and
distribution. This organization quickly broadened its scope and linked its work with the work of
smaller organizations all over Belgium to become the Comité National de Secours et
d’Alimentation (CNSA). Hoover’s simultaneous organization of the CRB in October 1914 then
solved the larger importation problem, eventually bringing Americans and American know-how
to Belgium.
While Belgium was known to Americans in the years prior to World War I, it was not
necessarily at the center of Americans’ international consciousness. Newspapers like the New
York Times ran the occasional story about Belgium in their pages, but these stories did not take
up many column inches. For instance, there was the occasional advertisement of bicycle tours in
Belgium.17 Colonial abuses of Africans in The Congo by King Leopold II accounted for some
significant reportage, especially relating to human rights abuses and then the colony’s eventual
acquisition by the Belgian state in 1908.18 The Congo spurred the creation of the American
Congo Reform Association to protest Leopold II’s rule. It was modeled on the work of E. D.
Morel in England.19 In 1911, The New York Times printed a long article announcing King
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Albert’s plan to visit the United States. The article detailed the virtues of Belgium and its peoples’
continuing desire to modernize in the early 20th century.20 (His trip was deferred by the war; he
eventually visited the United States in 1919.)

Belgium as a Nation and a State
Part of why Belgium remained far from the minds of most Americans could be attributed
to its young age as a country and the fact that it was not an easily understood place. Belgium sat
at the border of a cultural and linguistic divide in Europe. The country was unofficially divided
into a southern Latin (Walloon/Francophone) region and a Germanic (Flemish) region in the
north. The monarch and the people’s Roman Catholicism were the two strongest unifying
elements in Belgium.21 Belgium was a tricky place to pin down as a “nation.” Indeed, the New
York Times reviewer in 1903 stated that it was:
difficult to give what may be the racial traits of the Belgians. Because French is largely
spoken that does not make the Belgian a Frenchman. The probability is that if he were
called a Frenchman he would resent it. The Belgian has a two-fold nationality. He is a
mixture of the Walloon and the Fleming, with the good qualities of both. The difference
between the two languages is marked; Flemish is Teutonic and shows its relationship to
English, German, and Dutch, whereas Walloon shows a derivation from the CelticLatin.22
During the war, the German government attempted to divide the Belgian people along these
linguistic and cultural lines with the policy of Flamenpolitik in an attempt to break Flanders off
from the southern part of the country and keep the Flemings loyal and responsive to the whims
and needs of the Germans. The francophone Walloons stood as the dominant force in Belgian
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society, culture, and politics at the time.23 This pro-Flemish policy was an attempt by the
Germans to curry favor with the Flemish speaking people by addressing their historical
grievances against the Walloons and dominant francophone culture.24
At the start of the war, Belgium meant different things to those who became entangled
with it. In the United States, the reaction, especially in the press, was generalized about the war
and its potential opportunities for trade.25 Both Britain and Germany tried to define Belgium for
their own purposes. The Germans created what one historian has called a “defensive discourse”
over Belgium, seeing it as a place of British and French duplicity, thus negating its supposed
neutrality and necessitating (or, at least, justifying) the invasion in the summer of 1914. For the
British, Belgium was “an innocent being bullied” and this trope “mobilized Victorian/Edwardian
notions of honor and dictated a line of duty” for defense of the small state.26
In a 4 August 1914 editorial, the New York Times seemed to endorse British action to
defend Belgium. The editors wrote, “[f]oremost in the public mind stands the obligation of
England under the Triple Entente; but with this, and hardly less important, are the obligation and
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the need of England to defend the neutrality of Belgium. Each strengthens the other. The force of
the two is irresistible.”27 A later editorial entitled, “Through Evil Good May Come,” advanced
the idea that “permanent peace could be assured to Europe only through the overthrow of the
Hohenzollern [German], Hapsburg [Austrian], and Romanoff [Russian] dynasties.”28 Russia,
though an imperial power, fought alongside Britain and France against the German and Austrian
dynasties. Belgium itself had emerged out of the older dynastic order that many in the American
press (and in the Wilson Administration) hoped could be wiped away by the general European
war.
Prior to the 1815 Congress of Vienna the Spanish Hapsburg dynasty ruled over the area
that became Belgium. The end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 led to the established a United
Kingdom of the Netherlands under the House of Orange. That new kingdom included what
would eventually become Belgium within its borders. The conservative and Protestant William I
of Orange was installed as king. This arrangement lasted until August 1830 when the largely
Catholic and more liberal elites of the southwestern provinces, which make up present day
Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, revolted. By July 1831 Belgium emerged as a
nominally independent state with a constitutional monarchy led by a minor German prince of the
House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Leopold took his oath before the Belgian people in Brussels on 21
July 1831, but the Dutch did not recognize the new nation right away. For eight years the Great
Powers of Europe debated the future of this new, small, coal-rich, and flat state that existed
between France and (then) Prussia and across the North Sea from Great Britain. Its position
between the Latin western Europe and Germanic central Europe, between major economic and
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political powers, and its proximity to Great Britain had long made it an important piece of
European real estate.
In April 1839, at the London Conference, the Dutch finally recognized Belgian
independence and the Great Powers set the terms of Belgium’s existence. The 1839 Treaty of
London established Belgium as a neutral state, due in part to fears that Belgium would ally with
France, thus altering the balance of power in northern Europe. 29 To help ensure Belgian
neutrality, the five major powers—Prussia, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Austria—
agreed to maintain Belgian neutrality among themselves and against others who might seek to
influence Belgian allegiances.
Because Belgium was established as a neutral state and because of the treaty guarantees
of its neighbors and the Great Powers of Europe, its political leaders saw little need for a large
military budget, though in the 1910s Belgium began to invest in rearmament. Such efforts, of
course, did not keep pace with the military budgets of France and Germany during the
armaments race preceding World War I.30 Beginning in 1911, the reform and rearmament of
Belgium was led by Belgian prime minster Charles de Broqueville. This plan, while intending
not only to enhance Belgian neutrality but to act as a deliberate deterrence to German invasion in
the long term, actually weakened Belgian war preparedness and even seemed to give some
credence to German claims of encirclement by its presumed enemies—France and Russia—as
the reforms were primarily directed against a possible German invasion.31 Belgium had quickly
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developed as an industrial and commercial power between 1839 and 1914. As the southern
provinces in francophone Wallonia were rich in coal, much of the industrial (and social and
political) power was located there. The northern half of Belgium was more pastoral. Brussels, the
capital, sat between these two regions, but was dominated by the francophone royalty and
political elite.
Though a linguistically divided state, Belgium needed the whole country to work together
in order to become a power beyond its modest size. Belgian businessmen focused on developing
the northern city of Antwerp as an important port, thus helping Belgium to become the fifth
largest trading nation in the world.32 With British investment, the Belgians built the first railroad
network on the continent in 1835, and that early start allowed Belgium to become a major point
of transit for travel in northern Europe. Belgians built on that experience by investing around the
world in transportation projects in China, Russia, and France, not to mention colonization in
Africa. Belgium achieved all this growth with a relatively small population. By 1910, the
Belgian population numbered 7.4 million. Forty-five percent were Flemish-speaking, forty
percent were French-speaking, and twelve percent were bilingual. Forty-three percent of the
population worked in manufacturing. Belgium was urban and industrialized and had more than
250 persons per square kilometer.33 Because of the industrial nature of the Belgian economy, the
country imported about 80% of its wheat in the years before the war.34 The CRB could not bring
imports back to pre-war levels during the war, but it was able help the Belgians meet their needs.
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The German war machine was not designed to feed its occupied territory, and as the war settled
into a stalemate, the German agricultural system became unable to support its own troops and
citizens with enough food, let alone millions of Belgians who were not contributing to the
German war effort. Organized relief efforts from the outside were therefore necessary and the
CRB’s American organizers and volunteers were well placed to do so because of their neutral
status and desire to be more involved in the world.
Over the course of its short existence, Belgium became not only a modern industrial state,
but also a modern colonial one. During the late nineteenth century mad dash for colonies,
Belgium, in a unique way, joined in along with the larger and stronger imperial powers of
Europe. King Leopold II, who ascended to the Belgian throne in 1865 and reigned until 1909,
claimed the Congo in Africa for himself—not for Belgium—in the 1880s, culminating with the
recognition of his personal rule over the Congo at the 1884-85 Berlin Conference. Leopold ruled
there, though never visited, until 1908 when the Belgian Parliament, tired of the international
press criticism of abuses of native people in the Congo, transformed the territory into a state-run
colony. The Belgian Parliament reformed the policies and practices put in place by Leopold in an
attempt to construct a more humane colonial relationship.35
Belgium, then, was as much a modern, imperial, industrialized, and densely populated
country as any other when Germany invaded in August 1914. The invasion and subsequent
occupation inflicted significant damage to the country. In addition to the physical damage to
Belgian industry in terms of ravaged or requisitioned factories and equipment, some one million
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Belgians fled the country.36 The loss of so many able-bodied workers exacerbated the country’s
wartime decline and Belgium’s ability to support itself financially during the occupation.

The German Conquest
When the German army entered Brussels on 20 August 1914, it made quite a show of it.
Paul Max, the mayor’s cousin, recorded in his diary that a “truly formidable,” “disciplined,” and
“admirably equipped” army marched through the city. The Germans, in earth colored uniforms,
marched under the Arc du Cinquantenaire, a monument celebrating the first fifty years of
Belgian independence from the Dutch. Soldiers passed the parliament building on the Rue de la
Loi on their way to Grand Place, the historic center of Brussels. There, the German troops
assembled before the fifteenth century city hall and the seventeenth century guildhalls to hoist
their flag above the city, cementing their conquest of the capital of the small but strategically
important Kingdom of Belgium.37 It took sixteen days from the initial invasion of Belgium on 4
August to reach the capital. That pace, however, was much slower than the Germans had hoped
or planned for with their Schlieffen Plan. While the Belgian army fought the invading force in
Liège near the German border, they ultimately were no match for the Germans seeking passage
through low-lying Belgium on their way to their ultimate goal of Paris. As King Albert and his
government fled the capital, those Belgians who remained in Brussels and elsewhere behind
German lines had to contend with growing difficulties. Though defeated, the Belgian army
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eventually took up a position with British forces in and around Ypres. Many Belgians expressed
their indignation at the German invasion and surrender ultimatum by flying Belgian, French, and
British flags. They also published a newspaper cover featuring a towering “Mannequin Pis”
showering the invading Germans.38 Unfortunately, patriotism could not fill empty bellies. Very
quickly, the price of foodstuffs soared, and Adolphe Max, the mayor, had to intervene in the
market to stop unscrupulous price gouging.39
On the black market, the price of many foodstuffs rose by 1,200 percent above 1914
prices by the end of the war.40 In the early days of the occupation in Brussels, a resident named
Constance Graeffe noted in her diary, “The bakers only bake every other day,” and “A real white
loaf is not to be had for love or money.”41 Over the course of the occupation, the price of food in
Belgium increased dramatically. For example, a kilo of butter cost 3.37 Belgian francs in 1914.
By 1916 butter cost 6.43 per kilo and in 1917 it was up to 8.35. Bread prices rose from .23
Belgian francs in 1914 to .61 Belgian francs in 1917. The price of milk rose from .17 Belgian
francs in 1914 to .85 Belgian francs in 1917. Bacon went from 2.73 Belgian francs in 1914 to
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over 25 Belgian francs in 1917.42 Both the early local Belgian and the later American-led relief
organizations sought to mitigate the effects of these cost escalations by providing food for those
who could not afford it, but at the same times those who could afford to buy food were asked to
pay for it. Some Belgians, like Constance Graeffe’s family, were lucky; they had access to fresh
food for themselves. Others had to wait in lines to receive their allotment of provisions.43
Daily intake of food for Belgians decreased during the years of occupation. In December
1915 the per capita daily caloric intake was 1,928 for unemployed workers in Belgium. By
September 1917 that fell to 1,387 calories. For employed workers, their caloric intake in
September 1917 was not much better, averaging 1,500.44 By comparison, the United Kingdom’s
National Health Service suggests that, in 2012, the average man needs 2,500 calories per day to
maintain his weight, while a woman requires 2,000 calories.45
Other metrics of Belgian society changed dramatically as well. In 1914 Belgium recorded
156,389 births and 41,095 marriages. A year later births were down to 124,291 and marriages
were down to 24,654, the lowest rate of the decade. This was likely because of the exodus of
Belgian refugees to Britain as well as because of the occupation. By 1918, births reached an alltime low for the decade of 85,056, likely because of the war and occupation.46

42

Data is taken from tables in Peter Scholliers and Frank Daelemans, “Standards of Living and
Standards of Health in Wartime Belgium,” in The Upheaval of War: Family, Work, and Welfare
in Europe, 1914-1918, eds. Richard Wall and Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), Table 4.2, p. 143.
43

See Graeffe, “We Who Are So Cosmopolitan” and Jaumain, Bruxelles.

44

Table 4.6 in Scholliers and Daelemans, “Standards of Living,” in Upheaval of War, 147.

45

http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/1126.aspx?CategoryID=51&SubCategoryID=164 Last accessed
23 July 2013.
46

Table 4.8 in Scholliers and Daelemans, “Standards of Living,” in Upheaval of War, 150.

40

Constance Graeffe recorded in her diary that in the immediate aftermath of the invasion
there was a run on the banks. The Belgian and then German armies took what they wanted as
they moved through the city, and it was hard for residents to get bread and milk.47 The Graeffes
were German-speaking Belgians and by the end of the war they became German partisans, but
during the initial invasion they suffered along with everyone else. They owned a house outside of
Brussels, and one of their sons, Robert, went there in August to check on it. When Robert
returned home he had “brought vegetable [sic] eggs, butter with him & told us no Germans had
gone to our house but our opposite neighbor who lived about ½ mile from us across our little
valley, had had all his cattle taken, his house broken in & his wine drunk by the Germans,
because his caretaker had run away from his house when the Germans arrived.”48 Conditions
grew only worse in the weeks and months ahead, and Brussels residents sought out any glimmer
of hope of help from abroad.
On 22 August, Paul Max heard talk around town that the United States had given
Germany a twenty-four hour ultimatum to evacuate.49 The next day, however, Max’s hopes for
American intervention were dashed: such news was false.50 Americans who were in Belgium
were confronted with questions about what role the United States would play in the emerging
global war. Hugh Gibson, the secretary of the American mission in Belgium, visited the city of
Louvain east of Brussels at the end of August.51 He had gone to see first hand if the damage and
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destruction to that ancient city of learning was as widespread as some of the initial reports had
indicated. Gibson recorded in his journal that he and his colleagues saw “frightened civilians
carrying away small bundles from the ruins of their homes.” As the Americans continued to
approach Louvain they saw “a great column of dull grey smoke that completely hid the city” and
“could hear the muffled sound of firing ahead.”52 The scene they confronted made a great
impression on Gibson:
They were pathetic in their confidence that the United States was coming to save
them…Nearly every group we talked to asked hopefully when our troops were coming,
and when we answered that we were not involved, they asked wistfully if we didn’t think
we should be forced to come in later. A little boy of about eight…asked me whether we
were English, and when I told him what we were, he began jumping up and down,
clapping his hands, and shouting: Les Américans sont arrivés! Les Américans sont
arrivés!53
Though no American soldiers would come to Europe for several years, these hopes for American
intervention were, in a way, realized with the arrival of the first CRB delegates that winter, and
the Belgians quickly and enthusiastically received those humanitarian volunteers. Until then,
however, the Belgians were on their own. The fall of Antwerp in Flanders on 10 October, after a
two-week siege, effectively ushered in the formal German occupation of Belgium. The British
blockade then completed the isolation of Belgium.
The battle for Belgium was violent and resulted in real atrocities in addition to
exaggerations in the British, French, and American presses that would contribute to the
disillusionment of the post-war world. The German Chief of Staff publicly justified the German
invasion: “Our method in Belgium is certainly brutal, but for us it is a matter of life or death, and
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anybody who gets in our way has to take the consequences.”54 In Brussels, Constance Graeffe
wondered in her diary why the “Germans spread this awfull [sic] terror around them?” She
reasoned that it was “[b]ecause they want[ed] to get on as quickly as possible.”55 Ideas about
history played an important role in this violent German perspective. The German high command
and the rank-and-file soldiers both feared a reoccurrence of the franc-tireurs of the 1870 FrancoPrussian War.56 The German Army then set up an occupation regime under the command of
General Moritz von Bissing, who governed occupied Belgium from November 1914 until his
death in April 1917. While the eventual arrival of the CRB suited von Bissing’s needs to some
extent by easing the burden of civilian support, he and the Commission’s leadership were often
at odds. According to Hoover, “Von Bissing was a pompous, arrogant little man who disliked all
Americans and resented the independence of our organization as imposed by the Allied
Governments and the German civil authorities in Berlin.”57 Von Bissing ruled Belgium with an
eye toward eventual future Belgian dependency on Germany or even outright annexation.58
While von Bissing hoped to reconstruct Belgian industrial society, he was not particularly
successful; Belgium instead eventually became a place for German leaders to look for forced
labor later in the war. (See Chapter 4.) While the CRB and the CNSA could threaten German
authority in Belgium, the two organizations served a useful purpose: they provided what the
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Germans could not and would not provide—food.59 The German occupation grew harsh. The
historian Isabel Hull wrote that “[e]ven with CRB aid, Belgium faced stringent military
administration, far-reaching economic exploitation, forced labor, and deportation.” 60 Three
considerations made the German occupation particularly difficult: Germany’s ongoing shortage
of manpower and material, a more rigid idea of what order meant than Belgian citizens were
used to, and a German presumption of deference to authority that was not so forthcoming by the
Belgians.61
The results of the invasion were not confined to changes in the price or availability of
foodstuffs. The 1915 Bryce Report was commissioned by the British Prime Minister, H. H.
Asquith, in December 1914 and published in May 1915, the report detailed alleged abuses by the
German army.62 The British and Belgians in Britain used the report during the war to solicit
support and produce propaganda for their war causes. They described vividly the abuses of the
Germans, often using specifically selected eyewitness evidence of systematic rape and plunder.
The committee used hundreds of interviews with Belgian refugees as well as some captured
German diaries to detail the crimes committed against individuals, especially women and
children, by Germans. The Bryce Report was published in thirty languages and disseminated
widely, including in the United States. While some of the accounts were certainly
sensationalized, there were systematic uses of terror employed against the Belgian civilian
population. The report was an essential tool in Britain’s propaganda scheme to highlight the
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powerfully gendered image of the “Rape of Belgium”: A helpless feminine Belgium at the mercy
over-masculinized men, in need of virtuous protection by British men at arms. As we will see in
Chapter 2, these perceptions became powerful motivators for some of the Americans who signed
up to help the Belgians. Horrors of war (both real and sensationalized) were then and are now
powerful forces for humanitarian efforts. 63 While the CRB’s organization may have been
founded out of a well-reasoned conclusion that it was better to find a way to feed the Belgian
people than let them starve, there were deeply emotional reasons for it as well as Hoover and
others attested to in their reasoning for taking on the work.
While the British did use the atrocities for exaggerated propaganda aims, the Germans
really did commit many violations of international law and norms during their invasion of
Belgium as set down in the 1907 Hague Convention on Land Warfare.64 Refugees were not the
only sources of these German crimes; stories circulated within Belgium as well. For instance,
Constance Graeffe recorded in her diary an account she had heard. She wrote she could “scarcely
believe it” and so “[would] only tell the facts” as she understood them:
A lady teacher of one of the principal government schools here in Brussels came back
and told her principal this: I live near Mons & when the Germans came there they passed
through our village & took 40 women of different ages, put them in front of them &
ordered them to walk on! One understanding a little German turned round & said to the
officers, aren’t you ashamed to protect yourselves behind women? He ordered the first
row to go back & of these was this teacher, but the next had to go on & suddenly from
afar the English fired & she saw 2 women fall & the others ran away & then the Germans
went on & fought hard against the English.65
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Graeffe thought, though, that the situation was complex. Her diary continued, also explaining
what she had heard about the German advance through Belgium:
In almost every village the German troupers came to, they were shot at by the villagers;
now in such a case they had the orders to bombard each village before entering to
ascertain if the enemy was not there! Instead of destroying in this way every village they
came to, they said we will take the villagers of one village & drive them to the next so
that those shall not fire at us, not as protection only for our men but for the good of their
own homes! Is such a thing right & wise that is another point of view. If they had only
always had soldiers to deal with it would be a very cowardly act but having so often had
‘franctireurs’ I wonder which was best.66
The invasion turned Belgian civil society on its head and left the Belgians incredibly fearful. The
eventual arrival of Americans with the CRB would provide a layer of security for the Belgians.
While the CRB delegates provided relief, they would also act as witnesses to the occupation
from a neutral perspective.
The Belgian cityscapes changed as well as a result of the German invasion. The burning
of the city of Louvain was one of the most famous large-scale destructive acts of the war. It was
the very place that the American diplomat Gibson visited and where he met Belgians clamoring
for American intervention. (After the war, Americans would help rebuild the library with funds
solicited from American universities. The names of the schools’ who donated to its rebuilding
are inscribed on stones surrounding the library.)
In the late fall of 1914, hope spread through Brussels and elsewhere that help was on its
way. It was certainly needed; in November, Constance Graeffe wrote that in some places “each
head only gets 200 gr[am]s of bread a day” and that “[w]omen cry for bread & when will it
arrive?”67 At this time, she knew that Great Britain had allowed foodstuffs to move through the
blockade and that much of it would be sent from America, though “with these seafights & all that
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goes with it, will there not be still some disappointment?”68 Indeed, the CRB lost seventeen ships
to torpedoes and fourteen to mines out of 2,323 total shipments.69
Before the arrival of Americans and their supplies, however, the Belgians worked on
their own relief efforts. The Americans may have found themselves in a “desolate” and “reduced”
nation, seemingly pushed back from modern civilization, but they encountered the real efforts by
the Belgian people to provide for themselves against all odds. There were structures within
Belgian society trying to make headway in providing food and relief to those who needed it. It
was with these local efforts that the American-led CRB would partner to make for an effective
relief program.

The First Local Efforts
The Belgian historian Sophie de Schaepdrijver has emphasized two main themes in
Belgian society after the invasion: “civilian helplessness” and “civilian action.” 70 De
Schaepdrijver analyzed the diary of Charles Gheude who visited the town of Aarschot in October
1914 and recorded the damage done to the town. He also worked to set up a local relief
organization: “[i]n one hospitable house, still standing and only half pillaged, we assemble[d]
our best endeavors around a table weakly lit by two candles, and we d[rew] up the first
measures.”71 In the city of Namur a young woman named Germaine recorded in her diary in
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August 1914 that “[t]he people of Namur are making provisions: potatoes, bacon, ham. Worthy
of note,” she continued, “some women who in normal times would not carry the smallest
package go by loaded with boxes and bags. Everybody fraternizes; people seem to know each
other; in short, worldly conventions are suspended; people’s interest is higher and we forget the
pettiness of ordinary life.”72 Before the Americans arrived and interjected their values and new
ideas of doing things, the Belgian people were engaging with each other in new ways while
enduring hardship, especially in the first few months before systematized relief efforts came to
Belgium. The Americans would see a different Belgium from the one that they would have seen
had they made a stop in Brussels or Louvain or elsewhere while taking a “Grand Tour” of
Europe before the outbreak of the war.
War and occupation wreaked havoc on the day-to-day lives of the millions of Belgians
who remained behind the German lines during the war. Their health, lives, and overall social
well-being relied on an effective organization of supply and relief, but that supply and relief
would arrive under the constant threat of war and maybe even requisition by the Germans
without any kind of third-party guarantee. In the early months of conflict, relief was haphazard,
but nonetheless important, and set in motion the larger relief efforts that the CNSA and the CRB
would put in place for the remainder of the war. These included efforts by the smallest
communes to the largest towns and cities around Belgium to organize some sort of system of
food distribution. For example, in the industrial region of Charleroi in Wallonia, action was
taken quickly. On 3 August 1914, the communal council of Charleroi was called to order and the
head of the council, M. Devreux, announced three immediate steps the administration was taking
72
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on behalf of the people: 1) a meeting of all the local mayors, 2) an agreement with millers to sell
flour at a price not to exceed 30 francs for 100 kilos, and 3) an agreement with bakers to make
bread at no profit. These proactive measures were necessary to combat the impending scarcity of
foodstuffs, especially flour, in the region. According to a report from Charleroi, from the start of
the war the Belgian Army requisitioned flour that was held in the old fortified city of Namur.
The Germans also requisitioned flour and other items as they moved across Belgium.73 As a
result of all these factors, scarcity increased.
Many of the smaller cities also took immediate steps to help those who were or might
soon become destitute or hungry because of the war. In Berchem-Sainte-Agathe, for example,
the town’s elites organized a committee to collect funds and goods for families of those who had
men called to the front to defend Belgium during the German invasion.74 At the same time, a
philanthropic group called “Le Lilas” provided localized aid to those who needed it. These
activities continued until January 1915 when local leaders were able to tap into the emerging
nation-wide relief efforts of the CNSA and CRB through “la soupe communale.” In Tubiez, poor
workers were given one franc per day to help purchase food and other goods during the early
period of the war.75 Not every town or commune had a program of aid and relief, however.76 A
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national relief program, expanded from the work being done by the relief committee that had
been organized in Brussels, was not put into effect until the fall.
Brussels had one of the first sophisticated efforts to relieve the civilian population of the
hardships presented by the invasion, occupation, and blockade. Ernest Solvay, a Belgian
industrialist, pledged around a million francs to Mayor Adolphe Max for Brussels’ use. This
effort on an individual level, however, while generous, was not sufficient. Local Belgian elites
appealed for help to the largest and most important bank in Belgium: the Société Générale de
Belgique.77 Its director, Emile Francqui, was a well-established figure in Belgium and would
soon head the CNSA. He was born in 1863 during the reign of the first king of the Belgians,
Leopold I. In his 20s, according to his biographer Liane Ranieri, Francqui associated himself
with the colonial ambitions of King Leopold II in the Congo. Francqui “play[ed] a decisive role
in the exploration and occupation of Katanga, the richest and most coveted province of the
Congo.”78 At thirty, Francqui headed up Belgian economic interests in Asia, in particular China,
where he first meet Hoover where they were both working at the time, but it was his work during
World War I with the CNSA that would set him apart from other well-to-do financiers in Belgian
and European society.79 When approached about the emerging relief effort Francqui reportedly
exclaimed: “I am your man. Count on me!”80
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At 11:00 a.m. on 1 September 1914 at the headquarters of the Société Générale in
Brussels, a group of Belgian notables met to form the CCSA. Francqui presided over the meeting
and announced that this relief committee was being founded to provide aid to the citizens of
Brussels and was under the patronage of the Spanish and American ministers to Belgium, the
Marquis de Villalobar and Brand Whitlock.81 Francqui made it clear that the CCSA would be
made up of a number of different people and would be organized without regard to political
loyalties (“sans couleur politique”).82 This evenhandedness would often prove difficult for local
committees to emulate. Finding the right balance between the powerful Liberals and Catholics as
well as the emerging Socialists resulted in the dissolution of not a few local committees during
the course of the war.83 The meeting also heralded American involvement: Hugh Gibson, the
secretary of the American Legation, attended, noting in his diary, “The hour I had put in there
had been well spent.”84 Gibson likely felt that the Belgians were effectively trying to find a
solution to dire distress they found their country to be in.
Four days later, the CCSA met again. The elite of Belgium decided that Solvay would be
the president of the CCSA, an important but primarily titular position, while Francqui would
become the chairman of the Executive Committee, and, thus in charge of the day-to-day
mechanics of their work.85 With these matters of position resolved, Solvay gave a speech that
extolled the spirit of solidarity that he claimed existed throughout Belgium, and argued that the
81
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CCSA was part of that solidarity. He also thanked the Spanish and American ministers for their
help in protecting the work of this new and unique organization in Belgium.86
Very quickly, the CCSA in Brussels became the national CNSA for all of Belgium and in
October 1914 the CNSA became the Belgian partner with the just-formed CRB. On 24
November 1914, Francqui explained how equal distribution would take place. He told his fellow
committee members the CRB delegates would “be joined by a Belgian citizen familiar with the
needs of the province [the American is assigned to].”87 The relief effort, then, was to be a firm
partnership between the Americans and the Belgians, who each needed the other in order to
achieve their shared goals, but the Americans occupied a position of significant power as the
organization recognized to import the needed supplies through the British blockade and to
supervise the transport and distribution of those goods in Belgium. The Americans would work
with the locally appointed and run Belgian provincial committees to find the most effective and
efficient way to feed an entire nation.
The CNSA was not a neutral humanitarian organization. It was decidedly patriotic. Not
an unreasonable position for it to take, but certainly one that set it apart from the CRB’s nonstate neutrality. The CRB sought to help and feed the Belgians because it was the humanitarian
thing to do. The Belgian CNSA wanted to help and feed Belgians because they were their fellow
countrymen. At a 26 November meeting, for example, M. Frank, the president of the Antwerp
Provincial Committee, praised King Albert and the queen, Elizabeth. Albert was still actively
opposing the Germans, even though he had retreated to the coast. The CNSA emerged as a
powerful Belgian organization alongside the powerful neutral, American-led CRB.
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Conclusion
Belgium endured a great deal at the outbreak of war. Ancient treaty obligations and
national pride set Belgium up for a violent few months at the start of the war, followed by an
occupation that, combined with the British blockade, left the basic needs of Belgian citizens
unmet. Local efforts in the cities and countryside to stabilize the food system and provide relief
where necessary were not enough for the long term, even though they did establish a structure
the Americans were able to work with once the CRB was founded and began its work by in late
1914. Though Belgium became a victim of German aggression and British strategy, its efforts in
the early days of the war were those of a modern European state. The Americans who eventually
arrived in Belgium as humanitarians confronted a complex humanitarian emergency, exacerbated
by the country’s industrial top-heaviness: it was unable to feed itself because its modern
industrial base was stalled and, in many cases, destroyed, and the British blockade prevented the
country’s continued importation of food. While the Belgians set up their own local relief
councils and eventually a central CNSA, there was still a void that needed to be filed. The
American-led CRB was just the thing to fill that void.
The Americans who arrived in December 1914 were in positions of power and privileged.
They were not part of the local Belgian political or social system, nor were they members of a
defeated and occupied people. They were neutral outsiders representing only humanitarian
interests: the feeding of a people in need. They would be able to draw on their American-ness (as
citizens of neutral America and as people with a self-described particularly powerful “knowhow”) to carve out a space where they could effectively manage the importation and distribution
of relief goods in Belgium. Carving out a space for humanitarian work is key for humanitarian
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groups who must guard their neutrality carefully, otherwise they cannot do their work effectively.
For instance, in its role inspecting the conditions of detainees around the world, the present day
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) “seeks solutions to humanitarian problems
through confidential dialogue with the detaining authority.”88 By relying on confidentially, the
ICRC shields those it is investigating, but enables itself to be seen as an “honest broker” with no
hidden agenda for publicity in order to effect change. While the CRB was wholly different from
today’s ICRC and did use the press to make its case for its relief efforts in Belgium, it, too, had
to establish its authority and carve out its humanitarian space to effect change in Belgium. To do
so, the CRB drew on its staff’s American-ness, both in terms of their national citizenship and the
characteristics and values with which the delegates identified.
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Chapter 2
Who Should Go to Belgium?
The American Membership of the CRB
Once established at its organizational meetings in London, the CRB recruited its first
American volunteers from Oxford. Many were Rhodes Scholars, but others, like Tracy Kittredge,
were there on private scholarship. Kittredge described Oxford as “Spartan” in November 1914
when about twenty-five Americans gathered at the American Club to sign up for work with the
CRB.1 Herbert Hoover wrote to one student there that “We are badly in need of Americans to
take charge of our work in various relief stations in Belgium,” he was looking for young men
who had “some experience of roughing it, who [spoke] French, [had] tact, and [could] get on
with the Germans.”2 The combination of the volunteers’ neutral citizenship as well as their
American-ness (their “experience of roughing it” and “tact”), their proximity to Belgium by
being in England when the war broke out, and presumptions of their character by virtue of their
status as Americans studying at Oxford set the tone for the American membership of the CRB,
even after the CRB tightened its recruitment standards when it became clear that some of the
early recruits were not up to the task.
Back in the United States, when President Wilson heard about the organization of the
CRB and that some American citizens and diplomatic officials were attached to it, he was clear
that they were all acting as private citizens and not as agents of the United States government.3
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While the American members of the CRB had no official connection to the U.S. government,
their cultural connections and the assumptions of power that came with them, were very much a
part of their identity and experience on the ground in Belgium. Hoover and the U.S. minister in
Belgium, Brand Whitlock, also believed that Americans would make better executives than the
local Belgians not only because they were stretched thin trying to provide relief for themselves,
but by virtue of them being Americans and the Americans would have freer mobility and “could
negotiate unhesitatingly with local German commanders” because of their neutral status.4 While
the CRB’s letterhead indicated Spanish and, later, Dutch patronage, these neutral nations
provided different support than the Americans did. The Netherlands acted as a neutral port for
imports (of goods and for new American volunteers) and the Spanish provided additional
diplomatic support in Belgium itself, but the CRB was very much an American enterprise and its
organizers sought certain types of American men to work for it. This chapter argues that CRB
officials sought out a particular kind of American man who represented the new dynamic power
of the United States in the world, and marshaled that power through humanitarian work.
There was one practical reason to solicit men from a class of men for whom money was
not a pressing concern: all the in-Belgium workers were not salaried. They were entitled to a
stipend, though, and they benefited from the good graces of their Belgian hosts who would often
take them into their homes to dine and live. For instance, long after his service Wickes said that
he had an expense account of 700 francs a month—“roughly the equivalent of $100 at the then
exchange rate.” This was a comfortable sum, “but it wasn’t in the nature of a salary of any sort,”
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he recalled. “We weren’t supposed to benefit financially from the work.”5 The CRB was not a
place to make money, but to give service and do one’s duty as a privileged member of the neutral
United States and a humanitarian organization. While the United States was not directly involved
in the European fighting, work with the CRB was an opportunity for Americans to go “over there”
and engage with the war.
Many factors motivated these early delegates from the reports of German atrocities to the
desire to do some sort of war service. “Everyone we knew,” wrote Kittredge, “was taking some
part directly or indirectly in the war. So as [Christmas] vacation time came we too began to
wonder what we should do.”6 The pull of adventure and desire to serve in some capacity across
the English Channel led these men into humanitarian work while their British friends went off to
fight for King and Country.7 Kittredge, at Oxford on a private scholarship, was one of the first to
volunteer in Belgium in December 1914: “Belgium was a land of horrors to us,” he wrote soon
after the war. “We thought it a country in ruins, with gray-clad ‘Huns’ stalking about seeking
what they could devour. The fascination of the unknown, the attracting of adventure, the desire
5
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to see for ourselves a bit of actual war or the results of war” was partially what drove him and
others to sign up for the work.8
The CRB organizers sought candidates who would practice neutrality by representing
American values of leadership, ability, and restraint as emphasized in American public discourse
and by political leaders like Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, to carry out their
humanitarian mission. Many men answered the call because the CRB offered them an
opportunity to experience the war while the United States maintained its neutrality. With this in
mind, the CRB selected men who at times exhibited traditionally masculine and American
qualities that were beginning to shift away from the solely martial sphere to a more philanthropic
one. Not all applicants were accepted. Some could be rejected because of gender (no women),
race, nationality (whites and American citizens only; some non-whites did apply, but were
rejected), age (though this was often overlooked), language ability (again often ignored), and
character (no ne’er-do-wells). While the CRB staff sought Americans who could be neutral, they
sought well-educated, cosmopolitan, athletic, and responsible men to shape the particular
humanitarian identity of the CRB through the period of U.S. neutrality. This set of characteristics
came to define many who would work in later U.S national security positions.9 These ideas of
the proper American man were not isolated to World War I humanitarianism, but were central to
the development of a particular American leadership class that would see the United States into
World War II and through much of the Cold War where humanitarian efforts would often find
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expression in government funded programs such as the Food For Peace Program originally
developed under President Dwight D. Eisenhower.10
In the early days of the CRB a man who was deemed physically and emotionally strong,
ready for adventure, with good experience and character (as in the morally “good” man of the
late Victorian and Edwardian eras), and possessed the potential for successful executive and
administrative leadership was thought to be all that was needed. These qualities were not limited
to Rhodes Scholars or those at Oxford, but they were associated with that group and formed the
template for future candidates, even after Hoover and others realized there needed to be a more
detailed vetting process than just being at Oxford.11
In fact, these qualities were part and parcel of a broad ideal of the proper American man
during the early twentieth century. Historians have been correlating such ideals with respect to
the emergence of American empire, and the values and motives in domestic Progressive politics
and American culture.12 At the end of the nineteenth century, many political and social leaders
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feared that American men were becoming “over civilized” with the closing of the Western
frontier, the changing economy necessitating less and less physical activity, and the lack of
military experience on the part of many men. The War of 1898 and the expansion of American
power into the Pacific and Caribbean helped not only position the United States as an emerging
world power, but also enabled a new generation of American men to either fight in a war or act
as overseas administrators, representing the interest of their country in exotic locales like the
Philippines. Because of Wilson’s call for neutrality, Americans could not participate in the
fighting on behalf of the United States, but the CRB provided an avenue for many men to engage
with the war in a new way as humanitarians.13 And because the CRB was a thoroughly American
organization, it was American culture and ideas of the proper American man that influenced who
became a CRB delegate.
The CRB, though a neutral and non-governmental humanitarian organization, was
imbued with such values from the start. While Hoover was certainly limited in the early stages of
the relief effort in choosing who could participate as delegates because of the American exodus
from Britain after the war began, examining CRB delegates and their backgrounds can help us
better understand how humanitarian work can be made effective, how humanitarian culture was
constructed in a particular time and place, and how a group of Americans navigated between
their status as neutral citizens in a war zone and as effective humanitarian agents. This chapter
uses those delegates’ own writings from during and immediately after their work in Belgium, as
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well as the detailed personnel records of the CRB, to elucidate who was accepted—and who was
blackballed—by the CRB “fraternity” between November 1914 and April 1917. Afterward, the
United States became a belligerent, and many of these “manly” men joined the American armed
forces. The values that made one a good American humanitarian could also make one a good
military man.14

A Delegate Template
Three interlocking organizational and socio-cultural systems played a part in establishing
the cultural norms that CRB delegates and executives would exemplify and seek out. The
Rhodes Scholarship Trust was an organization dedicated to reinforcing the values of Englishspeaking peoples and helping to develop a class of men able to properly govern society.15 The
scouting movement in Britain and in the United States, too, focused on good works, altruism,
and “being prepared,” thereby developing a new generation of good, manly, citizens ready to
defend the values of the nation.16 In the years leading up to the CRB’s work, reform-minded
social service inculcated in institutions of higher education also began to emerge as an important
arena in which young men could become good American citizens and full members of civil
14
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society.17 The ideas of public service were being exhorted by leading American educators like
Charles Eliot of Harvard, Endicott Peabody of Groton, and Woodrow Wilson when he was
president of Princeton. Traditional values of masculinity—strength and military service—were
encountering a new “fatherhood” ethos, thus mandating service to individuals and in local
communities, and not just to the nation-state. Skills and talents other than those learned at drill
became a part of the positive value system of gendered masculinity. A broader “Rough Rider”
ethos of service, activity, and manliness emerged in the imagination of and vivid language used
by delegates in their writings during and shortly after war. One such delegate, Francis C. Wickes,
wrote that those first delegates were “possessed [with] a certain spirit of adventure together with
a desire for service.”18 A later delegate, Maurice Pate, while sailing to Europe for a position with
the CRB wrote in his diary that while he was enjoying excellent meals aboard his ship, they
“were a hard fore-runner for European ‘war bread,’” a reference to the hard, dense, dark bread
most Belgians lived off of during their years of occupation.19 Another participant, Joseph C.
Green, who in later decades would help shape the Truman Doctrine, described his peers as
“strong [Teddy] Roosevelt men.”20
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An original purpose of the Rhodes scholarship was the development of elite colonial
administrators through the best education. Applicants were chosen on the basis of various
categories of accomplishment and potential: “scholastic attainments;” “fondness of and success
in manly outdoor sports;” “his qualities of manhood, truth, courage, devotion to duty, sympathy
for and protection of the weak, kindliness and fellowship;” and “his exhibition during school
days of moral force of character.”21 While the United States embarked on a different imperial
project than did Britain, a man’s association with the Rhodes scholarship could open doors by
the ready identification of society’s elites. In the case of the CRB, delegates were not only drawn
initially from the ranks of Rhodes scholars; subsequent delegates also fit the categories of that
prestigious scholarship, even if a number of those early participants were not really up to the task
(leading Whitlock at one point early in the relief effort to declare that it was dangerous to recruit
“a lot of impulsive, ignorant, young doctors of Philosophy.”)22 CRB officials learned from their
earlier mistakes and undertook a sophisticated recruitment regimen including formal references,
interviews, and even language tests, even though they often stretched the requirements to allow
in those who did not completely meet the new guidelines. While the recruitment practices may
have changed, the virtues required did not. The ideal as represented by the early values of the
CRB was very powerful and dictated recruitment policy throughout the war.
As the early delegates were still students and many of the subsequent delegates were
products of American higher education in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, new
ideas on the role and power of education (formal and informal) can help shed light onto how and
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why these men chose humanitarian work. Recent work by Emily Mieras argues that the turn of
the twentieth century saw an emphasis on public or “social” service as a masculine endeavor for
civic engagement and self-fulfillment. Mieras writes, “Young people in a liminal stage between
childhood and independence….found a way to identify themselves by practicing social service.
This process of identification had different implications for men and women. For young men, it
marked a way of reasserting middle-class male privileges.”23 As members of the CRB were
drawn from these academic settings and as recent graduates they were not yet fully established in
their careers, they were both part of this “liminal space” where they were creating their own
personal and professional identities. The CRB was just the place to do so because it meant
identifying not only with public service, but a new expansion of American power overseas
during what was shaping up to be an important historical event, a world war. Mieras writes that
“[m]ale youth who performed service redefined manhood to incorporate nurturing tendencies
usually associated with women.”24 In reconstituting non-martial service as manly, humanitarian
assistance could be seen, then, as not necessarily an alternative to combat, but war service itself,
albeit as neutrals, not belligerents, and as bearers of bushels of wheat, not arms.25 CRB delegates
nonetheless did still draw on those older conceptions of manhood and power in their work and to
help create their identities. Male college students’ work with social service organizations like
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YMCAs and settlement houses was indicative of the inclusion of broad relief activities within the
culture of those who would go on to serve in the CRB. While a direct connection between
participation in YMCA or settlement house work is not possible for CRB delegates, some did
work for aid organizations like the American Red Cross. Princeton University’s president, John
Grier Hibben, referred Maurice Pate to the CRB on partial account of his work with the Red
Cross as an undergraduate in 1914 and 1915.26
The delegates’ work in Belgium placed them in the outdoors quite frequently. Being out
of the office, on the road, and visiting relief depots was a big part of the job. Being comfortable
with that was a basic requirement. In this way delegates fit into societal norms of American men
as expressed in the newly developed scouting movement. In the 1911 edition of the Official
Handbook for Boys the Canadian-born, naturalized American citizen, Ernest Thompson Seton
asked the youth of America if they had a “desire for the knowledge to help the wounded quickly,
and to make [themselves] cool and self-reliant in an emergency” and if they had a belief in
“loyalty, courage, and kindness…[and wished to] form habits that [would] surely make [their]
life success in life.”27 Work with the CRB required (or desired) men who had these exact
qualities and, in many cases, contributed to their later careers.
Wickes had read Seton as a boy and, along with his family, became an avid camper and
participant in “the outdoor life” both before and after his time with the CRB.28 Wickes, like all
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members of the CRB, was too old to have been a member of the Boy Scouts, given that they
were founded in the United States in 1910. And it should be noted that the outdoor life meant
many things to many people. In fact, Francis Wickes’ son made it a point to indicate that both he
and his father likely picked up Seton’s work for its interest and attention to nature and animals
rather than for any martial purposes as may have been intended by the British founder of the
Scouts, Lord Baden-Powell.29 But those broader ideas and applications of the outdoor life for a
national purpose were still likely important to Wickes, who used language of the active life in the
outdoors in his writings about the CRB’s work and the importance and necessity of engaging
with the outdoors in Belgium.
The natural world and a man’s involvement with it became important, though, for the
proper development of an American if he was not to be over-civilized, but rather able to exercise
control over an uncivilized natural environment. 30 Wickes wrote that the Americans’
“acquaintance with [Belgium] … betrayed sometimes the[ir] deepest ignorance,” and they:
Discovered conditions far different from what they had conceived and soon found
themselves embarked upon a project whose vastness they had never imagined. Neither
their anticipations nor their training had in any way prepared them for the work, which
they were to do….[but] [w]hat they lacked in specific [knowledge of the Belgians’
conditions] they more than made up for in their zeal and in their possession of more
fundamental characteristics.31
Belgium was indeed in terrible shape after the invasion. Many citizens fled to London as
refugees, cities like Louvain were damaged greatly by the war, and the normal function of
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government and economy had ceased. They would have to make sense of an unknown situation
very quickly and establish their authority right away. According to Wickes, this required
characteristics and men who were “intelligent thinkers with a practical turn of mind…an
ingrained quality of adaptability, accustomed to independence and initiative—they were AngloSaxons of the western world.”32
These were the men, then, who could do the job and do it well. While the world around
them was chaotic and disordered, by virtue of their particular cultural background they could
bring some order to Belgium. It was a declaration of American Exceptionalism, but tied to a
longer trajectory that reached back to Old England. The early twentieth century was also a period
of growing cultural and social ties between the United States and Britain, especially between rich
American women and cash-poor, but land- and title-rich, English nobles. For instance, the future
British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, was the son of an American woman, Jeanette Jerome,
and an English nobleman, Lord Randolph Churchill.33 Though the United States stood apart from
the Old World, it was also connected to the “best” of its history and culture, especially that
represented by civilized and powerful Great Britain.
They would need to possess qualities of education and intellect, a sense of duty and
service to their fellow man, and an ability to engage with difficult circumstances with selfcontrol and strength. These were the qualities sought after for and by the first American
delegates from Oxford and later from many of the premier colleges and universities in the United
32
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States. Whether or not the men actually had these qualities, they believed these attributes were
necessary for themselves and for others to succeed in the humanitarian mission. The CRB
brought together two ideas—adventure and service. It helped to fuse older concepts of the
masculine outdoors (in this case a war zone) and fears of over civilization, with a more
protective and nurturing desire to help an injured and weak people, the Belgians, without guns or
force.
Once the Americans got to Belgium to begin to act on their desires to do good and be
active Americans abroad in an emergency situation, they were assigned a specific area to work in.
The CRB used Belgium’s provincial divisions and designations for its organizational purposes.
Each had its own Belgian-run provincial committee. Each committee provided relief for roughly
the same Belgian province. These committees consisted of local politicians, businessmen, and
community leaders. Each had to have a fair political representation among the parties: Liberal,
Catholic, and Socialist. Attached to each provincial committee was a principal American
delegate and then one or more assistants, sometimes based in a major city aside from the
provincial “capital.” The Antwerp, Limbourg, Brabant, Brussels, Hainaut, Namur, Liège, and
Luxembourg committees were all located, more or less, within the German “Occupation Zone.”
This zone was governed from Brussels by an occupation government headed by a German
general. The committees for West Flanders (North), West Flanders (South), and East Flanders,
fell within the Army Zones and under stricter military control. Northern France, which came
under CRB auspices in April 1915 was also part of the Army Zone. 34 Delegates stationed in the
southern provinces like Luxembourg, Namur and Liège were located in the francophone, coal34
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rich south. Delegates in the Army Zone and the Antwerp Province were in the more pastoral,
Flemish north. Hainaut, Brabant, and Limbourg straddled the linguistic divide, not yet official in
Belgium, while Brussels, as the capital city, had its own committee. It was up to Hoover and his
senior officials to assign delegates to an appropriate region of Belgium, but it was up to each
individual volunteer to make his case about why he should be chosen for work with the CRB.

Candidates’ Self Characterizations
David T. Nelson was one of first to take up the Wilson’s challenge of neutrality and
impartiality and Hoover’s call for action and involvement in a new humanitarian endeavor. A
native of North Dakota, Nelson was neither part of the “Eastern Elite” nor Hoover’s own West
Coast network of Californians and Stanford University faculty and alumni.35 Despite these
differences, however, Nelson’s background as a “westerner,” placed him within the context of
the Rooseveltian idealization of “the frontier” and those who came from it. 36 Nelson had
graduated from Luther College in Iowa in 1912 and took up his studies as a Rhodes scholar at
New College, Oxford in September 1914. In late November, the young man wrote his parents
that with his vacation coming, he might join up with a “scheme” to go to Belgium. “There’s no
danger attached to the work,” he wrote in what must have been an effort to calm his parents’
fears of their son leaving safe Oxford to go to a war zone. “[T]he relations between the Germans
and American Committee are very cordial, - but one will very likely have to rough it as the
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country is in a terrible state of desolation.” 37 Nelson’s reference to “roughing it” echoes
Hoover’s call for men who could live such a life.
Francis Wickes also emphasized the outdoor life and its attendant meanings. Wickes
learned about CRB work though established delegates and joined on the partial recommendation
of a friend, Lawrence “Duke” Wellington. In May 1917, Wickes wrote an account of the
delegates’ experiences in Belgium. Though written in the comfort of London and in the month
after the United States entered the war, it was included in an official volume of documents that
tell the history of the CRB.
Born in Rochester, New York on 7 July 1890, Wickes graduated from Williams College
in 1912 where he was a friend and a fraternity brother of Wellington’s. Wickes went on to
Harvard Law School, graduating in 1915. Wellington had attended Oxford before being among
the first Americans to go to Belgium. Wellington then returned home to Amherst, Massachusetts,
where Wickes visited him in the summer of 1915. On that visit Wellington spoke of his CRB
experience and thus piqued Wickes’ interest “having been bitten by the travel bee from [his] year
in Germany.”38 Being willing to travel and spend time away from home was a necessary part of
being a CRB delegate. One could not return home for a visit or to see family. Once a delegate
left the CRB it was difficult—but not impossible—for him to come back for another tour. That
Wickes was used to travel and had spent significant time abroad was a plus in his file.
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Wellington had returned home on the account of an illness in his family, but the staffing
of the CRB remained very much on his mind and he knew that the CRB was now seeking more
mature men than his first cohort had been. In their rush to get a staff up and running, the CRB
had let in a number of ill suited volunteers. At one point, an early delegate told Whitlock that he
was in Belgium on an inspired mission from God. Whitlock wrote to Ambassador Page that he
wanted “to obtain, through Hoover’s intercession a call for him to go back.”39 The general
assumption that good-stock Americans would make good humanitarians had its limits. These
limitations did not dissuade delegates from recruiting and Hoover from accepting men with the
same value set, but they tried instituting a better process before permitting the new volunteers to
go to Belgium, overseen by successful and trusted veteran CRB delegates or a Belgian consul,
Pierre Mali, in New York City.
Wellington wrote to his superiors in the CRB that he knew some men “who would seem
to come up to the qualifications—young men who have themselves well under control” and had
worked for a year or two in some junior business capacity.40 Wickes, in Wellington’s and the
CRB’s eyes, seemed to be a perfect candidate: less than a month after his initial letter to the
CRB’s New York Office, Wellington wired a simple and direct message: “Recruit Francis
Coggswell [sic] Wickes 229 Oxford St. Rochester NY.”41 Wickes was to join the club and set off
for Belgium.
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Once recruited, Wickes left for Washington to get his passport and then back to New
York City to sail across the Atlantic and begin his work with the CRB. 42 Like the other
Americans who traveled to Europe for work with the CRB, he knew of the dangers. Wickes
recalled he “didn’t have any U-boat scares, although we were all very conscious of the fact that
that was a possibility. But the passage was uneventful.”43 The adventure began with high seas
suspense. Even though the Americans were not going to Belgium to engage in the fighting, their
travel to Europe and conception of what life would be like there was filled with a certain amount
of danger.
Wickes was stationed first in Namur, in the francophone south of Belgium. There he
stayed with Emile Attout, who worked with the local Belgian committee. Wickes’ son, George,
has written that his father—and many of the American delegates—either could not speak French
or spoke it poorly. In the case of the Americans who stayed at Attout’s house, his two “attractive
daughters,” who had spent time in England, helped out with communication. In fact, in the case
of Wickes, he quickly learned the meaning of “l’amour” in Belgium. George Wickes later wrote
that his father met his mother, Germaine Attout, “almost immediately upon his arrival in
Belgium and fell in love on the spot. ‘C’est le coup de foudre,’” George recalled his father
saying about that first meeting with the daughter of his Belgian host.44 Wickes served with the
CRB until the American withdrawal from humanitarian action.
A great bond developed between the delegates over time. They were a fraternity, meeting
frequently after the war and publishing alumni newsletters that updated each other on weddings,
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jobs, and the other milestones of life after the war. The fraternal bonds were strong. In his article
“Yankee ‘Culture’ Makes Good” by Gardner Richardson and published in Hearst’s Magazine,
Gardner Richardson described fellow delegate John Llyles Glenn Jr. from South Carolina, a
Rhodes scholar, as standing six feet tall and weighing two hundred pounds. Glenn had “light hair
and blue eyes [that] gave a boyishness to his otherwise serious mien,” and “when off duty he
would amuse himself, and the Belgians still more, by throwing stones out into a lake twice as far
as they could.”45 An odd way to spend one’s free time, but an example of how the Americans
imagined themselves as stronger than the Belgians they worked for and with. Whether the
Belgians in question were actual children or adults and just not up to the physical standard of
Glenn remains unknown. Through this article and over eighty like it, the men of the CRB played
an active role in their organization’s public messaging. Their stories, as crafted for the public,
were one way the CRB got its message of war-time, American-led humanitarian service out into
world, revealing a desire by those associated with the CRB to make their work and experiences
widely known to the American people in order to develop support back in the United States,
even as the war dragged on in Europe.46
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Tracy Kittredge stressed the group’s privileged backgrounds in his own writings on the
CRB. His unpublished essay “The Emergence of an American Aristocracy” made that clear.47 So
did his article titled “Californians with Hoover In Europe,” published by the University of
California’s alumni magazine in 1920. Kittredge incorporated ideas from his “American
Aristocracy” and compiled statistics of the college affiliation of the CRB’s membership
including twenty from Harvard, eighteen from the University of California, and seventeen from
Princeton. Stanford sent eleven, Yale ten, Columbia six, and Cornell had five alumni serve in
Belgium; other universities and colleges were also represented.48 This was a geographically
diverse group of men—coming from coast to coast and, with the smaller colleges, north and
south—but the vast majority came from the elite institutions of the United States, similar to those
who populated the American foreign service of the Department of State in the early twentieth
century.49 Like the diplomatic corps, the CRB volunteers formed a “club” of men with their own
rules and requirements and assumptions about who could and should participate in the work at
hand. Over time, the American diplomatic corps would professionalize and so too would
international humanitarian work, but the foundation for both were laid by these kinds of men.
New delegates came by way of recruitment by veteran delegates or by application,
usually by sending a letter of interest into the New York City office. Sometimes the CRB would
solicit specific institutions for possible candidates. Princeton University President John G.
Hibben responded favorably to a request by the CRB’s New York office director, John Beaver
47
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White, for the names of Princeton men who would be suitable for work in Belgium.50 Even so,
White was reluctant to promise Hibben that “men just out of College” would be able to go in the
summer of 1916.51 The “recent appeal from London,” wrote White, “asked to have men not only
speaking French fluently but having business experience and more mature.”52 While the age
requirement may have gone up and more business experience may have become desirable, the
reality of the situation required a more case-by-case hiring of delegates. After the initial group,
delegates submitted letters of reference to establish what kind of character they possessed and
what experiences they had. Such references enabled the CRB staff to weed out “clubmen or
dilettantes” who were undesirable.53 Once the CRB had a firmer footing in Belgium and had a
better understanding of the scale and scope of the work, Hoover and his colleagues realized that
they would need to not only rely on subjective cultural markers of competence, but looked for
men with some professional experience. Professional experience would mean that the new
recruits could manage Americans and Belgians appropriately, often without direct intervention
from Brussels or London. Thus, they put in a stronger vetting process and felt no need to accept
just anyone into their ranks. Of course, they made exceptions for men who had exceptional
references.
In addition to the CRB’s executive in London and the delegates in Belgium, the CRB
employed a staff in New York and London responsible for the overall bookkeeping and clerical
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work of the CRB. These men, especially the accountants, were paid.54 They were often the first
people to meet applicants. An assistant director in New York wrote to Hoover in the fall of 1916
that they were “having a difficult time to meet the requirements in regard to the delegates” but
that one of the former delegates, Robert Arrowsmith, had proved “of great assistance.” In one
instance, staffers interviewed thirty applicants who wanted to go to Belgium but after having
“gone over this bunch with a fine tooth comb” were only able to identify four acceptable
candidates: “They are all absolutely first class men, and we have no doubt concerning them.”55
Later in this chapter, we will see what could disqualify an applicant. Sometimes it was because
of race or sex, sometimes because of bad timing, or because the application did not come close
enough to even the sometimes subjective requirements for acceptance.
After the initial influx of Rhodes scholars, Hoover established a more organized system
of staffing and control in Belgium. Arriving in the country just before Christmas 1914, he
celebrated the holiday at the American legation with Whitlock and his American staff in Brussels.
While Hoover managed the CRB from London, he centralized Belgian-based executive work in
new offices at 66 Rue des Colonies. This new office stood around the corner from the massive
Cathedral of St. Michel from where the Belgian Catholic prelate, Cardinal Mercier, preached
patience and fortitude and sometimes resistance during the German occupation.56 The American
delegates acted as the agents of Brand Whitlock, to whom all imports were originally charged. In
this way, the America delegates served as guardians and overseers of the imports, not actual
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distributors of the foodstuffs.57 Though they were not official agents of the U.S. government,
there was an implicit relationship between the CRB and American government officials in
Belgium that provided an added level of protection to the CRB’s work. The relationship between
an international NGO and its state of origin can complicate a group’s work or, in the case of the
CRB, it can be a helpful one. Once the United States entered the fighting in April 1917, the
Americans’ relationship to their country of origin was a complication and led to their withdrawal
from Belgium.
Not only were delegates drawn from recently graduated university classes, some
delegates were drawn from the ranks of university administration. David Barrows was a dean at
the University of California when Kittredge recruited him in the winter of 1915-16. 58 Frank
Brackett, a Dartmouth University graduate, was a dean and professor of mathematics at Pomona
College in Claremont, California when he joined the CRB in the spring of 1916. In fact, he asked
for a leave of absence from the college to join the CRB, sailing from New York on 28 June 1916.
He served with the CRB until December 1916. As he was preparing his trip, he also offered his
son’s services. Not yet twenty, the son was not taken on, but Brackett described him as of the
type capable for the humanitarian work: “he is a good worker, strong, tactful, with some
executive ability.”59 Even with his father’s recommendation, the younger Brackett did not serve.
As it became apparent that the CRB’s work would not be brief and the work became more
systematized, Hoover sought more mature men. Being a teenager disqualified Brackett’s son.

57

Nash, Herbert Hoover, 78-79.

58

Kittredge to White, 25 November 1915, CRB Collection, Box 313, Folder 4. Hoover
Institution Archives.
59

Brackett to CRB NY, 5 June 1916, CRB Collection, Box 313, Folder 10, Hoover Institution
Archives.

77

While the delegates had to be Americans through and through, their experience in and
with the wider world, especially Europe, could work in their favor in the application process.60
Milton Brown, who served in Belgium from February 1916 until the American withdrawal in
1917, came highly recommended from Howard McClenahan, Dean of Princeton University.
Brown, originally from Glendale, Ohio, graduated from Princeton in 1913 and was
recommended “very heartily” by McClenahan in September 1915. Brown was a self-described
“travel-lecturer” according to his own publicity pamphlet. “Mr. Brown,” the pamphlet reads,
“invites you to accompany him with your eyes and ears and your imagination, rambling with him
familiarly through the scenes made famous in song and story, in history and legend,” in his talk
on “Rambles Beneath Italian Skies.”61 Brown exemplified the cosmopolitan nature of many of
the delegates selected for work in Belgium.
McClenahan was so confident about Brown’s potential that he wrote the CRB without
Brown’s knowledge. McClenahan hoped that Brown’s maturity would work to his advantage:
“He is a man of very fine ability, fine character, and of excellent judgment. I believe that he
would do the work which a younger man can do in Belgium most admirably.”62 Since the CRB
received many more applications for positions than were available, Brown’s was one that was
kept on file. He was called up a few months later. 63 Over time, the CRB went from an
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organization reaching out to the nearest group of Americans potentially well suited for the work
at hand, to an organization that had so many applications that they could keep them on file and
return to them at a later date. This enabled the CRB to be more discerning in its choosing of
delegates and, thus, continue to strengthen its position in Belgium with a well developed staff of
proper, American men exemplifying their American-ness. Since patience was a desired virtue,
men like Brown, who could wait to be called into service, were excellent candidates.
Though Brown’s application would later include a letter from his father and from
Princeton’s president, John Grier Hibben, he also advocated for himself, drawing on the
characteristics that the CRB sought for its staff. “At present,” wrote Brown, “I am in good health,
and my general condition is such that I am rarely indisposed in any way.”64 Health, certainly,
mattered for work in Belgium. As the members of the CRB were there to help Belgians, having
to spend time caring for their own because of illness was not helpful. To paint oneself as healthy
and therefore not a potential drain on the resources of the CRB was an obvious plus. It could also
be a way to reassure the CRB that one’s age was not going to be a problem in far off Belgium.
Brown reported that “due to the fact that at college I was engaged in a department of athletics
which is one of the very best trainers for endurance and good physical condition, long distance
cross-country running, and, too, to the fact that my summers were usually spent in the rough life
of a camp in the Canadian woods” he was prepared for life in war torn Belgium.65 Like Wickes,
the outdoor life was important to Brown, who used it as a way to indicate his understanding and
expectation of the work ahead in Belgium.

64

Brown to CRB NY Office, 3 November 1915, CRB Collection, Box 313, Folder 14, Hoover
Institution Archives.
65

Ibid.

79

After the declaration of American belligerency, Brown joined the 324th Field Artillery.
He wrote in a letter to a friend that he was now “a plain, ordinary, common, dish-washing, floorsweeping, cuspidor cleaning, heavy artillery, rear rank, lowest grade, 2nd class, buck private!”
and that he was “getting hard as nails and hoped to go over before too long.”66 Brown, like many
other CRB men joined up with the U.S. Army, some seeing action in Europe. After the war,
Brown fathered a son who also went to Princeton and then joined the Peace Corps. Brown had
established a pedigree of elite education and humanitarian service with his work in the CRB.
Cosmopolitanism was valued, but business experience was a prime characteristic for
CRB officials in their recruitment. Hoover was a man of business and the CRB operated as a
large logistical organization, not a charity or soup kitchen. The men who worked for the CRB
had to have (or quickly learn) how to manage people, time, and resources under difficult
circumstances. As an example of a person who brought some business experience, Prentiss N.
Gray enjoyed a very distinguished career with the CRB. Born in Oakland, California in 1884, he
graduated from the University of California in 1906 and entered the lumber and shipping
industry in San Francisco. He joined the CRB in February 1916 and served as representative in
Antwerp, Brussels, and Valenciennes, France before becoming an assistant director of the CRB
in Brussels in June 1916. He was promoted to director (still a volunteer position) in Brussels in
April 1917, just as the United States entered the war and, upon returning to the U.S., worked in
the New York office as an assistant director.67 Gray went on to serve on the executive council of
the Belgian American Educational Foundation, the bi-national philanthropic and educational
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exchange group founded with leftover funds from the CRB. Gray was just one example of CRB
members maintaining their relationship with Belgium and with philanthropic work related to the
CRB long after the war. A great many former CRB delegates served as officers of the BAEF in
the decades after World War I. Hoover was the honorary chairman of the board from 1941-1951
and from 1962-1964.68
After the war, many delegates went on to careers in the law or business, but some
continued to work within the growing humanitarian space. Probably the most important one was
Maurice Pate of Denver, Colorado, who became the first director of UNICEF after World War II.
He became a CRB delegate in the summer of 1916. He had offered his services in April 1916. He
wrote that he worked with the American Red Cross at Princeton University until he graduated in
1915 and that he was “willing to volunteer my services while in your employ.”69 Pate, 22 years
old, was upfront about his lack of French language skills, but neither that deficiency nor his
relatively young age kept him from starting his work in July 1916.70 During his preparations for
work with the CRB, Pate spent time in New York City from 16 May. He met with CRB officials
and Mali, the Belgian official who evaluated CRB members for their French fluency. He studied
French for three weeks and eventually received his appointment with the CRB on 13 June and
left for Europe on 17 June.71 Pate is an example of how the requirements were more like
guidelines than hard-and-fast rules for recruits. Here again, subjective values of who could make
68
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a good delegate sometimes trumped the stated requirements the CRB tried to put into place after
the first few months.
Pate’s recommendations placed him well within the bounds of the value-set and
humanitarian identity sought after by the CRB. Hibben, Pate’s university president reference,
called Pate “helpful and resourceful”—“a man of resolute purpose” who “can be trusted
implicitly.” Hibben was “delighted to have one of [Pate’s] ability and character represent
Princeton.”72 One of his English professors, Morris W. Cross, wrote that Pate had a “remarkably
clear head” and was “a most efficient manager and executive.”73 Another letter by a Princeton
official called Pate, “a young man of the finest character….[and] in all personal things he is a
fine, straightforward, reliable young gentleman of the highest type.”74 Pate served with the CRB
in Hainault Province until the American withdrawal. Pate’s references highlighted the right type
of characteristics in the right way—“efficient manager and executive” and a willingness to serve
as a volunteer—and this was enough to let Pate in. By taking a chance on Pate, Hoover and the
CRB helped foster one of the more important international humanitarians of the twentieth
century.

Who Did Not Make the Cut
Because of the CRB’s publicity in the United States by returning delegates, the CRB
received many more applications for work than they had spots to fill and more importantly, some
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applicants were not acceptable candidates even when positions were available. Sometimes, an
applicant applied when there was no need for new volunteers. Delegates were asked to serve for
a minimum of six months.75 A. Piatt Andrew wrote a letter to Lindon W. Bates, the CRB’s New
York Office director in early December 1914. Bates responded that that because Hoover and the
Commission had “secured the services of a number of American Rhodes scholars of Oxford
University, the Commission does not wish any more sent over from this country at the present
time.”76 Andrew, however, found work with the American Ambulance Corps in France.77 While
unique, the CRB was still one of a variety of organizations Americans could seek out for
wartime service before U.S. belligerency. It would take time for the CRB to publicize its efforts
and to then have applicants seeking to work exclusively with the CRB, though it still would
receive many applications from men who simply wanted to just “do something,” which was not
something that worked in their favor.
While the CRB certainly sought men from elite backgrounds, that alone was not always
enough to guarantee acceptance. If and when the CRB could be particular about its candidates, it
was. For instance, the nephew of President Ulysses S. Grant’s secretary of state, Hamilton Fish,
was rejected for being too young.78 In his application letter, Hamilton Fish Armstrong impressed
upon his potential employers that he and his family “have been entirely Americans for
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Generations.”79 At twenty-four and even with awards and honors from Princeton University, he
was not acceptable. His is a prime example of the inconsistent standards the CRB often had.
Sometimes it seemed that there was no justification beyond “no.” At twenty-four, Armstrong
was too young, but Pate, at twenty-two was acceptable. Armstrong would go on to a
distinguished career as a journalist and long-time editor of Foreign Affairs, the influential
American foreign policy journal.
While recommendations counted, they, too, were often not sufficient. Timing, also
mattered. In the case of Lawrence C. Murray, the recommendation of former president Theodore
Roosevelt could only get him a cool reception and delayed appointment with the CRB until
February 1917, just as the CRB’s American position in Belgium was unraveling, given the
imminent end of the nation’s neutral status. “There is no man,” wrote Roosevelt, “in whose
judgment, tact, and diplomacy I have more confidence, and I cannot speak too highly of his
straight-forward sincerity of character.”80 Murray, who had been Roosevelt’s controller of the
currency, did not have the appropriate French language skills.81 Again, another example of the
inconsistency of CRB recruitment practices. Murray was, however, considered as being of a
“high type man” who might be an able assistant to the American executives in Brussels.82
Applying just as the United States was about to enter the war ultimately prevented him from
taking up an official position with the CRB.
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Being an American citizen was essential. A number of non-Americans did apply but were
turned down. In July 1916 James Barnes, a physics professor at Bryn Mawr College, applied but
his Canadian citizenship, as a citizen of a belligerent nation, disqualified him from CRB service.
“Authorities require that all of the members of the Commission be native Americans,” wrote
Lucey.83 The power of American citizenship and a “natural” American identity was the very first
requirement for acceptance into the CRB delegates. In this way, the CRB could never be truly
“international.” Though it had non-American honorary chairmen from Spain and the Netherlands,
the actual body of humanitarians had to be natural-born Americans. Without that underlying
American legal status as a citizen, no broad based desire for humanitarian work could get
someone into the CRB.
Some communication between the CRB and its applicants was remarkably blunt. H. B.
Barton, a twenty-nine year old teacher from Worcester, Massachusetts was turned down
ostensibly because of his lack of proficiency in French, though other candidates had been
allowed through with similar limitations. (An undated note in his file that recommends him has a
red slash across it and “can’t use” written in the margin.84) In a lively letter from an unnamed
CRB official in New York, Barton was told that “[m]erely a reading knowledge [of French] is
not sufficient” but the official saw “no reason why [Barton] could not get busy with some French
companion” to get his conversational French up to par for work with the CRB. Even more
interesting is how this CRB official presents the qualifications necessary to Barton: “tact, the
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ability to keep your feet on the ground, and your head cool and your mouth shut.”85 A CRB
delegate needed to be adventurous and represented the forceful attitude of a Roosevelt-type to
get difficult work done, but also needed restraint in their words and deeds as Wilson articulated
in his neutrality speech in August 1914.
Barton was not only interested in CRB work, but ambulance work as well. In October
1916 a CRB official answered a question from Barton differentiating the type of work the CRB
did from that done in the ambulance corps:
I fear I cannot give you any first hand advice. Of course there is no question of the great
service that can be rendered in that work, but it is after all, a work in which physical traits
count perhaps for more than the mental maturity which is the most valuable factor of the
work required from a Belgian representative, whose labors affect more closely a large
number of individuals than do those of the members of the ambulance corps.86
This response emphasized the CRB’s intellectual work and privileged food relief over medical
relief. This was one way the CRB distinguished itself from other forms of humanitarian war
service and could justify its exclusivity: it was one thing to provide medical care, a long-standing
humanitarian practice, but it was quite an other to provide food relief for millions of people. In
this particular case, the balance between the values of the mature mind and the mature body had
shifted toward the mind and the powerful element of self-control for the neutral delegates. In the
CRB’s view, the work of a CRB delegate was more complex than driving an ambulance from the
front to the hospital and back again, or so they presumed. Even with another recommendation
from a CRB delegate that praised Barton as “mature, thoughtful, enthusiastic, manly, [and]

85

Unknown to Barton, 20 July 1916, CRB Collection, Box 318, Folder 8, Hoover Institution
Archives.
86

Arrowsmith to Barton, 27 October 1916, CRB Collection, Box 318, Folder 8, Hoover
Institution Archives.

86

experienced,” he was not selected to go.87 It was likely not a smart idea for an applicant to
suggest that they wanted to do any kind of humanitarian work. Rather, the CRB looked for men
who wanted to do its kind of work. The Americans were developing their own humanitarian
identity, one that was new and engaged in something different than what one would do as a
medical aid or ambulance driver closer to the front.
The CRB was not a refuge for young men to run to forget their problems, either. Men,
however, did write to the CRB asking for just that change. W. G. Beach was “about ‘busted’” in
November 1916 and had “a great deal to forget.” Though he was twenty-seven and a Harvard
graduate, he probably was not physically up to the task as he was “five feet none, 150
[pounds].”88 His letters of reference did not help his cause. A father who employed Beach as a
tutor for his son described him as “erratic and something of a ‘floater.’”89 While many delegates
did find their professional calling in Belgium, some even found love, Belgium was no place
solely “to find oneself” post-graduation. Perceptions of a person were also disqualifying features.
For instance, C. J. Becker’s application in December 1915 was turned down because of his
“German name,” even though he was born in the Netherlands and a naturalized American
citizen.90 He also asked for a $200 a month salary as he had a wife and three children.91 Asking
for money was a safe bet to make one’s acceptance less likely.
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Being perceived as (or being actually) too pro-British or pro-French was also a problem.
For instance, Charles Bennett, a professor at Cornell University, would have been a great
addition, delegate Robert Arrowsmith thought—but he was persona non grata in Germanoccupied Belgium because of his outspoken pro-British statements.92 CRB officials in London
and Brussels preached strict neutrality almost religiously. When Pate arrived in Brussels in July
1916, he and his fellow new delegates reported to the Commission’s office where they “were
given a heart-to-heart talk by Mr. Brown (Director) and Mr. Richards (Secy.) on ‘neutrality’ and
what it meant to the Commission’s work.”93
Being a woman also disqualified an applicant from service. Most of the delegates were
single men, but the CRB’s files contain over a dozen applications from women. All were turned
down. Clara Dunn from Monroe City, Missouri applied to work for the CRB in July 1916. She
had read about the CRB’s work in Outlook magazine and was responding to the appeal for more
workers in Belgium. Dunn was twenty-eight and had graduated from the University of Missouri
where she studied French. “I believe that I could do the work as capably as a man,” she wrote,
“and I know that my enthusiasm for the cause could not be surpassed.”94 Notwithstanding her
capability, the CRB turned her down because “we regret…that the conditions under which the
Commission operate do not permit women workers.”95
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The CNSA and CRB used Belgian women for some work, especially for bookkeeping in
the local provincial offices. So, Mrs. A. de Beyersdorff who wrote to the CRB in March 1915
about working in “any capacity,” was turned down.96 Her Germanic name aside, the CRB
informed her that even “relief work that women can handle is thoroughly organized and is being
carried on very efficiently by Belgian women who are naturally devoted to the work and
understand the needs of their countrymen.”97 The division of work between Americans and
Belgians even applied to the sexes. Work that could be done by women was not outsourced or
necessary for American supervision beyond the supervision already provided by American male
delegates. The CRB sought men for masculine work. That was part of the cultural identity of the
CRB: masculine American-ness. Even though the CRB was not engaged in martial work it was
still a place for American men to engage in this new kind of expression of American power and
influence overseas.98
Not all denied applicants took their rejections quietly. Some, like Yale sophomore John
Ellington, pushed for their acceptance. The chance to go overseas and participate in something as
new and seemingly important was often a key motivating factor. He wrote to the CRB’s New
York office in November 1916 that he was “deeply disappointed” and he felt that he “did not
think [his] years an honest measure of [his] maturity” and would have further references
forwarded to the CRB on his behalf.99 One recommender, Charles Brown, Dean of the School of
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Religion at Yale, wrote that Ellington was “a big, strong, wholesome type, brim-full of energy
and with extraordinary resourcefulness.” Brown also noted that Ellington had lived for a while in
Alaska.100 Even this frontier experience was not enough for the CRB to overlook the young age
of the candidate this time.
A few days later, Ellington wrote telling the CRB that he had received and would accept
a commission with the American Ambulance Service in France. It was his hope, he wrote, that
he could work in France for six months or so and then enter into the CRB’s employ.101 This
scenario would, he was told in a follow-up letter, permanently ban him from service with the
CRB since Ellington would then have served behind French lines.102 The Germans would not
allow anyone who had served behind French lines to enter into German occupied territory for
fear of espionage.
Race, too, was a limiting factor. Not many non-white Americans applied, but those who
did were turned down. In December 1915 Alonzo Esannson wrote the CRB:
It might interest you to know that I have lived for 4 years in Belgium….and can speak
French, Spanish, and a large amount of German….I am native of Puerto Rico (colored),
refined, and intelligent and came to this country in 1900 in the employ of the Officers of
the 11th US Infantry.103
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Attached to his letter was a note from a CRB official that read: “Porto [sic] Rican—Colored.
Unavailable.”104 The CRB assumed that the only Americans able to work for it were white and
male. These were the paramount markers of proper American-ness needed to be a member of the
CRB. Beyond Esannson’s “colored” status he was “Porto Rican” and thus not an actual U.S.
citizen, but a “non citizen national” of the United States. Familiarity with Belgium and the
French language, even German, and service with the American military were not enough to
allow Esannson into the CRB.
Sorting out men with ulterior motives was also part of the application process. Many men
went to see the Belgian consul in New York, Pierre Mali, who judged their language skills and
character. In at least one instance, Mali noted the pro-German sympathies of one applicant, Paul
Myron Linebarger.105 The freedom of movement for Americans had to be guarded carefully and
the inclusion of someone who would not be neutral—in the eyes of the CRB, the British, and the
Germans—would only damage the credibility of the CRB and inhibit its work for the Belgian
people. The legal status afforded American neutrality was part of the identity of the American
CRB delegate just as much as social and cultural qualifications were.
Many different reasons barred applicants from joining the ranks of the CRB. Most often
it was lack of French-speaking ability or being clearly younger than the target age. Of course,
constant exceptions were made to that rule, but age and French language served as an early
vetting tool by the CRB staff. Though many of those who sought work with the CRB had the
valued qualities that the CRB sought, as the CRB became more established it could be more
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careful with whom it let in. The simple act of having the stated attributes of a man of good
character did not always suffice; applicants also had to measure up to a slowly developing
identity of an American CRB “humanitarian” that drew on those qualities. The network of
delegates who recruited their friends and peers created a somewhat closed group of potential
relief workers. In so doing, the personnel of the CRB began to rest upon a set of assumptions that
were often not articulated, but important nonetheless in the development and sustenance of the
CRB’s staff because it allowed for the CRB to have a well of possible recruits that was selfselected. Like many other self-selecting groups, the CRB wanted to populate itself with people
who looked and acted like one another. Belgian relief was not a time to experiment with
diversity or new ideas in its staffing or in the execution of its work. Once Hoover and his
colleagues discovered what worked and who worked well, they kept to that script, only making
exceptions when they could identify some exceptional qualification that trumped a deficiency in
age or language ability.

Conclusion
In his essay on “The Emergence of an American Aristocracy,” Kittredge connected the
delegates to the cultural values of elite American education at the turn of the twentieth century:
They were nearly all at the beginning graduates of American colleges who had been [at]
Oxford as Rhodes Scholars or advanced students when the war began in 1914. Later
many men were sent over from the United States, but the type was still the same. They
were men whose education had fitted them to leadership and to service of the common
good, and had provided them with the training, tact and experience that made it possible
for them to handle large business affairs, complicated matters of administration, and
delicate and involved diplomatic questions with equal felicity.106
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His essay detailed the service of “the American college man” who participated admirably during
World War I. Members of the CRB, according to Kittredge, were just one subset of this
particular new “American aristocracy.” It was a group of men who were forged in American
institutions and culture. That fact gave Kittredge the confidence to write that we “now know that
the type of man shaped by [American colleges and universities] has given the world a
demonstration of efficiency in action, altruism in ideals, adaptability in habits and ideas, that can
only be characterized as wonderful.”107 These values were considered the primary values for
proper American men and an idea of what the United States, as a presumed Anglo-Saxon nation,
could be on the world stage.108 These values applied to the CRB as well and helped to determine
who would be allowed to participate in the CRB’s humanitarian mission and how they went
about their work in Belgium, leading to a legitimization of humanitarian endeavors as another
way for the Americans and the United States to exercise power in the new twentieth century.
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Chapter 3*
On The Ground in Belgium:
The World of the CRB Delegates
While in Belgium, CRB delegates lived in a theater of war. They were relief workers, but
they were also spectators to one of the greatest calamities in history. Their humanitarianism
came to mean more than supervising relief goods, but also participating in the life of Belgian
society and witnessing the war and occupation. Despite the difficult circumstances of their labor,
they often experienced the war as “war tourists” who absorbed the sights and sounds of the
conflict and they also reflected on the foreign peoples they encountered. These experiences,
coupled with their privileged place as American outsiders, influenced how they thought and,
indeed, how they conducted their humanitarian work over the course of their time in Belgium.
By witnessing the spectacle of war in addition to their aid activities they constructed a
humanitarian identity for themselves to comprehend the war and their place within it. This new
identity was shaped by their American-ness, their neutral status, and the amorphous space they
inhabited in Belgium: they were neither combatants nor victims; neither occupied nor occupiers.
At times they became tourists, unofficial ambassadors of the United States, and agents of mercy
to people threatened with starvation. Their official role as neutral arbiters of relief aid was
complemented by their informal role as travelers in a strange land. A new generation of
Americans was experiencing an overseas war firsthand, complete with all its sights and sounds.
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As neutrals the Americans tried to stand apart from the politics of the war, but they were also
very much a part of the day-to-day life as civilian aid workers living in a distressed land.1
The CRB delegates encountered a dynamic country full of the strange machinery of war,
but also characterized by aristocracy, abbeys, and culture often unlike what they were used to in
the United States. Historians have recently argued that Americans traveling overseas act as
agents of American power. 2 Those Americans’ identities were shaped by their foreign
experiences. 3 Despite the increasing regularity of American travel to Europe in the early
twentieth century, many of the CRB’s delegates assumed new roles in an unfamiliar place. Susan
Sontag contended that “[b]eing a spectator of calamities taking place in another country is a
quintessential modern experience.” 4 Indeed, the outbreak of a great European war was a
profound calamity as the historian Julia Irwin has discussed, and the attendant humanitarian
disaster in Belgium was one as well.5 Sontag argued that journalists were “specialized tourists”
who could observe and then report on the spectacle of the disaster they witnessed.6 Whereas
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journalists are widely acknowledged to be powerful mediators of war for a wider public, agents
of humanitarianism were also powerful interpreters of the First World War. Their witnessing was
just as important as any of their doing as it began to inform many delegates’ future views on the
need for American involvement with the wider world, especially with American-led
humanitarian aid during the middle of the twentieth century.
Their doing, however, was still extraordinarily important. It was not only critical for the
Belgian people who needed the Americans’ aid, but it was essential to how this group of
Americans fashioned their identity as humanitarian workers during the early years of the First
World War. Since the CRB was a new organization and this was the first real American effort at
a logistical footprint in Europe of any sort, what they did and how they did it took on deep
meaning for the men who were there to do the work. Those meanings were then shared with
fellow delegates and shaped their interactions with the Belgian people, and those interactions
influenced how the delegates thought about their work and their place as agents of American
power. This chapter argues that even though the CRB delegates were recruited to be neutral and
professionalized humanitarians, they were often influenced by emotional and sensory factors that
impacted their understanding of their place in Belgium and within an emerging humanitarian
space populated by Americans seeking to be more involved with the world.
Hoover unleashed his operational and business know-how to make the CRB effective and
efficient. While the Belgians themselves were expected to handle the actual distribution of the
imported food, the American agents in Belgium were commissioned to be “controlling and
inspecting managers” of the relief effort “to see that the Belgians did the job properly and
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honestly.”7 This did not always sit well with the CNSA chairman, Emile Francqui, and some
Belgians. For instance, Francqui was never fond of the Department of Inspection and Control,
led by Joseph C. Green, a 29-year-old Princeton graduate. Inspection and Control was supposed
to be a joint endeavor by the CRB and the Belgians, but it was dominated by Americans, which
caused a good deal of tension because Francqui felt that the Americans were not trusting of the
Belgians and encroaching more and more into Belgian-led distribution of relief. 8 For the
Americans, it made perfect sense that they would have as much influence as possible, since it
was they who were providing for the protection and freedom of movement of goods around
Belgium by virtue of their status as American neutrals.
The CRB agents accounted for and reported back to CRB executives in Brussels and,
ultimately, to Herbert Hoover in London. They did this through detailed bookkeeping at offices
in cities, towns, and communes all around Belgium and through frequent inspection tours of
CRB warehouses and Belgian-run distribution centers. The American agents regularly gathered
in Brussels to report in writing and verbally on their work and the Belgians’ efforts. Their status
as official representatives of a relief organization and as citizens of a neutral power enabled the
CRB to be a successful example of a Progressive-era professionalized philanthropic machine
whose members would often be called on for future international humanitarian endeavors, like
when Hoover toured post-World War II Germany to investigate that country’s food needs at the
behest of President Harry S. Truman.
CRB delegates also forged emotional and sentimental relationships with their hosts and
their surroundings. Francis Wickes became so connected to Belgium that he married a Belgian
7
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woman and many maintained ties to the country after the war through philanthropic work with
joint U.S.-Belgian organizations like the BAEF. These connections formed between the CRB
men and the land and people they were helping transcended the routine of work and refashioned
earlier more dispassionate sensibilities that had encouraged distance from aid recipients. Instead,
the Americans allowed for some personal attachment to place and people, although that approach
was challenged in the months leading up to the Americans’ withdrawal in 1917 when they were
confronted with a German policy of labor deportations and had to often choose between the
larger, and seemingly less personal, relief effort and the wellbeing of Belgians right in front of
them.
In some ways the men of the CRB resembled those involved with American settlement
house efforts in that they lived with and among the people they were working with.9 While the
CRB delegates were not trying to “Americanize” the Belgians or “develop” them in the ways
that some Progressive Era reformers had wanted to do with immigrants, the Americans did bring
with them American perceptions of efficiency and effectiveness that they at least hoped would
influence the Belgians in the short term. The Belgians were too close to problems in their own
country, and local political issues could get in the way of efficient work. The Americans, though,
were free of such baggage and could try to render more impartial service.
But the Belgians were also dedicated to making the relief effort as successful as possible.
For instance, Maurice Pate noted that he was impressed with “the people in charge of the
ravitaillement in the small villages…a word or hint for improvement of any details in the stores
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or book-keeping I saw at once carried out.”10 The CRB delegate’s job was to dispassionately
support the work of the Belgians wherever they could through observation, accounting, and
suggesting improvements when and where necessary.
Their visceral experiences, however, invariably tempered the CRB delegates’ ostensible
objectivity and impartiality as neutrals, and the relationships they made with Belgians enabled
them to really put the “human” in the humanitarian. These American relief workers in Belgium
experienced and sensed—in a literal way—the theater of war, revealing that they comprehended
the war and their work as not something clinical and their job as a distant one, but as something
they were experiencing right along with those they were trying to help. In some cases, these
experiences challenging their stated neutrality as they could see first hand who was causing pain
and suffering to the Belgian people. Finding the right balance between dispassion and emotional
investment is still debated by humanitarian organizations to this day.11

Humanitarians at Work
In 1917, toward the end of the CRB’s initial work in Belgium, the Commission published
a forty-seven page “Manual for CRB Representatives.” Pate was its editor, but the manual was
likely the collective work of the CRB delegates, shaped by the experiences—formal and
informal—of the nearly 150 men who served at one time or another in Belgium. According to
the manual, the work of the CRB “demands business ability, honorable and serious undertaking,
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tact, breadth of vision and action.”12 These broad values were certainly important to the work of
the delegate. The CRB embodied elements of both “Rooseveltian” notions of honor and action
and a Wilsonian emphasis on efficiency and dispassion. CRB men also walked a delicate line
during their stays in Belgium. A key feature of humanitarian work is the relationship between
being intimately part of the community being helped while at the same time being apart from it,
and often accorded special accommodations by virtue of being an outsider. Their exact role in
Belgium was, however, constantly being reevaluated and reinterpreted, especially as the CRB
slowly established itself as less of an ad-hoc organization helping to import food in the early
months of the war to a more established organization in Belgium, staying in that country until
whenever the long war would come to an end.
As it became clear that the European war would not end anytime soon and that the relief
work in Belgium would have to continue, American delegates assembled in Brussels in July
1915 to discuss their role going forward. Hoover attended this meeting at 66 Rue des Colonies.
“This work was undertaken in a spirit of idealism,” he said in his remarks. “And has been held
higher than ever before and which will leave a mark in our history.”13 This meeting debated how
large a role the American delegates should have in making decisions at the local level. In one
exchange, the delegate Robinson Smith asked if “members sitting on Provincial Committees
[would] have the right to vote” on various matters. Hoover replied, “Our idea is that it is not
necessary. You may have the right of presence and argument.”14 The Belgians would make the
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ultimate decision for their local committees, but Americans could offer advice when necessary.
This was part of the balance Hoover and his staff had to strike with the Belgians, who did have
their own interests to look after even with Americans there to help.
Calls for extensive American involvement did not always sit well with the Belgian
leadership of the CNSA. There were frequent debates between the CRB and CNSA about the
proper role of the Americans. In the fall of 1916, for instance, disagreements bubbled to the
surface. Francqui expressed gratitude for CRB assistance, but was resistant to any increase in
American control or interference with the Belgian efforts of the CNSA. Francqui made it clear to
the American CRB director in Brussels, Vernon Kellogg, “that the C.N., which is a national
institution, sprung from the will of the Belgian people, is alone responsible towards the Belgian
people and their government for the repartition of food.”15 This friction often arose when there
were claims of malfeasance by local Belgian committees or individual Belgians. Both the
Americans and the CNSA wanted to protect the integrity of relief work, but they often came to
different conclusions about how to do so.16 The CRB was, from the start, an “outsider” since the
Americans would leave after the war. The Belgians, however, had been there, were there then,
and would be there after the war. Local political and petty considerations became part of the
world of relief work, no matter how hard the Americans tried to stop them by trying to serve as a
neutral arbiter.
The issue of local favoritism and the role of the Americans had come up in earlier CRB
meetings. In February 1915, at a meeting where Hoover was present, the CRB delegates
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discussed favoritism “on account of political differences in certain places.”17 The delegates
expressed their understanding that each Belgian provincial committee needed some flexibility,
though how much was left open to debate. The CRB director in Brussels at the time, Albert
Connett, told the delegates that the CNSA could act on specific complaints but not generalities
and that those complaints had to be sent up the chain of command of the CNSA.18 This would, in
effect, cut the CRB out of this process.19 In other ways, though, the CRB was central to how the
Belgians conducted the business of relief.
Over time a system of hearings (though they were called “trials” at the time) was put in
place jointly by the CRB and the CNSA to adjudicate abuses by bakers. Prentiss Gray, a delegate
who arrived in Belgium in the late winter of 1916 and was stationed in Antwerp Province
presided over some of these hearings. On 3 March, just after being promoted to chief delegate of
the Antwerp Province, Gray had his “first taste of judicial authority.” “It appears,” he wrote in
his diary, “that it falls within the province of the American Delegate to preside at the trials of
bakers who have violated the rules imposed upon them by the Provincial Committee, also to
mete out to such offenders punishment which he deems in accord with the ‘crime’ committed.”20
Because of Gray’s status as the American CRB delegate he was the “judge,” but he realized that
power was very much limited:
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These trials are staged with all the impressiveness of a real court, but they are carried on
entirely outside the military or civil German law. In fact they are frowned upon by the
German authorities.
Mr. Friling, of the Department of Inspection and Control, and I, presided over the
assembly. We were seated at the end of a long hall. Proceedings were conducted entirely
in Flemish, so I knew as little at the end of the trial as I did at the beginning. Mr. Friling
had, however, prepared a slip of paper with the various degrees of punishment. In a few
words he explained to me what it was all about and why a particular penalty should be
imposed, whereupon I announced the punishment.
Usually, at this point, the baker wept copious tears.21
Even though the CRB wanted French speakers, it did not seek out anyone with a particular
knowledge of Flemish, a variant on Dutch, but a language not spoken outside of Flanders. This
posed a problem for delegates like Gray who were posted in Flemish speaking areas. He could
not understand the language of the trial. His lack of language ability was not a hindrance to his
authority to be an arbiter of justice in this matter, but did make it clear that he was only serving
as an imprimatur for Belgian justice. Gray was not independently passing judgment, but rather
providing legitimization to the proceedings, legitimizing both the CRB’s role by being the
representative to hand out punishment and also legitimizing the punishment itself. If the verdict
came from an American CRB official, it gave the impression of being uninfluenced by local
Belgian politics.
The only thing Gray seemed to be independently judging was the Belgian character vis-àvis trading flour for love (and that only for himself):
Despite the onward march of the Germans, Romance still lives in this saddened country.
Among thirteen offenders who appeared before us today, they had wayward sons, who
had stolen flour and sold it fraudulently in order to support some girl with whom they
were in love.
I am inclined to think that this is a Belgian trait. The excuse seemed to impress many of
the onlookers as justifying the crime.22
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Life, of course, went on in Belgium even under the difficult conditions of occupation. This was
something Gray and other delegates witnessed on a daily basis and had to account for in their
work and detailed in their writings about the life in Belgium with the CRB. They could not help
but be witnesses of the daily ups and downs of the Belgian people, which had an effect on their
service and especially on their ideas of their place in Belgium as privileged outsiders who did not
have to contend with the same daily difficulties of the Belgian people. Witnessing served as a
reminder of their outsider status, enhanced, sometimes, by their use of powerful symbols of their
American status: the American flag and use of automobiles.
In early 1915 the American flag was frequently flown over relief facilities and on the
automobiles the Americans used to get around Belgium. The flags were used as a diplomatic
symbol, but their use sometimes disturbed the Germans and Belgian elites because of the
publicity it gave to the United States. In response, in April 1915 the CRB ordered the American
flag to be flown only over the main CRB offices and warehouses. At other sites, Belgian or
CNSA flags were to be used.23 While the physical symbol of the United States could be limited
the cultural value set of the Americans could not. It was their work, in addition to their physical
symbols that coded their humanitarian activities as American-inspired. Simply removing the
flags did not diminish the delegates’ use of American power in their efforts to make their work
effective.
The automobile served as a great representation of power for the CRB’s work. Early on
in the relief effort Hoover worked out agreements with the Germans that the Americans were

22

Ibid.

23

Nash, Herbert Hoover, 135.

104

able to travel around Belgium quite freely.24 Not only was the automobile an effective and
necessary tool to get the American delegates to and from meetings in Brussels and to tour the
food depots, their privileged use of automobiles made an impression on the Belgian people and
reinforced the fact that it was the Americans who had a superior and privileged position within
Belgium.
This travel was, of course, necessary for the work of the delegates. Part of their job was
to visit facilities where relief goods were stored in order to keep an accurate account of what was
moving through Belgium. Though the challenges delegates encountered varied, Pate provided a
useful example from one such day in August 1916:
Spent the morning visiting communes. At each place I see the secretary, inspect the local
food-distributing station and examine the account-books. The spirit of self-sacrifice
shown by the workers in many communes is laudable—out of 82 communes in this
district we pay no rent for the stores; in the majority of the communes the farmers haul
the food without charge and volunteers do the distributing and keep records. This has
been going on for two years, and yet the original interest and sacrifice is shown. We have
two chemists working at Tournai (R. R. men temporarily out of work) who spend 10 hrs.
per day at the laboratory—examining specimens of grain, flour, bread, milk—without
remuneration. In many places the books are kept by young ladies.25
Pate seemed to think highly of the work the Belgians did and was impressed by the continued
sacrifice and the scientific nature of the Belgians at work. He followed a routine of inspection
that kept him moving even when out of the car. At the stations he met with various officials and
observed the activities of the Belgian workers. He mentioned the close cooperation among all
those who were working together. Pate’s experience, and that of other delegates, highlights the
nature of the various elements of the humanitarian work: business-like and scientific, but
charitable; American-led, but a Belgian undertaking; everyone—men and women—pitching in;
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near-constant activity. The American delegates embodied these values, and their presence was
very visible as they moved around the Belgian countryside.
As the delegates were explicitly chosen for being a “certain type,” this active style was
not only necessary for the work at hand, but for the development of their American identity in
the era of the First World War. They were professionalized and worldly men, engaged with their
environment for practical and productive purposes, harnessing technology and using their
privilege for effective outcomes. There was a broad assumption in Anglo-American culture
during the early twentieth century that the sedentary life was not only unbecoming, but also
dangerous. From too little activity—proper activity, of course—could come a wasting away.26
The indoors was considered the domain of women, while the outdoors was considered the men’s.
In fact, Pate pointed out that “[i]n many places the books are kept by young ladies.”27 Of course,
that was likely due to necessity in an “all hands on deck” kind of way, but the juxtaposition
highlights an attention paid to who was doing what kind of work.
As the delegates moved around, they met many Belgians. “Everywhere as we pass along
in the villages,” wrote Pate, “the people come out of their homes and line the streets at the rare
sight of an auto.” Both parties were struck by what was novel to them: while the Belgians
watched the passing Americans, Pate registered the visual impact of war: “[a]long one street we
passed, marks of August 24th [1914] were on every door—bayonet holes, cartridge holes, dents
and breakage caused by forcing doors with gun-butts.”28 Even though Pate was one on the later
delegates to serve, the marks of war were still evident and still made an impression. The
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delegates, though, experienced the war as spectacle, observed from somewhat of a distance and
from the position as a neutral in a car, riding past the scars left by the Germans. For the neutral
Americans, they were very much present in a war zone where the values of “rough-and-ready”
American-ness and comfort with adventure played just as important a role in their levelheaded
business approach to routine inspection.
Pate’s travels around Belgium in his car represented not only the power and allure of the
CRB and its American-ness, but were also exemplary of his and his colleagues’ expectations of
how the delegates were supposed to do their work. In Francis Wickes’s post-war narrative, he
noted that the presence of automobiles contributed to “a large measure of independence” on the
part of the delegate to “[make] regular weekly rounds of his province.”29 These “rounds” were
like those of a doctor visiting patients in need. Pate, Wickes, and their colleagues were, in effect,
inspecting the health of Belgium and the Belgians’ relief activities. They were assessing the
country’s vital statistics by checking the books, interviewing Belgian officials, and witnessing
the post-invasion landscape. This work took the men outside their posts in cities like Tournai and
Brussels and put them in communes of 500 or so people, three kilometers apart from each
other.30 Though the CRB was a centralized organization, the work required a freedom that fit
with American self-conceptions of independence and proper use of power. “The delegate…had
an office,” wrote Wickes in the summer of 1917, “but he spent little time there. His work was in
his province, and whatever problems arose he had to solve them there—Brussels could not help
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even when he appealed to it.”31 Even though the delegates had a great deal of independence and
their work was “in the field,” as often as once a week they all traveled to Brussels to discuss
what was going on in their districts, what others were doing, and what new procedures they were
supposed to follow. They also shared stories of the gratitude they received for their work, which
made an impression on the Americans.
The Belgians expressed their thanks in many ways. Belgian buildings, like schools,
sometimes had the American flag centered between pictures of their King and Queen.32 The
Belgians also gave gifts to the Americans for the service they rendered to the Belgian people.33
These gifts were often returned sacks, which had previously contained American flour that the
Belgian bakers used. Before being returned to the Americans, Belgian women would embroider
them with words and images of gratitude to the United States and the Americans of the CRB.
One exampled consisted of two flags—one Belgian, the other American—crossed with the
words “La Belgique Reconnaissante,” which translates as “Grateful Belgium.”34 Years after the
war, Hoover himself received a gift: a statute of the Egyptian goddess Isis, the goddess of life
and motherhood. Though the CRB delegates conceived of their work as masculine and even as
more important than humanitarian work with actual combatants, the Belgians delivered a
feminine-gendered gift of an Egyptian goddess to say thank you. World War I changed notions
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of proper service for men and women.35 The CRB is an example of this. As the scale of warfare
grew—in scope and duration—so too did the scale of relief. It was no longer something that
could be left to charity or a traditionally feminine sphere of aid and nurturing; men had to take on
the responsibility of providing organized and professionalized assistance when needed. Later in
the twentieth century the United States would adopt distinct humanitarian policies (like Food for
Peace) as part of its foreign policy, traditionally the purview of men.

Humanitarians as Spectators
Although the American delegates were surrounded by constant reminders of the violence
of the war and engaged in the difficulty of their work, most still found time to experience life as
Americans abroad. Pate, for instance, often found beauty in his surroundings. He also described
moments of danger in terms of awe. In October 1916, Pate recorded in his diary an account of “a
beautiful aeroplane raid during the morning. The sky was perfectly clear,” he wrote,
except for a few very high white clouds. Three allied aeroplanes flying very high—above
the clouds—surveyed the district….Several bombs were dropped, bursting with a deep
intonation. These were answered by a steady fire from the German guns….The greater
part of the time the planes were hidden by the white clouds—reappearing now and then at
clear spaces, and thus giving a very picturesque effect.36
Pate’s language evoked an airshow performance as much as it did a description of an air raid. He
described the bombs dropped by the Allied planes as “bursting with a deep intonation” akin to
the deep register of percussion instruments from an orchestra, maybe like the one aboard the ship
he sailed over to Europe on, the Rijndam. In the same entry he described a meeting with a
German official and how expected food shortages meant more Belgians would have to eat “black
35
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bread,” a wartime staple that was poor in nutritional value but eaten by all classes of Belgians
during the occupation. In a single entry, Pate discussed the artistic beauty of the war and the
harsh reality of the lack of food. Belgium was a strange place, but an exciting one, and one
where Pate and his colleagues could attach themselves to a new and developing aspect of U.S.
intervention in the world. Pate’s war involved more than daily drudgery of ledgers, distribution
lists, and meetings. It was also a spectacle of modern technology and a sensory experience like
no other he had encountered just as he was at the formative point in his career.
The sight of the German Army impressed Pate as well. “To see them drill or make an
‘arms-at-rest,’” he recorded the day after the air raid, “is a marvel. It is a perfect machine,
lacking only in individuality.”37 His remark about the lack of individuality in the German action
has an anti-German undertone since individuality is a hallmark of Anglo-American identity.
Here Pate’s neutrality conflicted with his subjective American identity that prized individuality.
Nonetheless, he was struck by what he saw. Pate demonstrated the duality of his role as a
humanitarian, a provider of relief, and as an American abroad, a sightseer-commentator. For
Belgians, the drilling of German soldiers represented military oppression and occupation, for
Pate it was “a marvel.”
Delegates used automobiles not only for work, but for taking in the Belgian countryside
either during moments of rest from work or even during travel to and from the various
communes where they inspected relief operations. For instance, on a trip to Terveren, “a
beautiful suburb of Brussels,” Pate remarked that “[t]he avenues of grand trees and the bordering
forests are magnificent.” He also visited Louvain, where he “look[ed] over the ruined section of
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the town.”38 Later, Pate visited Liège’s major attractions including the city’s storied churches,
Parc d’Avory, Place du Theatre, Place S. Lambert, and the Palais de Justice.39 These visits were
part of the experience the Americans had in Belgium. It was a real place with real sights and a
real history that they wanted to experience.
The American delegates were often the honored guests of Belgians, especially the elites
of the country. Wickes eventually married into the relatively wealthy francophone Belgian
Attout family. He served from August 1915 to June 1917, mainly in Namur province. Wickes
wrote that he would sometimes “drink a glass of Burgundy with a village burgomaster, or honor
a bourgeois family by dining at its table, or spend a weekend at a chateau, playing tennis with the
daughters of an aristocrat.”40 The delegates were privileged people in Belgium. By virtue of
being college educated at that time, the Americans were part of a social elite in the United States,
but it was not the same as the formal and official hierarchy that existed in Belgium. As members
of the CRB, they were allowed to enter into the upper echelons of Belgian society even though
they were not aristocratic themselves. These experiences fit into conceptions of American-ness
because the qualities that made them proper members of the CRB also prepared them to interact
in an effective way with Belgian elites. Even if they were not technically the Belgians’ social
equals, they could meet the challenge of new social situations, just as easily as they could meet
the challenge of the physical landscape of war-torn Belgium.
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These meetings allowed for interaction between American humanitarians and Belgian
citizens in an informal manner. Germaine Attout, the eventual wife of Wickes, recorded in her
diary that she and her family were “happy to have the diversion brought by the arrival of a
substantial part of—America!!”41 The intimate ties cultivated in numerous conversations and
social events offered the Americans distractions from their profound responsibilities maintaining
Belgium’s food supply. During one such event Germaine and her family entertained a number of
American delegates, although her future husband, Wickes, was not present. The Americans sang
“folk songs, their Negro lullabies, and their university songs! What music!” at that dinner. 42
Through their singing uniquely American tunes the delegates brought American culture to the
Belgian people, continuing a trend in U.S. foreign relations that saw more and more Americans
go overseas and share the American culture with the world.43
The Americans were fascinated by such encounters, which were full of exciting
discoveries. Like Pate, Wickes traveled around Belgium and embraced what the country and the
people had to offer. On Christmas Eve 1915, Wickes, his fellow delegate Robert Jackson, and a
Belgian nobleman attended a midnight mass at the Maredsous Benedictine Abbey near Namur
with the Attout family. Wickes, a Protestant, declared it to be “a most beautiful and impressive
service.”44 The abbey was not as old as some in Belgium, but it certainly stood apart from almost
anything in the United States. The liturgy, too, would have been different for him. Wickes was
deeply affected by the service and confessed: “The world had completely vanished for me for the
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time.”45 After Mass, Wickes dined with his hosts and talked into the early hours with “G.A.,”
Germaine, his future wife.
When Wickes was transferred away from where the Attouts lived in Namur, he expressed
how sad he was to be stationed elsewhere. In early January 1916, he wrote that he was
“desperately homesick for Namur and lonely for G.A.,” but would soon return to Namur where
he would be “supremely happy.”46 In the short time he was stationed there Wickes had embraced
Namur as his home and the Attouts as his family; he had been profoundly changed by his
experiences. His desire to return to Namur is understandable. He was in love. As a humanitarian
official, however, it could have been more problematic. It was hard for Wickes to practice strict
neutrality when he became emotionally invested with a particular Belgian family. This is a
challenge for all humanitarians who spend significant time with the people they are helping. On
the other hand, they can gain great knowledge of the people and that can serve them well in
helping them.
According to Wickes, one of the delegate’s unofficial responsibilities was to
“[s]upport…Belgian morale.”47 These human interactions were important, according to Wickes.
“Were it not that the material relief was absolutely essential to the life of the country,” he wrote,
“it might almost be said that this moral contribution meant more to the people than did the
physical support.”48 This might be somewhat of an overstatement, but it illustrated Wickes’
belief that the CRB’s humanitarian service was multifaceted and that the Americans understood
their role was to safeguard Belgium in complex ways. He was explicit about the American
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delegate’s unique position within the social structure of German occupied Belgium: “The mere
fact that they [the Belgians] had by their side, for the time intimately associated with their lives,
one who still possessed rights, who enjoyed certain privileges, was to them [the Belgians] a
comfort.”49 The Americans did occasionally act as protectors in instances where the Germans
attempted to alter the conditions of the occupation, such as with labor deportations in late 1916
and early 1917. While the Americans were not always successful in protecting the civilians, the
shift from a more observer status to an active role of intervention was a tension the Americans
had to settle. An emotional bond formed between the Americans and the Belgians that
complicated the Americans’ identities as purely neutral aid givers. The CRB delegates reconciled
their dual roles as humanitarians and spectators by becoming advocates for Belgium, especially
in their writing in popular magazines back in the United States highlighting the CRB’s work and
their own experiences in war-torn Europe.
Robert Withington was another American delegate who walked the same difficult line of
struggling to maintain absolute neutrality while identifying with the plight of Belgium. He served
from March to December 1916, primarily in the provinces of Antwerp and Limbourg, in the
Flemish area of the country. In 1921 he had a recollection of his time in Belgium privately
published. In it, Withington recounted a trip he took at the invitation of a Belgian friend to the
pilgrimage site of Montaigu in (Flemish) Brabant Province. In one of the abbeys he visited along
the route, Withington described how the priests he met told him of the German invasion in
“mediaeval [sic] surroundings of the Flemish abbey, echoed from the Dark Ages.”50 Though
Belgium came into being only in the 1830s, the history of the area went back much longer than
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the American history Withington knew. The war brought him and his colleagues to the Old
World where they could not only bring new ideas of American involvement in the world, but
could also investigate the artifacts of an ancient world while doing their work. He wandered
around the grounds talking with the priests about “war, art, and music, and heard the pleasant
gratitude of the priests for what America had done for la pauvre, petite Belgique.”51
The next day, Withington was shown around the abbey itself. His Belgian hosts displayed
church vestments “embroidered with borders so fine that it seemed as if the scenes and figures
thereon were painted.” 52 The beauty and the vulnerability of the place were what struck
Withington, who was acting both as a tourist and as a representative of the relief organization
responsible for “saving” Belgium from further harm. “One could not help trembling,” he wrote,
“at the thought that a shell might fall through the Abbey before the war ended: or, what was
more likely, the Boche, in his pleasant way, might set fire to the place, having plundered it.”53
Here, Withington used a slur for the Germans, a term that Germaine Attout used in her diary to
describe her occupiers. Withington’s postwar recollections were no doubt colored by searing
tales of the German invasion and the burning of Louvain and by the fact that Germany was the
United States’ enemy after April 1917. His great concern with the cultural and aesthetic
protection of Belgium when discussing his time as a humanitarian, however, exemplified the
complex relationship these humanitarians formed with their work as being deeply engaged with
the place and people, but also requiring some distance in order to be effective. While a trip to a
beautiful abbey certainly provided Withington some physical and emotional distance from the
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difficulties of the relief work, it also altered or maybe highlighted his loyalties in Belgium’s
favor. He blamed the Germans for Belgium’s suffering, and found it impossible to remain
objective and non-partisan. When remarking on the town of Aarschot, Withington wrote of the
damaged town that “[a]lmost two years after the tragedy, there was nothing sinister in the ruins
themselves: but when you realized they were the result of an ordered campaign of
destruction. . . .”54 He did not finish the sentence, leaving it up to the post-war reader to infer the
palpable anger he seems to have felt for what had been done to Belgium before he arrived as a
humanitarian. He came to see his role as protecting Belgium, its people and its places.
Since Americans were invited to and attended so many Belgian social engagements they
often increased their identification with the occupied population. In a series of gestures of
solidarity the Belgians and the Americans celebrated one another’s national independence days.55
Withington recounted how he and other Americans were invited to attend a Mass at the
Cathedral at Antwerp where he was stationed, to commemorate Belgium’s national holiday on
21 July. The Americans were seated in a place of honor behind the former Belgian governor of
Antwerp Province and the city’s mayor. The Mass was decidedly patriotic, ending with the
playing of the Belgian national anthem, the Brabançonne. Withington noted that German
authorities forbade the song to be played in public, but that its playing deeply stirred those in
attendance, including the Americans. Though the Germans ran a strict occupation, they did not
seek unnecessary fights with the Belgians. This demonstration of patriotism was one such
example of when the Germans let the Belgians alone. “Perhaps we were not strictly neutral in
going to the Mass,” Withington wrote of the principled demonstration, “But none of us regretted
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having gone. And if the German secret-service agents noted our presence, none of us ever heard
it.”56

Conclusion
In their daily work the American delegates engaged with not only Belgians committed to
the relief work, but those who tried to skirt the laws as they applied at the time. By virtue of the
delegates’ status as not only aid givers, but American ones, they meted out justice, even if that
sometimes meant they were a rubber stamp. The Americans also kept up an active routine,
checking on the Belgian distribution and the supplies, thus demonstrating that an active life as
proposed by men like Teddy Roosevelt and Baden-Powell could apply to humanitarian affairs
and not just militaristic adventure. Their American-ness allowed them to establish their authority,
but over time, maintaining their composure and neutrality proved difficult for the men of the
CRB as they spent more and more time with Belgians in social situations and toured the country
like they would have in peace time. No matter a humanitarians’ intent and desire for some sort of
“objectivity” and purely rational approach to the work, the unique circumstances in which they
found themselves invariably had an impact and could change their perspective on their role in a
disaster zone. Their composure and neutrality would be even more challenged when German
authorities began deporting thousands of Belgian laborers to Germany in the fall and winter of
1916. CRB delegates watched uneasily as those deemed “unemployed” were whisked away, only
able to save those whom they could prove were working for the CNSA or otherwise aiding the
CRB in its relief endeavors.
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Chapter 4
Where Have All the Belgians Gone?:
The Deportation Crisis of 1916 – 1917
The deportation of Belgians for labor in Germany began in the fall of 1916. Stories about
what the Germans were doing came “like a storm approaching from the West, [and] the grief and
sorrow and fear of the deportations spread over the land,” as CRB delegate Robert Withington
recalled. “As yet, nothing had happened in our province [Limbourg]: but we understood that
elsewhere men were being taken from good positions. ‘Quite naturally,’ said the people. ‘The
Boches [Germans] don’t want the loafers and ne’er-do-weels [sic].”1 Withington expressed the
dilemma he and the rest of the CRB faced: “It was hard not to be able to help the people, who
looked to the Americans with a trust one rarely finds save in dumb beasts. But we had to
remember that we were in Belgium for the ravitaillement alone, and that we had no interest in
the deportations, unless they affected our own men.”2 Withington expressed deeply held ideas of
American Exceptionalism and was more than a little patronizing about the Belgians. He made an
assumption that it was up to Americans to stop the mistreatment of Belgians, but he noted that
there was no easy way to do it, especially if he and his colleagues wanted the broader relief effort
to go on. He expressed the tension between ameliorative humanitarianism and restorative or
preventative human rights. The CRB and its delegates were acting as agents of humanitarianism,
not human rights, but they could also act as witnesses.
Though the Americans’ sense of “absolute” neutrality had been changing during their
stay in Belgium, the German deportations of Belgian laborers—which led to increased tension
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with the Wilson Administration—was a serious and painful challenge to their identity as
humanitarians. They could step in and protest the deportation policy of the Germans and
jeopardize broader relief effort or they could advocate only for those who worked for the CRB
directly or indirectly in order to keep their larger mission going. The Americans had to find a
way to continue their humanitarian work when the ideal of impartiality and neutrality came up
against obvious and observed violations of a people’s human rights. This chapter argues that
though the CRB had a great deal of power and clout in Belgium, that power and clout was not
absolute. The Americans had to choose when to use the CRB’s influence and when to not. This
chapter is partially organized by Belgian region to show that when confronted with a German
policy of labor deportation, individual Americans had to exercise their own judgment in order to
balance the needs of individual Belgians against the larger work of the relief effort, even though
there was a general policy outline from CRB headquarters. In the end, the CRB and many
individual delegates developed a cold or “tough love” approach in order to protect the broader
work of the CRB. The real object was the broader humanitarian mission, even at the expense of
the violation of individual human rights. The main mission was feeding an entire people. Trying
to do “too much,” even if it would have resulted in fewer people being sent to Germany to do
work, could have harmed that broader mission. These are the difficult questions humanitarians
have to ask and answer each day. The CRB chose to act in a limited fashion, and the American
delegates did their best to translate that policy into effective interventions into the German
deportation scheme.
In October 1916, German authorities in Berlin and Brussels upended the tense status quo
governing occupied Belgium by ordering the deportation of tens of thousands of Belgian
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civilians to Germany for military-related and industrial work.3 This deportation policy violated
decades-old international law that forbade the “compulsion of the population of occupied
territory to take part in military operations against its own country.” 4 This action outraged
international observers like the CRB, as well as many in the United States, including the Wilson
Administration. This development was not an original German war aim nor was it an
uncontroversial policy for German Imperial and Occupation authorities. It was, as the historian
Isabel V. Hull argues, a new policy for Germany and an illustration of the wartime government’s
“incremental, short-term nature of decision making, the lack of overt guiding principles, and the
strength of covert assumptions.”5
Because the deportations were a new facet of occupation policy, the executives and the
delegates of the CRB had to adapt their own decision-making, principles, and assumptions. They
had to alter the existing boundaries of their humanitarian mission to incorporate and exclude
those whom they could and could not prevent from being sent to Germany, while sustaining their
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broader relief effort. Because of the egregious and publicized nature of these actions
international opinion cried out for an end to the deportations, including in the United States.6
Thousands of Belgians working for the CRB and the CNSA were subject to deportation,
even if they had proof of employment with the CRB or CNSA. Hoover and his delegates,
however, tried their best to keep those who worked with them from being deported. In some
cases they succeeded; in other cases they failed. In all, they made an active choice to limit their
intervention in an effort to protect the broader work. The best protection, of course, came from
the eventual end of the war, made possible by the arrival of new American troops to refresh the
Allied trenches.
While Hoover and his colleagues were disturbed by the German policy, the CRB judged
this new issue a political problem and, thus, beyond the scope of the Commission. Hoover wrote
to Whitlock in November 1916 informing him of the situation. Whitlock believed that making
too much of an official protest might harm the relief effort.7 That did not, however, keep the
delegates from paying close attention to what the Germans were doing and, when possible,
intervening to save those who worked for them. The Wilson Administration eventually made a
formal protest to Germany, but not until after much hand-wringing in Washington and the
realization by German officials that the deportations were not only not a boon in industrial
manpower, but were actually a disaster not worth continuing.8
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Previously, the CRB had encountered the deportation of workers in northern France in
April 1916, and had been forced to formulate a response. The Germans took more than 20,000
French civilians from Lille and nearby towns and made them work on military projects in the
French countryside. Many of these people, who were unfamiliar with agricultural labor, proved
poor choices for such work. The policy prompted a CRB intervention that helped to end the
deportations from Lille. Ambassador Gerard petitioned the German government after he met
with CRB delegates, and the German government relented.9 The situation the Germans faced in
the fall and winter of 1916 and 1917 was different. The German government decided that there
was a greater need for new labor, and Belgium was going to be the place to get it. This put the
American CRB in the difficult position of standing by and allowing this action to go on, or
intervening and potentially harming the relief effort as Whitlock feared. They decided to not use
their power to stop the German policy, but to maintain their larger relief effort. It was a costbenefit decision that resulted in hardship for the thousands of deportees, but continued aid for
millions of Belgians.

The New German Policy
From the early months of their occupation, German authorities in Belgium sought to
“solve” the employment problem there. The invasion and occupation, combined with the
subsequent British blockade greatly disrupted the Belgian economy, leaving many people
without adequate work. Though it has been difficult to quantify the extent of the crisis, the
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generally accepted number is around 600,000 unemployed Belgians by October 1916.10 This was
about eight percent of the total prewar population of nearly 8,000,000.11
The Germans dealt with the labor situation by issuing various degrees and orders. On 19
November 1914, Field Marshal Colmar von der Goltz, the first Governor General of Occupied
Belgium, ordered that any Belgian who wanted to work for the German authorities or for firms
contracted with German authorities should be able to do so, and that anyone who stood in the
way of freedom of employment would be “punished by imprisonment.”12 Many Belgians refused
to work, often out of patriotic feelings.13 Ordinary Belgian workers, or at least many Belgians
who advocated for them, knew that what the Germans were doing was illegal.14 The Belgian
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Labor Party, in a letter to von Bissing on 14 November 1916, pleaded with him in both
emotional and legal terms to stop the deportations: “Listen, Excellency, to these tears and these
sobs. Do not permit our free and intact past to go to ruin! Do not permit human rights to be
violated in its holy of holies….We make appeal to the law and humanity solemnly and with the
hope of being heard.”15 Even if the intricacies of the Hague Conventions were unknown to
ordinary Belgians, they did understand that they should not have to rely on German offers of
work to survive. They had the CRB and their own CNSA to provide secours [charitable relief for
those unable to pay for their food] if and when they were not working or not working enough.
Many even found employment with the CNSA or the CRB. In fact, the CRB was dependent on
Belgians to do the food aid distribution around the country.
This organized relief relieved the Germans of the burden of providing for the Belgians, as
they were technically required to do, and helped maintain a relatively pacific population. German
authorities were unable to use food to compel Belgians to behave or work according to German
interests. These authorities also feared the idle masses and the potential for a recurrence of
(presumed) guerilla attacks that plagued them during the Franco-Prussian War and could distract
from the German strategy on the Western Front.16
Because the military stalemate on the Western Front prevented the Germans from
diverting resources from elsewhere, the German government could not provide direct relief if the
American-led relief work stopped. Von Bissing’s assistant, Baron von der Lancken, the head of
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the German occupation government’s Political Department, pledged to Whitlock that the German
authorities recognized that the CRB and the CNSA could work unimpeded by the Germans,
pledging that “the Governor-General shall never make use of the Comité National [or the CRB]
to force the Belgian population to employ itself in the service of the German Army contrary to
the stipulations of the Hague Conventions.”17 By the end of July 1915 the CRB and the CNSA
were firmly in control of how relief was distributed to the Belgian people.18
British foreign secretary Grey made it clear to both the patron ministers of the CRB and
to von Bissing that there was an “absolute minimum on which His Majesty’s Government can
allow [the] work to continue.” One such requirement was that “there shall be no interference of
any kind whatever by the German authorities either in the sale of these foodstuffs or in their free
distribution in the way of relief to those whom the Commission and the Comité National shall
consider deserving of such relief.”19 This was the condition to which Lancken was responding.
Britain controlled the CRB’s blockade access. If the British closed what little access there was,
the Germans would have on their hands a population that was not only idle, but also starving.
This would not have been a recipe for a peaceful or productive occupation.
Von Bissing, however, still faced the problem of those who declined to labor for the
Germans, as well as pressure from home to resolve the situation. Later that same summer he
moved trials for “refusal to work” into military courts instead of channeling them through the
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civil courts as before. On 14 August 1915, von Bissing informed the Belgian public that he was
reinforcing the November 1914 order: “Anyone who without adequate reason refused to
undertake or continue to labor in the interests of the public, for which he is called upon by
German authorities and which is in the line of his professional activity, shall be punished by
detention or imprisonment for not more than one year.”20 This criminalization of idle workers
was technically based on an 1891 Belgian anti-vagrancy law and became the basis for the future
deportation policy.
Von Bissing reluctantly implemented the policy under orders from Berlin.21 It was rarely
enforced until the demands of the German High Command necessitated a more aggressive labor
policy in the spring and fall of 1916 after the casualties resulting from major battles on the
Somme and at Verdun.22 As the war intensified, German industry’s need for more workers
occurred at the same time as the increased need for replacements at the front. Because the
Imperial German government and the nation’s industrial sector had expected a short war, there
were few “plans for a transformation of the peacetime economy to a war economy.” 23 Hence the
growing need for non-German workers.
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Even before the war, the German economy had utilized a sizable number of foreign
workers. According to the scholar Jens Thiel, “there were approximately 500,000 seasonal
workers and about 700,000 foreign industrial laborers and miners in Germany.” 24 German
industrialists in the west and agriculturalists in the east relied on workers from Russia’s Polish
possessions, Italy, and even the Netherlands. There were few Belgians, but those who obtained
jobs in Germany before the war were often used in highly specialized trades like glass and mirror
production.25
Before looking to Belgium to fill open spots in the Reich’s workforce, the Imperial
Government altered existing law in an attempt to maintain the national domestic industrial
economy. In August 1914, the government suspended a series of regulations originally related to
workplace safety, including prohibitions against the employment of youths between ages 16 and
19 in mines. As an example, Krupp Works provides some scope for the dilemma of the German
military and German industry. Krupp employed about 35,400 workers at the start of the war,
27,000 of whom were eligible for military service.26 During the time between the passage of new
regulations in 1914 and 1918, the participation of adolescents in the industrial workforce
increased from 15.5% to 40.5%. An additional consideration—the employment of women in
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mines—was never instituted.27 The German “home front” was militarized by this time, and labor
in occupied Belgium for the gain of Germany therefore became a logical extension.
The establishment of the Deutsche Industriebüro (DIB) in June 1915 was an early attempt
to get Belgians to work for and in Germany. This bureau was private, but worked closely with
German government officials in Belgium to acquire labor for industries located in what was then
the Rhine-Westphalian area of Germany. The German War Ministry asked von Bissing in March
1915 to find volunteers for the labor effort back in Germany. The DIB, however, proved
inadequate. 28 By October 1916—when the deportation policy went into effect—the DIB
averaged 500 recruits a week for a total of “only” 30,000 over the life of the bureau—a
significant number, but far fewer than the Germans required.29
The situation in Germany grew dire, and casualties mounted on the Western Front; as a
result in March 1916 the War Ministry in Berlin asked von Bissing to transport 400,000 laborers
to Germany to work in factories, which would in turn free up able-bodied military-age men for
the army. Von Bissing thought this request was unworkable because of international political and
legal ramifications. Further, because he did not think deportees would make good workers, he
believed the effort would, in fact, be counterproductive. Von Bissing, however, was beginning to
lose support from Berlin for his more moderate measures as the military’s need for bodies began
to make concern for international opinion and law seem to be luxury rather than essential
policy.30
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The Kaiser sided with his military officials and accepted the more aggressive labor policy.
As a loyal subject, von Bissing obediently changed the rules for the unemployed and his
occupation regime’s responsibility to them. In May 1916 he ended German funding of public
works in Belgian cities and towns, effectively creating more unemployed Belgians (who might,
in turn, become sufficiently needy to make German employment seem more acceptable). He
enforced the August 1915 decree and used his military authority to order Belgians who were
unemployed and/or refused work into situations and places where they would have no choice but
to work. The policy turned idle citizens into victims of international crimes as defined by the
Hague Convention.31
By summer 1916, Germany not only had an increased need for workers, but also new
leaders with a new plan: the Hindenburg Program.32 With the rise of Ludendorff and Hindenburg
to the top of the military and Government, the need for labor in Germany followed directly from
the new plan to “triple munitions productions by spring and to increase Germany’s troop
levels.”33 Von Bissing could act against the new military leadership, especially in combination
with the demands of German industrialists like Karl Duisberg of the Bayer Company who, in
September 1916 wanted to take advantage of “the great human reservoir of Belgium.”34 Duisberg
and other industrialists hoped to tap the Belgian labor reservoir, using extreme force if necessary.
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Opening Belgium to German industrial exploitation would, men like Duisberg assumed,
solve two wartime problems at the same time: the need for workers in Germany and the
unemployment that Von Bissing’s recent embargo on public works in Belgium had exacerbated
would both be ameliorated. Walter Rathenau, a government minister and chairman of AEG, a
German electrical engineering firm, said that “[t]he solution to the Belgian worker problem can
only be achieved by ignoring international prestige questions, so that the seven hundred thousand
workers in Belgium are made available to the home market, even if it means American [relief]
aid will end.”35 This late in the war, “international prestige” may have been of little concern to
some in the German elite, but at the start of the war, one of the reasons the Germans allowed the
CRB to operate was to avoid a situation where they could be blamed for letting Belgium starve
by not providing the necessary relief. Most civilian and military leadership were of one mind: the
need for Belgian workers outweighed all other considerations. Von Bissing, however, still
demurred. Uneasy about both the implications of a forced deportation policy on morale in
Belgium and its potential effectiveness, he even offered his resignation, but was refused.36 Von
Bissing’s consistent opposition to forced labor and deportation was not necessarily either
altruistic or economic, but also ideological. Von Bissing may have been a strong proponent not
only of Flamenpolitik, but the of the eventual formal annexation of Belgium by Germany.37
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Forcibly taking tens of thousands of Belgians and making them work for German firms engaged
directly or indirectly with the war effort, he thought, was hardly an effective strategy to persuade
the Belgian people that a post-war relationship with Germany was in their own interest. The
short-term goal of labor supply, in von Bissing’s mind, did not outweigh the long-term costs to a
potential postwar Germany. In the end, von Bissing lost.
By September 1916, the German government tried to legally justify the deportation
policy. In a meeting on 28 September, the Imperial Government rationalized any probable
deportations by arguing that the mass unemployment in Belgium was a “military danger,” and
thus, under Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Convention, the Germans could act to “restore, and
ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety.” The fact that von Bissing had earlier used a
Belgian anti-vagrancy law to provide justification for the criminalization of idleness covered the
fact that the occupier also had to respect “the laws in force in the country.”38 This legal reasoning
convinced the Imperial Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, that the previous orders
from May and August 1915 were sufficient to criminalize idle workers. Von Bissing, having lost
both the economic and legal argument, ordered the deportations on 11 October 1916.

Implementation of the German Policy

treaties of a different kind, will succumb to the disastrous influence of England and France, and
to the effort of America to exploit Belgian resources. Against all this our only weapon is the
policy of power, and this policy must see to it that the Belgian population, now still hostile to us,
shall adapt itself and subordinate itself, if only gradually, to the German domination.”
38
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Germany’s new policy on Belgian labor proceeded in two overlapping stages. The first
began on 3 October 1916 with the organization of Zivil-Arbeiter-Bataillone (Civil Worker
Battalions or ZAB). According to Jens Thiel, some 62,000 Belgians were “drafted” into this
domestic Belgian labor force. Though workers, the Germans saw them as civilian prisoners.
They wore insignias on their clothes to mark them as such, and military guards supervised
them.39 The second stage, the deportation scheme, began a few days later and ended in February
1917 after some 60,000 Belgians had been forcibly taken to Germany.40
Statistics bear out von Bissing’s concerns about the ineffectiveness of forced labor.
Historian Kai Rawe has demonstrated that of the 56,000 taken to Germany between October and
December 1916 (the most active period of the deportations) only about 8,000 men were actually
forced to work. An additional 8,000 agreed to work on a voluntary basis. Rawe cited German
records stating that nearly 40,000 Belgians were not actually working; these were mostly
professionals who were taken out of carelessness by the German officials back in Belgium who
often made little effort to match potential laborers with the work they would be expected to do.41
The Germans needed laborers, not clerks, to work in factories. Ironically, part of their initial
justification to the CRB when the policy was carried out was that they were taking specific types
of workers for specific types of work. Further, German officials had hoped to leave the
professional and elite class out of the deportation policy so as not to antagonize the elites of
Belgian society in anticipation of the possible need for postwar cooperation. It was not supposed
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to be a punitive policy across all classes.42 Rawe’s study, however, demonstrates the failure of
these policies.
Flemings were also treated differently from Walloons—a result of von Bissing’s and
other German high commanders’ belief in Flamenpolitik, that is the effort to cater to the
Germanic Flemings who were often poorer and marginalized by the Francophone-dominated
elite in Belgium before the war. More Walloons than Flemings were deported, but the Flemings
often endured worse treatment when deported, which runs counter to the logical assumptions that
the more Germanic ethnicity would be treated better. Many Flemings were taken directly to the
Front to build fortifications, where they often fell victim to artillery fire and gas attacks while
building defenses for their occupiers.43
The policy failed miserably both economically and from a public relations perspective. It
tested the nerve of the Americans in the CRB and did not endear the Germans to the Belgian
elites, whether Flemish or Walloon. The Americans had to confront what many in the
international press termed a new “slavery,” but their options to counteract the German policy
were limited.44 This campaign for workers also harmed German relations with the United States
by pushing the Wilson Administration to make a formal protest against the German Government
at the same time that Wilson was seeking a way to bring about a negotiated peace.
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The deportations also took a toll on the health of the workers. Recent studies have
established that 1,298 Belgians placed into ZABs died, and 1,316 Belgians deported to Germany
proper perished during the deportation period—about two percent of each group.45 Belgians who
went to Germany were placed in Verteilungsstellen (distribution centers) or Unterkunftsstäten für
Industriearbeiter (lodgings for industrial workers) for the duration of their stay in Germany.
Some deportees also suffered malnutrition from living off of less than the official ration of 1,745
calories a day.46 Failing to stop the deportations had a great cost, but the Americans in the CRB
had limited options. They could have made a formal protest, but that would have risked the
whole relief effort and put millions of lives at stake. There was no easy decision; all many
Americans could do was use what little clout they had to act as witnesses to the German policy
and save those Belgians most directly related to the CRB’s work.

The CRB Confronts the Deportations
On 30 October 1916, Hoover, two of his senior CRB officials, Warren Gregory and
Prentiss Gray, as well as Dr. Reith, an assistant to Lancken, of the Vermittlungstelle (German
Communications Center) met to discuss the requisition of the Belgian unemployed. After four
45
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hours Hoover declared, “Hell, logic is useless. Let’s go,” and they left the meeting.47 Reith,
representing the German headquarters in Belgium, had described the requisition of labor as a
“paternal act,” according to Gray, a senior official in the CRB. Reith argued that the Belgians
working in Germany would be better off than those who stayed in Belgium, even those employed
by the CRB or the CNSA. “We had come,” wrote Gray in his diary, “not to argue the moral or
political side of this question, but only to insist that the 55,000 [Belgian] employees of the
Commission for Relief should receive some card from the German government which would
exempt them from this service.”48 Reith, however, did not believe having those Belgians do
relief work in Belgium was the most effective use of their labor. They “could work much more
efficiently at their former trades,” he argued, “and, consequently, should be forced to employ
their hands or minds to the highest point of efficiency by working for the German Government at
the trade which they knew best.”49 The two parties had mutually exclusive positions that could
not be resolved.
Though the morality and even the politics of requisitions were not lost on Gray, Hoover,
or other American CRB officials. It was often at the forefront of their mind. Gray pointed out in
his diary that the primary concern of this group of elite CRB officials was the practical issue of
protecting 55,000 Belgians and not the 600,000 or so unemployed. Saving those 55,000 would
allow the relief to continue for the rest of Belgium. This was a telling indication of the difficult
choices this group of humanitarians faced when confronted with this new German policy. These
deportations were a serious threat to the Belgian relief program: the British threatened to reduce
47
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or stop food shipments, and numerous pleas to the Wilson Administration by Belgians, the
British, and even vocal American citizens (including former President Theodore Roosevelt and
the powerful Cabots of Massachusetts), brought the U.S. government even closer to the brink of
hostility with the Germans.50
Hoover sought Whitlock’s help: “I fear it is the beginning of the end,” he wrote, and “this
is a great[er] issue to the Belgian people than anything since the invasion and they look to you as
to America for some strong action.”51 Once again, the American underwritten status of the CRB
was in play. In order for the CRB to continue operating, they needed to look at themselves as
Americans and to American representatives to secure their work. They saw their work as being
contingent on their connection to the United States and their identity as Americans. A few days
later, on 11 November, Hoover rebuffed a German request for help in setting up the regulations,
stating that “[t]he matter is now in discussion between the American Legation in Brussels and
the American Embassy in Berlin and, in consequence, it would be entirely wrong of me to
intervene in any way.”52 Here Hoover sought to distance himself from whatever formal policies
his government was extolling. Hoover had a different project in mind: maintain the CRB’s
independence and agency in Belgium. Though he was personally horrified at the Germans
actions, it was not his place to intervene in the larger political fight. Whitlock, too, was uneasy
about making a “ringing protest” and noted in his diary on 9 November that he knew “there
would be plenty of blaze, if I were to do such a thing [as to make an official protest], but little
50
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glory.” “No,” Whitlock continued, “it is not the time for hysterics, or for plays to the forgetful
gallery.”53 While Whitlock did not fully approve of the German tactics, in October he wrote that
he had opposed the original policy of providing unlimited relief to the idle men of Belgium,
concluding that while the German policy was “harsh,” it was “not surprising.” Given this
pessimistic assessment, Whitlock chose not to push the issue over the deportations. He was
nonetheless sufficiently concerned to keep up a steady stream of correspondence with
Washington regarding the Belgian predicament. 54
Hoover knew that he and the Commission had limited options. Even if he chose to not
publically challenge the Germans, he still chose to report on them to the State Department.55 He
asked, however, that his name and the role of the CRB as a de facto sort-of listening post be kept
quiet and hoped to leave the political condemnations to prominent politicians in the United States
and other neutral nations.56 The CRB, however, had to find a way to navigate these new political
dynamics even if Hoover and his officials refused to partake in the general condemnation. NGOs
are often in this position. They serve as witnesses of not only the humanitarian catastrophe they
are seeking to alleviate, but also to any human rights violations that may occur while they are
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there. Whether or not they should maintain their distance or act as de facto reporters is an
important decision.57
By the last week of December—after the requisition policy had been in effect for about
two months— a restrained CRB policy had become as codified as it could be. A report prepared
for the CRB’s Department of Inspection and Control noted that “[i]t is not within the realm of
the duties of the CRB to protest against the general seizure of Belgians, but when it finds that the
Ravitaillement of Belgium is endangered, by the fact of the requisition of its own personnel, it
then feels that it should make vigorous protestation.”58 Here the official policy of the CRB was
being set down. There was a role for CRB delegates to protest, but not just at the sight of any
Belgian being taken. The protest had to be connected to the relief effort in some way. This policy
required a good deal of individual initiative and restraint on the part of the American CRB
delegates. If challenged by the Germans, they would have to have a very good reason and
explanation for why a particular Belgian was necessary for the relief effort.
In his history of the CRB, Tracy Kittredge described the actions of the Germans as well
as the CRB’s reaction accordingly: “These deportations had the gravest influence on the work of
the Commission in Belgium, and had it not been for the position which the Commission had
come to enjoy, as a result of two years’ activity, the whole of the Belgian relief work would
probably have been instantly stopped by the allied governments.”59 That a card with the imprint
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of the CRB’s name and the signature of the American delegate could, in some cases, stop the
requisition of individual Belgians bore testament to the status and power of the humanitarian
mission. That power, however, was not always respected, and many delegates had to intervene
personally to bring back a man taken wrongfully. Sometimes, even with intervention, the
deportation would occur anyway. In the end, the Germans deported about 1,000 Belgian CRB
and CNSA workers.60
In striking terms, Kittredge described how, in some instances, Germans showed disdain
for CRB efforts to protect relief-employed men. “But the Germans in the provinces who carried
out the deportations paid little heed to these cards or to the assurances given to the Commission,
he wrote; “In some places they openly showed their contempt for the Commission by tearing up
the cards and deporting practically all men who bore such cards. This happened at Arlon and
other places in the Luxembourg [Province], and also in certain places in Namur and in other
provinces.”61 Kittredge painted a damning picture, and in some cases he was right, but in
others—particularly in the key port city of Antwerp—the Germans did respect the cards and the
intervention of the Americans. It remains to be understood why some Germans respected the
cards and some did not.
Kittredge regarded the deportations as illegal and as a darker moment of the German
occupation and his time in relief work. As he wrote,
The Americans, who sometimes were allowed to be present at these requisitions of men,
probably never witnessed more pathetic spectacles than those that occurred at the times
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of these deportations. They never realized so fully the impersonal cruelty of the German
military regime and their helplessness to render effective service to the Belgian people in
this hour of great need. Certainly the memory of those scenes in which husbands were
torn from their wives, fathers from their children, at the point of the bayonet, and shoved
on to a train for an unknown destination will not soon fade from their minds.62
The impression made by these deportations did indeed remain with many of the delegates and
may have turned them even more anti-German than they were before. The Americans’ neutrality
in Belgium was sometimes at risk of fading or ending when confronted with what they deemed
unacceptable behavior by the Germans. Francis Wickes, who was serving in Namur at the time
of the deportations, retrospectively looked back over 50 years of German history and deemed
them “atrocities.”63 “I was present,” Wickes remembered, “for the purpose of protesting against
some of these transactions where the young men were brought in by the soldiers and put into
confined areas and then loaded like cattle into freight cars and carried off to Germany for forced
labor;” the references to standard descriptions of deportations from the Second World War are
inescapable.64
While the outrage then and later on the part of CRB officials was clear and often
expressed in letters and reports, the day-to-day policy of the CRB worked itself out through trial
and error. Hoover’s delegates faced a situation that they never planned for or expected.
The CRB could not avoid being front-and-center in this new situation in Belgium. The
clout earned by the Americans through their work and experiences in Belgium made them, in the
grandiloquent words of Maurice Pate, “the headquarters of the Ministerial Protectorate of the
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United States and Spain; the arbiter for the enforcement of the International laws of the Hague;
and a general cure for all evils.”65 Pate made this remark in early October 1916 because a
Belgian relief official told him about “a working man who has been forced to assist in some
work (such as the making of an aviation field) for the military authorities and seeks
intervention.”66 Pate was a man of influence and power in Belgium. He was accorded this power
and influence by his American citizenship and work with the CRB. The Belgians saw this and,
from time to time, sought help from the Americans beyond what their mandate was. Little did
Pate realize at the time that he and his fellow CRB delegates were at a crossroads. They were
about to construct a new set of relationships and take on a new humanitarian effort just before
their work in Belgium would end.
A few days later, on 11 October, Pate recorded that “30 men from Tournai and
Templeuve, who had refused to work on the aviation field, together with Mr. Wilbaut (échevin
[city councilor] of the town) were conducted as prisoners to the station and started on their way
to Germany. A new poster placed today announces more serious penalties unless the necessary
workmen are forthcoming.”67 Even though the actual procurement, transport, reception, and
distribution of food—the CRB’s raison d’être—was at this point well-founded and efficiently
run, for men like Pate the “biggest question now [was] the wholesale requisition of civilians for
forced military work.” While it is unknown if Pate was able to help the Belgian worker from the
previous week, he insisted that he “successfully intervened in the case of a very devoted worker
for the CRB and his commune.” Pate also described how trucks, already loaded up with men
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from the small villages outside Tournai proper, had passed through the city. The Belgians rarely
volunteered to work for the Germans. When asked, they usually refused, as Pate wrote was
“always the case,” and then were forced to work by the German authorities.68 The Belgians
considered it their patriotic duty to refuse to work for the Germans even if it meant contributing
to the unemployment rate that in turn pushed the hand of the Germans to deport more and more
people for forced labor.69
If a Belgian town or commune refused to aid the Germans in their policy, the army often
fined the town, while still requesting worker lists. Part of the German policy involved requesting
a list of the unemployed from the town elders and town councils. Often, however towns did not
have accurate lists. In other cases the lists were held by the CNSA, and the local leaders either
refused to ask the CNSA for the lists or the CNSA refused to hand them over. The city of
Tournai near the French border was fined 200,000 marks on 23 October and given six days to
pay the fine and hand over the list of the unemployed. Pate noted in his diary that, “[it] is
generally believed that the town will refuse to pay, and suffer the consequences no matter how
severe.”70
Tournai did pay its fine, but continued to refuse to provide a list of unemployed men, so
the Germans assessed additional fines of 25,000 francs a day. The Germans then threatened to
take all men between the ages of 17 and 30. The standoff between the desperate Germans and the
proud Belgians continued. Tournai saw many of its town elders deported, and others with whom
Pate worked closely kept clothes packed lest they be called to present themselves to German
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Ibid., 40.

69

On the patriotic duty, see Wickes’ interview, Claremont Graduate University, 34. See also
Zuckerman, The Rape of Belgium.
70

Pate, “Diary,” 23 October 1916, 42.

142

officials.71 Pate and his colleagues could do nothing to stop the process, but they could try to
intervene when possible, distribute identity cards to Belgians signifying that they were indeed
necessary to the relief work, and act as a witness.
Many CRB delegates became arbiters of who was “employed”—and therefore eligible
for protection—and who was not. They elevated one set of Belgian citizens above others in a
simultaneous effort to save as many people from being deported to work in Germany as they
could, while also continuing to secure the broader relief work. Indeed, the danger to the relief
effort was palpable. Work in some places in the Province of Luxembourg had to be curtailed
because too many Belgians were taken, and relief work could not go on effectively. 72 As
important as the Americans were, the Belgians themselves were important to the work. It was in
the Americans’ interest to save as many Belgians who worked on relief programs not only for
human rights concerns, but also for the practical work of the relief effort. When the delegates
could not stop a deportation it also impacted the Belgians’ view of the Americans. Whitlock
recorded in his journal that “the Belgians now detest the Americans as much as anybody,
because the United States does not go to war over the deportations!”73 While the United States
would not go to war over the deportations, the CRB did try their level best to keep some
Belgians from being forcibly taken to Germany.
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While the Americans could not stop every deportation, they came up with a plan to try to
stop the deportation of those Belgians who worked for the relief effort. In early November 1916,
Hoover wrote to the German Headquarters detailing the instructions from his office to the
delegates regarding the CRB-issued cards to indicate who should not be considered unemployed
and, thus, subject to deportation. The cards were given to “members of provincial, regional, and
local committees; regular employees of the magasins, oeuvres, and soup-kitchens; employees in
mills and factories who work exclusively for the committee; [and] employees on the docks who
are continually and exclusively in the service of the CRB or CN[SA].”74 It was Hoover’s hope
that these would be enough to keep the Germans from taking some Belgians.
Hoover sought permission to distribute additional cards—possibly of a different color
and wording—to bakers and carters who were “still vital to the ravitaillement” even though they
did not work directly for the CRB or CNSA.75 His argument was based on the fact that the flour
the bakers and others used was one way or another controlled by the CRB. Since “[t]here is no
other flour in the country,” he wrote, those workers had to be protected too.76 The rationing of
cards that provided some protection from deportation was outlined from the top, but was
implemented by individual CRB delegates. For the most part, delegates witnessed the same
German actions across the country, but it is useful to look at how the system of deportation and
protection played out in different provinces. Looking at how the deportations and protections
played out in the different provinces underscores how CRB delegates, while working for one
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organization and in one country, had to often work independently and adjust to unique situations
in their area of activity without oversight from Brussels. The CRB recruitment strategy of men
with practical minds and a spirit of adventure was put to the test in these final few months of the
Americans’ service in Belgium.

Antwerp Province
The experience of Gardner Richardson in Antwerp Province in the Flemish north of
Belgium helps illustrate the power of the CRB. In the midst of the German deportations,
Richardson reported to his superiors in Brussels that “[t]he CRB employment cards that have
been issued have been uniformly respected and as yet we have no cases to report of CRB
employees having been taken to Germany.”77 A few days later, however, Richardson reported
that the Germans seemed ready to take some skilled Belgians who had CRB cards. Through
direct intervention, Richardson was able to have one of two men released. 78 A personal visit
from the CRB delegate made the difference. Over time, many delegates made sure that they were
present and ready to intervene when the Germans entered a town for deportations.

77

Gardner Richardson to CRB Office (Brussels), 15 November 1916, Green Collection, Box 6,
Folder Deportation of Men, Document #1, Hoover Institution Archives. In Box 6 there are three
separate files each noted as “Deportation of Men” with “Document #1,” “Document #2,” and
“Document #3” found within. These files contain reports by the Department of Inspection and
Control regarding the deportations and, especially in the case of folder “Document #1” dated and
individually signed reports by individual delegates. Some of these reports from folder
“Document #1” can be found in PR CRB II, 51-57. Some of these reports found in the Green
Collection were incorporated into a memorandum by Warren Gregory dated 20 November 1916
while others were ongoing updates on the situation in the provinces.
78

Richardson to CRB Office (Brussels), 22 November 1916, Green Collection, Box 6, Folder
Deportation of Men, Document #1, Hoover Institution Archive.

145

The German policy seemed uneven and often random. Richardson reported that the
Germans were “taking men they wish, without regard to the status of employment.”79 In this way,
the policy was punitive against Belgium. For instance, the Germans did not take a man earning
1.50 francs a day, but did take a man who was earning 24 francs a week. Germans took men who
presented the same or similar certificates of employment, leaving many families in great
hardship.80 This happened less in Antwerp, however, than it did elsewhere.
The CRB feared that giving out too many CRB cards would result in problems for the
CRB, CNSA, and the Belgians in general. As of 29 November, Richardson reported, his office
had issued about 1,130 CRB cards. They were given out only to those who had “actually been
asked to present themselves for control [by the Germans].”81 This was one attempt to control
how many cards were in circulation. These cards, backed by the power of the American-run
CRB, were valuable and too many would have diluted that power, hampering not only the
Americans’ clout, but also their actual work if too many necessary Belgian workers were taken
to Germany.
In early December, the head office of the CRB asked Richardson to inform them of
Belgian CRB or CNSA workers whom the Germans had taken. Richardson had happy news to
share: “We can report that we have only two cases in the Province of Antwerp.”82 The two men,
Joseph Ludovicus’t Servranckx and Gustave Van der Linden, had already left for Germany when
their cases were presented to Richardson. Servranckx, a 17-year-old brewer boy who had worked
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with the CNSA since March 1915 was taken on 16 November. Richardson did not fight for this
young man; “He had already departed when his case was taken up,” the CRB delegate reported,
and “in view of the others being released, we agreed with the German Authorities, to let the
matter stand.”83 Seventeen other men with CRB cards had up to this point been commandeered
by the Germans and released after the intervention by Richardson. The Germans took the other
man, Van der Linden, a 31-year-old workman, on 30 November. His case came to the attention
of Richardson only after he had already left for Germany.84 If the delegates were not quick in
making their interventions, they would likely “lose” a Belgian to the Germans who should not
have been taken.
As the deportations continued, the Germans became stricter about whom they would
release. In late November the Germans informed the CRB and the Belgian population that
anyone who could not prove that they were employed before 15 October 1916 would be
considered a chômeur (an unemployed person) for the purposes of the deportations. This was an
attempt on the part of the Germans to decrease the number of exemptions and increase the pool
of potential laborers for deportation and to make sure the CRB were not now distributing the
cards just for the protection of other Belgians, rather than for their “real” employees. It also
illustrated the shifting playing field CRB delegates had to work on. The rules of the game kept
changing.
Richardson soon encountered the newly strict guidelines. The 17th, 18th, and 19th of
December were singled out for an inspection by the Germans of the unemployed citizens in the
Antwerp Province town of Malines (Mechelen, in Dutch, and the seat of the Catholic Church in
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Belgium). Richardson reported back to Brussels that he was allowed to be at the station to give a
kilogram of bread to each workman sent off to Germany. The Germans, Richardson reported,
asked that the CRB provide “2,000 breads for the three days.”85 Instead of preventing the
deportation, he was being asked to facilitate the situation. The Germans were taking advantage of
the CRB’s mandate—keep the Belgians fed—for their own political purposes.
For this round of deportations, Richardson issued 143 CRB cards. On the first inspection
the Germans accepted 110 cards. The cards were not accepted for the 33 men who had only
begun to work for the CRB or the CNSA after 15 October or who had switched their
employment from the Belgian government to the CRB or CNSA. Richardson went directly to the
German authorities and was able to convince them to “accept all of our cards.”86 The Germans,
however, were scarcely pleased to let 33 potential workers go. (They were under quota orders
from their high command.) The Germans “considered the list excessively large and asked that it
be reduced for the next control…in January.”87 Richardson indicated in his report that he would
discuss this matter with the Malines CNSA Committee “to see if the number of cards cannot be
reduced, and only cases of absolute genuiness [sic] and continuous service, be accepted by the
CRB for protection.”88 Here, Richardson gave in to the pressure of the Germans. Richardson
made a difficult choice, but one that was in line with CRB policy: save those who could be saved
for the greater good of the relief work.
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Richardson’s willingness to limit the number of cards and impose restrictions on who
could get them exemplified the protective approach to the CRB’s authority. It made sense for the
Belgian-run CNSA in Antwerp’s cities and towns to want to stretch the pool of exempt workers,
but Richardson—in an area of Belgium that was relatively well ordered—sought to provide
protection, albeit at a minimal cost to the larger authority of the CRB. Using the CRB, it seems,
as a holding pen for the unemployed to dodge the deportations ran counter to the aboveboard
mission of the relief organization, even if it meant losing a number of Belgians to the German
war machine in violation of international law.

Brabant Province
While there seemed to be some coordination and respect in the Antwerp Province, such
was not the case elsewhere. From the American and Belgian perspective, the Brabant Province
saw more violation of standards. By mid-November about 59 CRB workers had been taken. The
local CRB official informed Brussels that twenty men working for the CRB or CNSA had been
deported and an additional 39 were taken before CRB cards could be distributed.89
Robert A. Jackson, a CRB delegate in the Brabant Province, reported what had happened
in Court-Saint-Étienne. Jackson spent most of the day in the town observing the Germans and the
Belgians. He noted that the men were brought in without any women and children. Those who
claimed illnesses were examined and either released or moved down the line closer to
deportation. The Belgian men presented themselves to the Germans. They presented their papers
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and were “on the whole very decently treated by the Germans.”90 The workers, however, “were
usually too frightened or confused or embarrassed to be very intelligent.”91 Within occupied
Belgium the Germans held the most power and the Belgians understood that. So did the
Americans who were constantly trying (and not always succeeding) to negotiate the best possible
outcome for the often frightened, confused, or embarrassed Belgian workers.
Jackson attested that “[t]he Germans certainly really tried to take the young and
unmarried men without employment rather than others.”92 This good faith effort, however, did
not always last because “toward the end of the list, when perhaps they [the Germans] were afraid
they would not get as many men as required, they took a number of factory workers, for whom
their employer Mr. Henricot, gave assurance that they were regularly employed.”93 In Jackson’s
opinion, the Germans rationalized that men like this were taken because the local town officials
did not provide lists of the unemployed like the Germans asked.94In that case Jackson viewed the
Germans as trying to blame the Belgians for their own deportations.
In the case of Brabant, those who were wrongly taken by the Germans did not necessarily
fare as well as others had elsewhere. Jackson reported that two workmen who were employed
with the CRB and had CRB-issued cards were taken by the Germans anyway. He protested to the
German officials, but he elicited little sympathy: “[the German officer] said we were lucky that
so few were taken, that no one is irreplaceable, and that he had no instructions concerning our
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cards.”95 This was in stark contrast to Richardson’s experience in Antwerp where the local
German authorities explicitly told him that the CRB cards would be respected.96 It is clear that
the instructions regarding protections for CRB- or CNSA-employed Belgians were inconsistent
at best or neglected by individual Germans at worst, and there was no real coordinated policy
that everyone followed. Jackson went on to further describe the confusion in Court-Saint-Étienne
on 15 November:
It appears that in the town, where the men collected before being marched to the filature,
there was a bureau […] where the cards we had given were taken away, and a stamp
‘Kreis Nivelles’ put on the carte d’identité of those who had had our cards. I am told that
certain men, having obtained this stamp, went away without presenting themselves at the
filature. The others came along with the crowd, and thanks to the stamp, were allowed to
go free.
A few, however, whose attention was not drawn to the bureau in the town, failed to
obtain the ‘cachet,’ arrived without it, but were still provided with their cards given by us.
The officers seem to have been somewhat at a loss as to the proper procedure in such
cases. My belief is—tho [sic], I have no proof as I did not see them taken—that the two
men taken by the Germans were of this class. (Cf. the civil commissar’s statement that he
had no instructions concerning these cards.) Of these two men, one was later
released….97
Jackson’s report posited a conclusion. He reported back to his headquarters that there had been
orders to respect the CRB cards “but they had not been communicated to the officers making the
actual selection of men.” 98 Beyond the dubious justifications and need for the policy, the
disorganization on the part of the German officers indicated the desperate nature of the regime. It
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also demonstrated the difficulty the CRB faced by having to adapt to not only new policies, but
also new interpretations of orders and laws adapted by the Germans for their own purposes.
Jackson concluded that while some German officers made an attempt to mark only young
men who were unemployed and without families, others did not. “These decisions in these
matters seemed more or less arbitrary,” reported Jackson.99 His impression of the whole project
was that “the officers had orders to take so many—1,000 I believe—men, and that when they
thought too many were being let off, they felt obliged to take a larger proportion of those who
presented themselves, workers or not.” 100 This need for a quota demonstrates the pressure
subordinate German officers felt to meet specific goals set by the German high command in
Belgium and back in Berlin. The local conditions and the relationship with the CRB, in this
instance anyway, took a backseat to the needs of the industrial military machine fighting for the
fatherland a few miles to the west of where Jackson and other CRB delegates were witnessing
the taking of Belgian men of all employment statuses.
A few days later, on 29 November 1916, Jackson found himself taking a personal interest
in the case of two employees of the Belgian Cantine. He reported back to Brussels that these two
men were called to the Kommandantur told and that unless they wanted to be sent to Germany
they needed cards from Jackson and they must have “on the back a statement of the date on
which these men entered the service of the Comité, signed by [Jackson], and with [his] ‘cachet’
added.”101 Here again a date became critical to indicate when the potentially employed Belgian
began to work for the CRB. This reference to specific dates was certainly used by the Germans
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to seem less arbitrary in their selection and to attempt to prevent the CNSA or the CRB from
providing “cover” for unemployed Belgians and keeping them from being deported. The fact that
the Germans indicated that they would be abiding by the protection the CRB cards offered—at
least on the surface—indicates that the CRB still carried some weight in these matters and that
the Germans needed to find semi-legitimate ways around the protection offered by the CRB and
its American staff.

Tournai Region (in Hainaut Province)
Unlike in other provinces, Maurice Pate in Tournai did not issue official CRB cards, but
left it up to the local committees to provide proof of employment. As he reported on 23
November 1916, “I have decided, in accord with the Regional Committee….not to issue cards of
protection.”102 Pate worried that by accommodating the many requests for cards he would “flood
the region with a large number of protection cards.”103 If too many cards went into circulation
the possibilities for forgeries or even a black market would increase, and thus dilute the CRB’s
protection and its power more generally. Instead, Pate had each local committee issue certificates.
These were Belgian-produced and Belgian-backed documents that indicated the status of the
potential deportee. To Pate, these certificates would “make sufficiently clear the essential fact,
namely, that the men are occupied and not chômeurs.”104
“In event of non-recognition of the certificate in the case of a man who had devotedly
served the ravitaillement or who is indispensable to the service, we reserve for ourselves the right
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to intervene at the final moment to ask the release of the person in question.”105 In Pate’s
articulation of policy, the CRB would be the defender of last resort, and CRB intervention would
come in the form of a personal visit by the American delegate. He was not going to give blanket
protection to everyone. “The plan of making a collective arrangement,” wrote Pate, “to exempt
from requisition all the members of the ravitaillement system, appears to me to be unfair and not
exactly judicious.”106
This narrow conception of fairness raised an interesting question of who exactly was
necessary to the work of the relief. Pate asked in his report whether or not employees of yeast
factories, for example, should be accorded protection since yeast is necessary for the bakers who
bake CRB-regulated bread.107 Pate even gave an example of some corruption among the local
committees: “In every Comité Local of 6 or 8 men, one or two carry the responsibility of all the
work. In this way a large number of men who render no service to the ravitaillement are
protected. We have the case of a certain CL in which, since 1 October, fathers have allowed
themselves to be replaced by their sons, so that the latter might cover themselves.”108 Pate did
not want people cheating the system. That could possibly do more to harm the relief effort. The
easy granting and assumption of CRB protection could very easily diminish its real power,
especially when it became truly necessary to free a man who was wrongly deported. He also
seemed to see this method as a way to protect the primary work of the relief effort.
Pate continued in his report, “To preserve the integrity of the ravitaillement force, which
is our real object, is best done by exerting all influence at the necessary time for this smaller
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number of men. In the meantime, every employee has his certificate of employment from the
President of his CL: if, in spite of this, he is requisitioned he does no more than stand on the
same basis as employees engaged in other work.”109 He also took a pessimistic view of how
faithful the Germans would be to any system of protection: “We know further that when
requisitions begin on such a whole scale as to cripple the ravitaillement service, they would
undoubtedly be made in spite of any protective system in force.”110 Pate seemed to want as much
flexibility as possible to counter any new actions by the Germans. Case-by-case intervention was,
for him, the most effective way to deal with questions of fairness and protection for those
Belgians associated with the work he was overseeing, and it seems he had great independence in
implementing CRB policy.

Hainaut Province
All over Belgium the delegates deepened their roles as protectors of Belgians associated
with the relief work. In a report by John A. Gade, he and other CRB representatives in the
province of Hainaut, “Messrs. Tuck, Carstairs, [and] Donald Gregory,” were “whenever possible”
present at any deportation activity and they did “our utmost to protect our men.”111 Gade also
described what he and others in his group saw. He wrote that in Mons, in particular, men were
taken regardless of their work status; trains stood ready to deport the men immediately; women
were prohibited from seeing their husbands, fathers, and sons during the process.112 It seems that
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these deportations had the effect of “killing” small, local industries. Gade reported that “[f]rom
the glass works at Jemappes which are the only works of their kind in the arrondissement more
than ½ of the best workers were taken….In the instance of this Glassworks, the industry has
practically been killed.”113 The German deportations were, in effect, self-perpetuating. If the
Germans were deporting Belgians because they were not working, then taking them from
industry that was in fact still operating meant that those industries came to a halt, thus, creating
more unemployed Belgians to be deported.

Luxembourg Province
On 4 December 1916, Joseph C. Green, the head of Inspection and Control for the CRB,
went with a colleague to the College of St. Joseph in the town of Virton in the southwest corner
of Belgium. They arrived around 7:30 in the morning and proceeded to the inspection spot. The
Germans running the process told Green and his companion that they could “intervene each time
a man presented himself with a CRB card.”114
Green reported that he was “very politely received.”115 In his recounting, the Germans
had a very limited understanding of the relief work. Green explained why they were there and
the Germans responded by saying, “[w]e have no need of bookkeepers.”116 Of course, the relief
work involved more than just bookkeeping, especially for the Belgians who did most of the
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actual work of distribution. The Germans did tell Gade that “[s]ome of your laborers may be
taken but these you will be easily able to replace.”117 Some Germans evidently did not think very
highly of the Belgians or their association with the CRB.
Green also stressed the personalized nature of these deportations. In the town of Arlon so
many relief workers were taken that it completely disrupted the work of the CRB—something
that he, Green, was trying to avoid by his presence in Virton. The German in charge said that the
event was a “special case.”118 The officer stated that the local relief committee “refused milch
[sic] to a woman” under the assumption that she was German.119 The German in charge was then
“treated rudely” when he inquired about the situation and “naturally [he] had the men sent to
Germany when the opportunity presented itself.” “Nothing of the kind,” he stressed, “will
happen in Virton.”120 This personal and emotional investment in the deportation was striking.
While the policy was ostensibly to keep order and to provide labor resources back in Germany, it
cannot be ignored that in some cases, punishment was meted out not only in the form of financial
retribution, as in Tournai and elsewhere, but in the targeting of individuals to be deported. Indeed,
this incident amounted to the unintended punishment of a local relief committee’s work. Whether
the woman denied milk was a German remains unknown, but the German official who insisted
on this harsh deportation was perfectly at peace in explaining his decision to a CRB official.
Even though the German occupation was one of relative peace and the CRB provided a modicum
of protection, life in Belgium was a tense affair. In this way, Green was acting as a humanitarian
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witness of German actions and their impact on the Belgian population, an important role for a
humanitarian, especially if one’s ability to directly help is limited.
Later, another German officer approached the Americans and demanded that they move
down the line of tables set up. As Gade and his companion complied, they were told to keep
moving until, finally, they were told to “[c]lear outside the gate!!! Go home!!! Go home!!!”121
Once ousted, Gade could not be sure how many exempt men were taken. He guessed 14.122 The
Germans were very much in command during the deportations. Gade appended an addition to his
official report that details an even more desperate scene: “The requisition was carried out with a
brutality surpassing all description. The men were herded like cattle and were roughly handled
by the soldiery.”123 He even depicted German soldiers hitting some of the women who managed
to witness the deportation.124 When the Americans could not serve as protectors, they served as
witnesses to the actions of the Germans just as humanitarians continue to do to this day.
While some deportations were troubling, others were less so. For instance, Oscar T.
Crosby reported to Warren Gregory on 7 December 1916 that when he informed the Germans
that four men with CRB cards had been taken, the Germans “expressed surprise but agreed to
look for the men among those taken. Having found them they were liberated.”125 This marked
another example of the varied experiences that the deportations engendered and the disparity in
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how the Americans observed the Germans and Belgians at this time and, when possible,
intervened to save those they could.

Conclusion
The Germans finally ended the deportation policy in February 1917 after it became apparent that
it was not working. But before its termination, the German policy challenged the CRB’s
conception of its mission. The American delegates not only witnessed violations of human rights
and international law, but a challenge to their very real effectiveness when the Germans took
people who were supposed to be under the CRB’s care.
For the CRB delegates, they confronted a new situation with some direction from their
headquarters in Brussels, but with inconsistency on the part of the Germans. For the most part,
each delegate defined the boundary of his humanitarianism in line with the policy from Brussels
and Hoover, but also retained a significant amount of independence when it came to individual
cases, though protective actions still sometimes proved ineffective. In making the choices they
did, CRB delegates tried to ensure that they could maintain some power for the CRB, even
though it meant letting Germans deport great numbers of Belgians.
While Maurice Pate’s quip about being a “minister protector” carried a great deal of
weight, it only went so far when new political necessity overtook old political requirements of
allowing the CRB to work unimpeded. While the CRB was still respected by at least some of the
Germans it had lost some of its power in that it could not intervene as it had at the start of the
war to prohibit German interference. Soon, however, with the entry of the United States into the
war as a belligerent, the Americans would have to withdraw and it would be up to American
military

power
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end
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Conclusion
Relations between the United States and Germany continued to worsen in January and
February 1917 over the Germans’ resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare and the
disclosure of the Zimmermann Telegram to the Wilson Administration by the British
government. While this was going on, Herbert Hoover and his colleagues began to make plans
on how to wind down the CRB. Hoover had already thought about this in the spring of 1915 after
the sinking of the Lusitania. He decided then that he would turn over the internal Belgian relief
work that the Americans were doing to the Dutch, but that he would maintain control over the
shipping and financial effort outside Belgium.1 He knew that once relations between the United
States and German governments were severed, the Americans would have to withdraw. Their
citizenship would have become a liability rather than the asset it had been at the start of the relief
mission. As hard as Hoover and the delegates worked to create and maintain a non-state and
independent organization, the political realities of national citizenship remained. Though the
Americans drew on both their legal recognition as American citizens and the subjective cultural
values of their American-ness to make their work with the CRB possible, the period of 19141917 was still state-centric and, thus, citizenship would trump cultural power and even a deeply
held and proved humanitarian impulse.
While the CRB would continue under Spanish and Dutch protection in Belgium, its
original staff had to leave. A person’s relationship to his state still mattered in whether or not
they could participate fully in a humanitarian mission once their state of origin became a political
or military actor in the larger disaster at hand. Their background, too, as members of that state
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and national culture—in the case of the CRB, American-ness—impacted how and why they did
the humanitarian work that they chose to do. In addition to providing humanitarian relief, the
humanitarians of the CRB and, indeed, humanitarians of any stripe acted as agents of national
power—in this case American power. With its entry into World War I, Americans began to
exercise their country’s power in a more traditional manner, through the military.
The men of the CRB, however, helped to present an alternative form of American
intervention during the First World War era, that of humanitarian relief. They changed from
being “just” adventurous young men with a desire for service, to being well-trained
humanitarians, associated with a man, Hoover, who would be able to call upon them to serve in
other relief-oriented activities in the decades to come. Even as Americans would lead other relief
endeavors around the world in their private or semi-private capacity, the U.S. government would
eventually adopt food relief as a tool of direct American foreign policy later in the century. But
before any such alternatives could make their way into the American foreign relations tool kit,
American work in Belgium had to be wound down.
In February 1917 Hoover and some of his senior staff members, notably William B.
Poland, debated whether or not it should only be the Dutch to take over the CRB’s
responsibilities in Belgium or whether the Dutch, Spanish, and, in Poland’s original proposal,
Danish nationals, should take on the work. Hoover now wanted the American relationship with
the CRB to end completely because he thought the Americans would want to fight for the United
States and he wanted to be free to serve in a new capacity.2 In the end, however, Hoover decided
to maintain his relationship with the CRB and its American connection outside of Belgium so
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that it could have some influence in Belgium after the war ended.3 He also allowed for both
Dutch and Spanish officials to take on the responsibility of supervising the relief effort in
Belgium. Hoover returned to the United States in the spring and took up his position as head of
the newly formed Food Administration. In this role, Hoover was responsible for maintaining a
constant food supply from the United States to Europe for American, British, and French troops.
With the slogan, “Food Will Win The War,” Hoover marshaled the American people to conserve
food with “Meatless Mondays” and “Wheatless Wednesdays.” He would continue his efforts
with food policy and famine relief for many more decades.4
The American delegates who had to leave Belgium in April and May 1917 traveled out of
the country to Switzerland for a brief quarantine before traveling to London and then back to the
United States, where many would join the American Expeditionary Force and serve once again
in Europe with the U.S. military. Their work, however, with Hoover and other humanitarian
efforts did not end with the war. They formed a group of “Hoovermen” who engaged in other
American-led food relief endeavors in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s.5
American involvement in World War I changed the United States’ relationship with the
rest of the world. The United States ended its long-standing policy of leaving European politics
alone, and because of American involvement with Belgian relief and then fighting in the trenches,
the United States established itself as a necessary actor on the world stage, even if its citizens and
politicians wanted to avoid too much international political or military involvement in the 1920s
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and 1930s. That did not stop Hoover and his former CRB colleagues from working around the
world to bring American food and relief to problem spots. Immediately after the war, Hoover
served as Director General of Relief in Europe and led the American Relief Administration
(ARA), a congressionally sanctioned relief agency that helped central Europe and especially
Poland recover from the war. Maurice Pate and others served in Poland for the ARA, and
beginning in 1921, Hoover’s ARA provided relief services in Soviet Russia.6 Here, again,
Hoover and a relief agency he organized transcended dicey political problems such as the United
States’ non-recognition of the Soviet Union.
When war broke out in Europe for a second time, men who worked with Hoover like Pate,
Hugh Gibson, and other former CRB delegates like F. Dorsey Stephens and William H. Tuck
joined relief efforts in Finland and Poland. 7 Their work would have made the influential
American publisher Henry Luce very happy as he called for more direct United States
intervention in the world, especially in his 1941 “The American Century” essay.8 Though Luce
was an advocate for military intervention, he indicated that a humanitarian component would go
a long way to maintaining an “American Century.”
Not only was the CRB successful in its mission to feed Belgians, it cultivated a group of
men who would further an image of America as a nation of humanitarians and humanitarian
6
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action. After World War II, President Truman asked Hoover to undertake a fact-finding mission
in Germany to assess the food needs there. The best example is, again, Pate. His career in
international humanitarianism peaked when he became director of UNICEF in 1947, serving
until his death in 1965. Soon the United States government would adopt food aid as an explicit
part of its Cold War foreign policy with PL 480, named the Food for Peace Program by President
Kennedy. Even today, TV advertisements often present the use of the American military as a
“global force for good” and highlight the Navy’s humanitarian missions around the world.9
By the time the Americans left the CRB’s service, those who served went from being
adventurous “good” American men to seasoned humanitarians ready for action if and when
called upon by U.S. policy makers to act on America’s behalf for humanitarian ends. Their work
with the CRB helped establish the United States and its citizens as leaders in humanitarian
service. While the Old World powers fought, this group of Americans found a way to interject
American power by using their official neutrality as citizens and their American-ness for a
constructive humanitarian purposes in Belgium. This history of the American delegates of the
CRB evinces a history of American action in the world that drew upon the country’s power,
culture, and people to provide aid in a time and place when the history of the world looked bleak
and nation-states were focused on destruction. The CRB and its work was, to quote the historian
Garry Clifford, “a Hoover alternative” and an example of how individual Americans offered a
path for the exercise of American power that was new and different, just as the United States was
emerging on the world stage.

9

“America’s Navy: A Global Force for Good (Version 1),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3wtUCPWmeI Last accessed, 3 July 2014.

164

Bibliography
Archives and Manuscript Collections
United States
Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, CA
Francis Wickes Oral History
Gray Family Papers, Morristown, NJ
http://grayresearch.net/
Herbert C. Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, IA
http://www.hoover.archives.gov/exhibits/
Hugh Gibson Papers
Herbert C. Hoover Papers, Pre-Commerce Files
Edward Eyre Hunt Papers
Maurice Pate Papers
Oral History Transcripts
Victoria Allen, Elizabeth Shaler Brouha, Milton M. Brown, Irone H. de
Beughem, Jean Kellogg Dickie, Eleanor L. Dulles, Joseph C. Green, James A.
Healy, Marguerite Rickard Hoyt, Charles N. Leach MD, Philip S. Platt, Gardner
Richardson, Gilchrist B. Stockton, Clare M. Torrey, Hilda Bunge Tuck, Mr. and
Mrs. Laurence C. Wellington, Francis C. Wickes
Hoover Institution Archives, Palo Alto, CA
Commission for Relief in Belgium (1914-1930)
Benjamin S. Allen Papers
Frank Angell Papers
Hugh H. Brown Papers
Philip H. Chadbourn Papers
Frederick H. Chatfield Miscellany
Perrin C. Galpin Papers
Hugh Gibson Papers
Joseph C. Green Papers
Warren Gregory Miscellany
Emile Holman Papers
Edward Eyre Hunt Papers
Robert A. Jackson Papers
Tracy B. Kittredge Papers
David Theodore Nelson Papers
Scott H. Paradise Papers
Philip S. Platt Papers
Robinson Smith Writings
E. Coppee Thurston Papers
William H. Tuck Papers

165

Brand Whitlock Papers
Robert Withington Letters
Wickes Family Papers, Eugene, OR
Yale University Libraries, New Haven, CT
Kellogg-Dickie Papers
James Robinson Smith Papers
Belgium
Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels (Belgian National Archives)
Archives de la Commission for Relief in Belgium et du Comité Hispano-Néderlandais
(CRB)
Archives du Comité national de Secours et d'Alimentation (CNSA)
Archives de la Ville de Bruxelles, Brussels (Brussels City Archives)
Collection des Archives de la Guerre 1914-1918
Published Documentary Collections (Print and Online)
Avalon Project (Online). http://avalon.law.yale.edu
“Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,”1899 and 1907.
“The Bryce Report”
Belgian American Education Foundation, “Officers of the BAEF since 1920,”
http://www.baef.be/documents/about-us/governance/officers-since-1920.xml?lang=en
Gay, George I and H. H. Fisher. eds. Public Relations of the Commission for Relief in
Belgium, Documents, vols. I and II. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1929.
Link, Arthur S., ed. The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1979.
National Archives and Records Administration Microcopy, No. 367.
Peters, Gerhard and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project (Online).
http://www.presidency.uscb.edu/ws/?pid=65382.
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914-1917, Supplements, The
World War, Washington, D.C., 1928-1931
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Monroe Doctrine, 1823,”
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1801-1829/monroe.
U.S. Food Aid and Security, http://foodaid.org/resources/the-history-of-food-aid/

166

World War I Document Archive,
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Sir_Edward_Grey's_Speech_Before_Parliament
Published and Unpublished Books, Memoirs, Articles, and Reports (Print and Online)
Attouts, Germaine and Francis Wickes. Love in a Time of War: Based on letters and diaries of
Germaine Attouts and Francis Wickes Beginning in Belgium during the First World War,
1914-1918. Mariette Wickes, ed. Self Published, 2011.
Gibson, Hugh. A Journal from our Legation in Belgium. Garden City: Doubleday, Page &
Company, 1917.
Graeffe, Constance. ”We Who Are So Cosmopolitan”: The War Diary of Constance Graeffe,
1914-1915. Sophie de Schaepdrijver, ed. Brussels: Archives Générales du Royaume,
2008.
Great Britain. Committee on the Alleged German Outrages. Report of the Committee on
Alleged German Outrages Appointed by His Britannic Majesty’s Government and
Presided Over by the Right Hon. Viscount Bryce. New York, 1915. [Bryce Report]
Gray, Prentiss N. “Fifteen Months in Belgium: A CRB Diary.” Unpublished. Gray Family
Papers.
Grey, Edward. “Speech Before Parliament, 3 August 1914.” In Great Britain Parliamentary
Debates, Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. LXV, 1914. Columns 1809-1834.
http://wwi.lib.buy.edu/index.php/Sir_Edward_Grey’s_Speech_Before_Parliament
Hoover, Herbert C. The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure, 1874-1920. New
York: Macmillan Company, 1952.
_____. An American Epic, Volume I. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1959.
Hunt, Edward Eyre. War Bread: A Personal Narrative of War and Relief in Belgium. New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1916.
International Committee of the Red Cross, “Respect for the Life and Dignity of the Detainees,”
29 October 2010, http://www.icrc.org/eng/what-we-do/visiting-detainees/overview
visiting-detainees.htm
Kittredge, Tracy B., The History of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, 1914-1918. London:
Crowther and Goodwin, 1918.
_____. “Californians With Hoover in Europe.” In The California Alumni Fortnightly 13:1
(Berkeley: Alumni Association of the University of California, 1920.
Luce, Henry. “The American Century.” Diplomatic History 22:3 (Spring1999).

167

Max, Paul. Journal de Guerre de Paul Max: Notes d’un Bruxellois Pendant l’Occupation (1914
1918). Benoît Majerus and Sven Soupart, eds. Brussels: Font Bruxaellae, 2006.
Nelson, David. Letters and Diaries of David T. Nelson. John P. Nelson, ed. (Decorah, IA:
Anundesn Publishing, 1996).
Passelecq, Fernand. Employment in Belgium During the Occupation and Its General Causes.
[unknown trans.] London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917.
Pate, Maurice. “Diary of Maurice Pate: Service with the Commission for Relief in Belgium.”
PDF Files (3 Parts). Online UNICEF Archives: http://www.cf-hst.net/unicef-temp/Doc
Repository/M.Pate-1st-exd-hs-2004-308.html
Richardson, Gardner. “Yankee ‘Culture’ Makes Good: The Inspiring Story of How Hoover’s
Men through Pluck and Efficiency Saved Northern France from Starvation.” Hearst’s
Magazine (November 1917).
Seton, Ernest Thompson. “A Message from the Chief Scout.” In The Official Handbook for
Boys. Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1911: xi-xii.
Taillandier, Saint-Rene. The Soul of the “CRB”: A French View of the Hoover Relief Work. trans.
Mary Cadwalder Jones, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1919.
U.K. National Health Service,
http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/1126.aspx?CategoryID=51&SubCategoryID=164
U.S Department of Agriculture,
http://www.mypyramid.gov/professionals/pdf_calorie_levels.html
U.S. Navy. “America’s Navy: A Global Force for Good (Version 1),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3wtUCPWmeI
Von Bissing. General Von Bissing’s Testament: A Study in German Ideals. London: T. Fisher
Unwin Ltd., n.d.
Whitlock, Brand. Belgium: A Personal Narrative. vols. I and II. New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1919.
_____. The Letters and Journal of Brand Whitlock, edited by Allan Nevins. vols. I and II. New
York: 1936
Wechsberg, Joseph. “At the Heart of UNICEF.” New Yorker 2 December 1961.
Withington, Robert. In Occupied Belgium. Boston: The Cornhill Company, 1921.

168

Newspapers
New York Times
Secondary Literature
Alexander, David. "The American Scholarships." In The History of the Rhodes Trust, 1902-1999,
ed. Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 100-202.
Amara, Michael. Des Belges à l’épreuve de l’Exil: Les réfugiés de la Première Guerre
mondiale; France, Grande-Bretagne, Pays-Bas 1914-1918. Brussels: Editions de
l’Université de Bruxelles, 2008.
Ambrosius, Lloyd E. Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory and Practice of Liberal Internationalism
during World War I. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1991.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism. Revised ed. London: Verso, 1991.
Anderson, Stuart. Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904. Rutherford:
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981.
Austin, Ryan Thomas. “Creating ‘a piratical state organized for benevolence,’ the Commission
for Relief in Belgium: 1914-1915.” Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University, 2009.
Barnett, Michael. Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2011.
Balakian, Peter. The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response. New
York: HarperCollins, 2003.
Bass, Gary. Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention New York: Knopf,
2008.
Bederman, Gail. Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the
United States, 1880-1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Bender, Thomas. A Nation among Nations: America's Place in World History. New York: Hill
and Wang, 2006.
———. Rethinking American History in a Global Age. Berkeley: University of California Press,
2002.

169

Blower, Brooke. Becoming Americans in Paris: Transatlantic Politics and Culture between the
Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Bruce, Robert B. A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War. Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press, 2003.
Calahan, Peter. Belgian Refugee Relief in England during the Great War. New York: Garland,
1982.
Capozzola, Christopher. Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern
American Citizen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. New York: Harper
Collins, 2013.
Clifford, J. Garry. The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement. Lexington:
University of Kansas Press, 1972.
Cmiel, Kenneth. "Review Essay: The Recent History of Human Rights." American Historical
Review 109 (February 2004): 117-135.
Coates, Benjamin A. “Transatlantic Advocates: American International Law and U.S. Foreign
Relations, 1898-1919.” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 2010.
Coogan, J. W. The End of Neutrality: The United States, Britain, and Maritime Rights, 18991915. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.
Cooke, Miriam and Angela Woollacott, eds. Gendering War Talk. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993.
Cooper, John M. The Warrior and the Priest: Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.
———. Walter Hines Page: The Southerner as American, 1855-1918. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1977.
Costigliola, Frank. Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations
with Europe, 1919-1930. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
Cullather, Nick. "The Foreign Policy of the Calorie." The American Historical Review 112 (April
2007): 337-364.
170

Cullather, Nick. The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.
Curti, Merle. American Philanthropy Abroad: A History. New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 1963.
Davis, Belinda J. Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin.
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000.
Dawes, James. That the World May Know: Bearing Witness to Atrocity. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2007.
Dawley, Alan. Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2003.
Dean, Robert D. Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy.
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001.
De Schaepdrijver, Sophie. “Champion or Stillbirth? The Symbolic Uses of Belgium in the Great
War.” In How Can One Not Be Interested in Belgian History? Dublin and Gent: Trinity
College and Academia Press, 2005: 55-81.
_____. La Belgique et la Première Guerre mondiale. Trans. Claudine Spitaels et Marnix
Vincent. Bruxelles: Archives & Musée de la Littérature, 2004.
_____. “A Civilian War Effort: The Comité National de Secours et d’Alimentation in Occupied
Belgium, 1914-1918.” In Remembering Herbert Hoover and the Commission for Relief in
Belgium: Proceedings of the Seminar on the Humanitarian Work and Legacy of Herbert
Hoover. Brussels: Fondation Universitaire, 2006: 24-37.
_____ and Emmanuel Debruyne. “Sursum Corda: the underground press in occupied Belgium.”
First World War Studies 4, no. 1 (March 2014): 23-38.
Ekbladh, David. The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an
American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
Eksteins, Modris. Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age. London:
Papermac, 2000.
Endy, Christopher. Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France. Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2004.
171

———. "Travel and World Power: Americans in Europe, 1890-1917." Diplomatic History 22
(Fall 1998): 565-594.
Engerman, David C. "A Research Agenda for the History of Tourism: Towards an International
Social History." American Studies International 32 (October 1994): 3-31.
Frahm, Jill. “The Hello Girls: Women Telephone Operators with the American Expeditionary
Forces during World War I.” Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 3, no. 3 (July
2004): 271-293.
Ferrell, Robert H. Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921. New York: Harper & Row,
1985.
Forsythe, David P. The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Friedman, Lawrence J. and Mark D. McGarvie, eds. Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in
American History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Fromkin, David. Europe's Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914?. New York:
Vintage Books, 2004.
Fussell, Paul. The Great War and Modern Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Gardner, Lloyd C. Safe for Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 19131923. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Gilbert, Martin. The First World War: A Complete History. New York: Henry Holt, 1994.
Ginzberg, Lori D. Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in the
19th Century U.S. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.
Gregory, Ross. The Origins of American Intervention in the First World War. New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, 1971.
Gullace, Nicoletta. "The Blood of our Sons": Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British
Citizenship during the Great War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Halttunen, Karen. "Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-American Culture."
The American Historical Review 100 (April 1995): 303-334.

172

Hansan, John E. “The Settlement House Movement,” The Social History Welfare Project
(Online), http://www.socialwelfarehistory.com/programs/settlement-houses/.
Hansen, Arlen J. Gentlemen Volunteers: The Story of the American Ambulance Drivers in the
Great War, August 1914-September 1918. New York: Arcade Publishing, 1996.
Heinrichs, Waldo H. American Ambassador; Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United
States Diplomatic Tradition. Boston: Little Brown, 1966.
Herbert, Ulrich. A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980: Seasonal Workers/Forced
Laborers/Guest Workers. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990.
Henry, Albert. L’oeuvre du Comité national de Secours et d’Alimentation pendant la guerre.
Brussels, 1920.
Herring, George. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Hochschild, Adam. King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial
Africa. New York: Mariner Books, 1999.
Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform. New York: Vintage Books, 1955.
Hogan, Michael J. and Thomas G. Paterson, eds. Explaining the History of American Foreign
Relations. Second ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Hoganson, Kristin L. Consumers' Imperium: The Global Production of American Domesticity,
1865-1920. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.
———. Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American
and Philippine-American Wars. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
Horne, John and Alan Kramer. German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2001.
Hull, Isabel V. Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial
Germany. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Hunt, Michael. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.

173

Iriye, Akira. Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the
Contemporary World. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.
Irwin, Julia F. Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian
Awakening. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
_____. “The Disaster of War: American Understandings of Catastrophe, Conflict and Relief.”
First World War Studies 5, no. 1 (March 2014): 17-28.
Jacobson, Matthew Frye. Barbarian Virtues: The United States Encounters Foreign Peoples at
Home and Abroad, 1876-1917. New York: Hill and Wang, 2001.
Jaumain, Serge, Valérie Piette, and Gonzague Pluvinage. Bruxelles 14-18, Au jour le jour, une
ville en guerre. Bruxelles: Historia Bruxellae, 2005.
Joll, James. The Origins of the First World War. Harlow: Longman, 1984.
Keegan, John. The First World War. New York: Knopf, 1999.
Kennedy, David M. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979.
Kennedy, David W. The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Kerber, Linda. "Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Women's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's
History." Journal of American History 75 (January 1988): 9-39.
Keys, Barbara. Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Kimmel, Michael S. Manhood in America: A Cultural History. Second ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Knock, Thomas J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
LaFore, Lawrence. The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Origins of World War I. Prospect
Heights: Waveland Press, 1971.

174

Lauren, Paul Gordon. The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen. Second ed.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003.
Leuchtenburg, William E. "Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and
American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916." Mississippi Valley Historical Review 39 (1952): 483504.
Levin, N. Gordon. Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and
Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
Link, Arthur Stanley. Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality, 1914-1915. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960.
———. Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917. The New American Nation
Series. First ed. New York: Harper, 1954.
Little, Branden. “Band of Crusaders: American Humanitarians, the Great War, and the Remaking
of the World.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 2009.
_____. “An Explosion of New Endeavors: Global Humanitarian Response to Industrialized
Warfare in the First World War era.” First World War Studies 5, no. 1 (March 2014): 1-16.
_____, ed. “Special Issue: Humanitarianism in the Era of the First World War.” First World War
Studies 5, no. 1 (March 2014): 1-129.
_____. “Humanitarian Relief in Europe and the Analogue of War, 1914-1919.” In Finding
Common Ground: New Directions in First World War Studies. Jennifer Keene and Michael
Neiberg, eds. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010: 139-158.
Lloyd, Craig. Aggressive Introvert: A Study of Herbert Hoover and Public Relations
Management, 1912-1932. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1972
MacColl, Gail and Carol McD. Wallace. To Marry an English Lord. (New York: Workman
Publishing Company, 2012).
Macleod, David I. Building Character in the American Boy: The Boy Scouts, the YMCA, and
their Forerunners, 1870-1920. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.
Macmillan, Margaret. Paris, 1919. New York: Random House, 2001.
_____. The War that Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. New York: Random House, 2013.
175

Manela, Erez. The Wilsonian Moment: Self Determination and the International Origins of
Anticolonial Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Marks, Sally. Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1981.
McGerr, Michael. A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in
America, 1870-1920. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
McGuire, Michael. “An Ephemeral Relationship: American Non-Governmental Organizations,
the Reconstruction of France, and Franco-American Relations, 1914-1924.” Ph.D.
dissertation, Boston University, 2012.
McPhail, Helen. The Long Silence: Civilian Life Under the German Occupation of Northern
France, 1914-1918. London: I. B. Tauris, 2001.
Merrill, Dennis. Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth-Century Latin
America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
Mieras, “Tales from the Other Side of the Bridge: YMCA Manhood, Social Class and Social
Reform in Turn-of-the-Twentieth-Century Philadelphia.” Gender and History 17 (August
2005): 409-440
_____. “‘A More Perfect Sympathy’: College Students and Social Service, 1889-1914.” Ph.D.
dissertation, The College of William and Mary, 1998.
Moorhead, Caroline. Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland, and the History of the Red Cross. New
York: Carol and Graff, 1999.
Nash, George H. The Life of Herbert Hoover: The Humanitarian, 1914-1917. New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, 1988.
_____. The Crusade Years, 1933-1955: Herbert Hoover’s Lost Memoir of the New Deal and Its
Aftermath. Palo Alto: Hoover Institution Press, 2013.
_____. Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover’s Secret History of the Second World War and its
Aftermath. Palo Alto: Hoover Institution Press, 2011.
O’Brien, Phillips Payson. “The American Press, Public, and the Reaction to the Outbreak of the
First World War.” Diplomatic History 37, no. 3 (2013): 446-475.

176

Patenaude, David M. The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet
Russia in the Famine of 1921. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Pearlman, Michael. To Make Democracy Safe for America: Patricians and Preparedness in the
Progressive Era. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984.
Perez Jr., Louis A. “Incurring a Debt of Gratitude: 1898 and the Moral Sources of United States
Hegemony in Cuba.” American Historical Review 104 (April 1999): 356-398.
Polk, Jennifer. “Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary and
Civil War Russia, 1917-1924.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012.
Power, Samantha. "A Problem from Hell": America in the Age of Genocide. New York: Harper,
2002.
Proceedings of the Seminar on the Humanitarian Work and Legacy of Herbert Hoover,
“Remember Herbert Hoover and the Commission for Relief in Belgium.” Brussels:
Foundation Universitaire, 2006.
Proctor, Tammy M. Civilians in a World at War, 1914-1918. New York: New York University
Press, 2010.
Ranieri, Liane. Emile Francqui ou intelligence créatrice, 1863-1935. Paris: Éditions Duculot,
1985.
Rawe, Kai. “Working in the Coal Mine: Belgians in the German War Industry of the Ruhr Area
During World War I.” In Une Guerre Totale? La Belgique dans la Première Guerre
Mondiale Nouvelles Tendances de la Recherche Historique. Serge Jaumain, Michael
Amara, Benoit Majerus, and Antoon Vrints, eds. Bruxelles: Archives Générales du
Royaume, 2005: 221-234.
Rieff, David. A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis. New York: Simon and Schuster,
2002.
Rodgers, Daniel T. Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age. New York: Belknap
Press, 2000.
Rodogno, Davide. Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 18151914. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

177

Rosenberg, Emily. Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics of Culture and Dollar
Diplomacy, 1900-1930. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.
———. Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 18901945. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982.
Rosenthal, Michael. The Character Factory: Baden-Powell and the Origins of the Boy Scout
Movement. London: Pantheon, 1986.
Rotter, Andrew. “Empire of the Senses: How Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching
Shaped Imperial Encounters.” Diplomatic History 35 (January 2011): 3-19.
Rotundo, E. Anthony. American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution
to the Modern Era. New York: Basic Books, 1993.
Rozario, Kevin. The Culture of Calamity: Disaster and the Making of Modern America.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007.
———. "'Delicious Horrors': Mass Culture, the Red Cross, and the Appeal of Modern American
Humanitarianism." American Quarterly 55 (September 2003): 417-455.
Schaeper, Thomas J. and Kathleen Schaeper. Cowboys into Gentlemen: Rhodes Scholars,
Oxford, and the Creation of an American Elite. New York: Berghahn Books, 1998.
Scholliers, Peter and Frank Daelemans. “Standards of Living and Standards of Health in War
Time Belgium.” In The Upheaval of War: Family, Work, and Welfare in Europe, 19141918. Richard Wall and Jay Winter, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005:
139-158.
Scott, Joan Wallach. "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis." In Gender and the
Politics of History. ed. Joan Wallach Scott. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999:
28-50.
———. "The Evidence of Experience." Critical Inquiry 17 (Summer 1991): 773-797.
Seltzer, Mark. Bodies and Machines. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Sontag, Susan. Regarding the Pain of Others. New York: Picador, 2003.

178

Spoerer, Mark. “The Mortality of Allied Prisoners of War and Belgian Civilian Deportees in
German Custody During the First World War: A Reappraisal of the Effects of Forced
Labor.” Population Studies 60, no. 2 (2006): 121-136.
Stephanson, Anders. Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right. New
York: Hill and Wang, 1995.
Stevenson, David. "Battlefield Or Barrier? Rearmament and Military Planning in Belgium, 19021914." The International History Review 29 (September 2007): 473-507.
Tanielian, Melanie. “The War of Famine: Everyday Life in Wartime Beirut and Mount Lebanon,
1914-1918.” Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 2012.
Thiel, Jens. “Forced Labor, Deportation and Recruitment: The German Reich and Belgian
Labourers During the First World War.” Natalie Gravenor, trans. In Une Guerre Totale? La
Belgique dans la Première Guerre Mondiale Nouvelles Tendances de la Recherche
Historique. Serge Jaumain, Michael Amara, Benoit Majerus, and Antoon Vrints, eds.
Bruxelles: Archives Générales du Royaume, 2005: 235-246.
Tuchman, Barbara. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.
Tucker, Robert W. Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America's Neutrality,
1914-1917. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007.
Tyrell, Ian. Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s Moral Empire. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010.
Von Eschen, Penny M. Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Vucetic, Srdjan. The Anglosphere: A Geneology of a Racialized Identity in International
Relations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.
Watenpaugh, Keith David. “The League of Nations’ Rescue of Armenian Genocide Survivors
and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism, 1920-1927.” American Historical Review 115,
no. 5 (December 2010): 1315-1339.
Watson, Janet S. K. Fighting Different Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World War in
Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

179

Watts, David M. “‘Just Like Free Laborers But Under Police Supervision’: German Forced
Labor Policy in Belgium, 1916-1917 and 1942-1944.” Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis
University, 2002.
Watts, Sarah. Rough Rider in the White House: Theodore Roosevelt and the Politics of Desire.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Weibe, Robert. The Search for Order. New York: Hill and Wang, 1966.
Weil, Martin. A Pretty Good Club: The Founding Fathers of the U.S. Foreign Service. New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978
Wert, Hal Elliot. Hoover the Fishing President: Portrait of the Private Man and His Life
Outdoors. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2005.
______. "The specter of starvation: Hoover, Roosevelt and American aid to Europe, 1939-1941".
Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1991.
———. "U.S. Aid to Poles Under Nazi Domination, 1939-1940." The Historian 57 (Spring
1995): 511-524.
_____. “Flight and Survival: American and British Aid to Polish Refugees in the Fall of 1939.”
Polish Review 34, no. 3 (1989): 227-248.
_____. “Hoover, Roosevelt and the Politics of Aid to Finland during the Winter War, 19391940.” In World War II: A Fifty Year Perspective on 1939. Robert W. Hoeffner, ed. Albany:
Siena College, 1992.
_____. “Hoovermen: Working with ‘The Chief’ for Polish and Finnish Relief, 1939-1941.”
Unpublished typescript.
Westerman, Thomas D. “Touring Occupied Belgium: American Humanitarians at ‘Work’ and
‘Leisure” (1914-1917).” First World War Studies 5, no. 1 (March 2014): 43-53.
Winter, J. M. The Experience of World War I. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Wilson, Joan Hoff. Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1975.
Zakaria, Fareed. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
180

Zeiler, Thomas W. Ambassadors in Pinstripes: The Spalding World Baseball Tour and the Birth
of the American Empire. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006).
Zuckerman, Larry. The Rape of Belgium: The Untold Story of World War I. New York: New
York University Press, 2004.
Zunz, Oliver. Philanthropy in America: A History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

181

